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ABSTRACT 
 
Unemployment does not hit only individual workers, it affects their families as well. There has 
been increasing interest in household joblessness and the polarisation of work across households. 
The consequences of household joblessness on well-being can be dramatic. Jobless households 
have a high risk of poverty and household joblessness can affect the long-term outcomes of adults 
and children living in such households.  
 
The objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of household joblessness in 
Europe by analysing couples in which both partners are simultaneously without work. Using data 
from the European Community Household Panel, I focus on three areas, which have received 
little attention in the literature.  
 
In the first empirical chapter, I analyse the dynamics of dual joblessness in Europe. I decompose 
dual joblessness rates into inflows and outflows. The results reveal that the European variation in 
dual joblessness rates results from variation in both flows, even though the differences in inflow 
rates matter more. I analyse these flows in more detail with further decompositions and event-
history models. The inflow differences depend on variation in breadwinner models and 
employment security, while the outflow differences are linked to the European differences in 
unemployment durations in general. 
 
In the second empirical chapter, I test the so-called macho-effect hypothesis. This hypothesis 
predicts that couples avoid female breadwinning because of cultural codes that regulate gendered 
family provision patterns. This has been used to explain why the wives of unemployed men have 
low employment rates. I test the hypothesis in two parts. First I fit conditional logit models on 
data on annual transitions between the joint employment statuses of couples. In the second step I 
use the estimates from these models to simulate transition rates for couples with varying 
characteristics. The results support the macho-effect hypothesis. 
 
In the third empirical chapter, I analyse whether childbearing affects the risk of dual joblessness. I 
construct a theoretical model in which wives are expected to withdraw from employment after 
childbirth while husbands are expected to remain employed or even increase their labour 
supplies. In this model, childbearing is expected to increase the risk of dual joblessness in the 
short-run, but the effect is expected to fade away as the child becomes older and the mother is 
more likely to return to employment. I test the with fixed effect logit modelling. The results 
support the expectations in most countries. I also analyse the institutional correlates of the cross-
national variation in the effects. Strict employment protection decreases the initial effect of 
childbearing, but also lengthens the time when childbearing increases the risk of dual joblessness. 
Policies targeted at supporting the employment of mothers, on the other hand, reduce this time by 
promoting the (re-)entry of mothers to work.  
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 1 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The European unemployment problem and household joblessness 
Practically every European country has experienced high and persistent unemployment since 
the 1970s. Three decades later, unemployment remains a major social and economic problem 
in the European Union. At the start of the millennium, three EU member states had 
unemployment rates above ten percent, in another six they were between five and ten percent, 
and the EU-level unemployment rate remained at 7.8 percent (OECD, 2004: Table A; see 
Table 1.1.). Of these then fifteen member states, eight experienced double-digit 
unemployment during the 1990s, and a full twelve since the 1970s (ibid.; Scharpf and 
Schmidt, 2000: Table A.4).  
 
Table 1.1. Unemployment and long-term unemployment rates in the European Union (EU15), 2000. 
 AT BE DK FIN FR DE GR IRL IT LUX NL PRT SP SWE UK 
Unemp.   3.7 6.9 4.4 9.8 9.3 7.8 11.0 4.3 10.4 2.3 2.9 4.1 11.3 5.6 5.4 
Long-
term 
 
25.8 56.3 20.0 29.0 42.6 52.5 56.4 33.1 61.3 22.4 26.7 42.9 47.6 26.4 28.0 
Source: OECD (2004), Employment Outlook. 
Note: The long-term unemployment incidence measure records the percentage of unemployment spells lasting at 
least 12 months.  
 
Given these depressing figures, it is not surprising to find active research on the causes and 
consequences of unemployment. Numerous books and articles have sought explanations for 
the European unemployment malaise from industrial structures, technological change, 
globalisation, and welfare state and labour market policies, among other factors (e.g., 
Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991; Layard et al., 1991; OECD, 1994; Nickell, 1997; 
Blanchard, 1998; Machin and Manning, 1999; Nickell and Layard, 1999; Blanchard and 
Wolfers, 2000; Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000; Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; DiPrete, 
2005; Nickell et al., 2005; see Chapter 2).  
 
High unemployment has raised understandable concerns of its social outcomes, most notably, 
income inequality, poverty, deprivation, and social exclusion (e.g., Gallie and Paugam, 2000; 
Atkinson et al., 2002). In general, the results from empirical studies point to negative impacts 
of unemployment on well-being. The relationship between unemployment and welfare is not, 
however, straightforward. Firstly, the duration of unemployment is important in determining 
its impacts. The economic effects of short spells of unemployment can be smoothed by 
savings and the like. On the other hand, the outcomes of long-term unemployment are 
 2 
potentially more severe, and consequently, the pronouncedly long-term nature of European 
unemployment is of particular concern (Table 1.1). Second, the standard definitions of 
unemployment assume search for work. However, for many of the consequences, the main 
issue is not whether a person is looking for work, but whether a person is employed or not. 
Therefore, many studies have expanded their focus to joblessness instead of unemployment in 
the strict sense of the word (e.g., Wilson, 1987; OECD, 1998; Clasen et al., 2006; Faggio and 
Nickell, 2003). Third, the impacts of unemployment are shaped by social and labour market 
policies designed to regulate employment and welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Gallie and 
Paugam, 2000). Fourth, family situations shape the impact of unemployment. The importance 
of the family is acknowledged in the main indicators of socio-economic well-being, which 
usually measure individual welfare as a function of the incomes or consumption of the 
household (cf. Jäntti and Danziger, 2000: 313-316). In the case of unemployment and 
joblessness, their effects depend importantly on whether they occur in a household with other 
employed members or otherwise. 
 
The distribution of employment and non-employment across households has attracted the 
attention of students of labour market inequalities. A number of studies have reported that 
employment and joblessness are not equally distributed across households (e.g., OECD, 1998; 
De Graaf and Ultee, 2000; Gregg and Wadsworth, 2001; Iacovou, 2003). This means that 
some households have several employed members, while others have none. Furthermore, 
these polarising patterns have become stronger in some countries (Gregg and Wadsworth, 
2001; Gregg et al., 2004). At the other end of the spectrum, the full-scale entry of women into 
the labour force has made the dual earner (and dual career) family model increasingly 
common (Blossfeld and Drobnič, 2001), while the other end of the spectrum has witnessed the 
“rise of the jobless household” (Gregg et al., 1999). This polarisation of employment and non-
employment has contributed to rising income inequalities. It has also promoted the 
combination of low aggregate unemployment, high employment, and high poverty rates in 
countries like the United Kingdom (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2001; Nickell, 2004). Because of 
the mismatch between individual and household level trends in employment and non-
employment, individual-level labour market measures do not provide an accurate picture of 
the social distribution of work and its consequences.  
 
The increase in household joblessness is a topic worthy of attention for several reasons. First, 
jobless households have elevated risks of poverty and deprivation. Across a wide range of 
 3 
countries, households with no working members experience notably higher risks of poverty 
than households with at least one working member (Iacovou, 2003: Figure 4.1.; Iceland and 
Kim, 2001). Household joblessness and poverty can also have long-term impacts on children, 
such as lower cognitive and educational achievement, weaker attachment to the labour 
market, and higher levels of risk behaviour (e.g., Brooks-Gunn and Duncan, 1997; Ermisch et 
al., 2004; Heckman, 2006). Second, living in a household with no person in employment – in 
particular, if this is over a prolonged period – means increased detachment from the world of 
work, and thus contributing to possible underclass formation (cf. Wilson, 1987; De Graaf and 
Ultee, 1991; Buckingham, 1999). Third, household joblessness means reliance on social 
transfers and increases pressures on social welfare systems (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2001: 
778). Fourth, household joblessness can affect the wage pressure from unemployment and, 
consequently, the equilibrium levels of unemployment (ibid.).  
 
This dissertation is concerned with couples, in which both partners are simultaneously out of 
work. The majority of the European population lives in couple-based households. Although 
household joblessness is more common in single-adult households than in couple-based ones, 
it is not totally absent from the latter (OECD, 1998; Gregg and Wadsworth, 2001; Gregg et 
al., 2004; Table 1.2.). The employment of single mothers receives much attention in the 
literature, and there is ongoing and vibrant research in the field (e.g., Lewis, 1997; Gonzales, 
2004).1 Less attention has been paid to jobless couples. Since the labour supply patterns of 
couples differ from those of single adults, focusing on either makes sense for theoretical and 
practical reasons. 
 
I study joblessness instead of unemployment – thus also including homemakers, discouraged 
workers, and others (unless otherwise indicated) – for the reasons related to social welfare 
stated above. For the social consequences, a clear and supported working hypothesis is that 
family level non-employment matters more than family level unemployment. I further limit 
the analyses to “working-age” couples (the specific inclusion/exclusion criteria vary 
somewhat across the chapters), thus excluding pensioners, to focus on the ages when couples 
are expected to provide for themselves independently through labour.  
 
                                                 
1 On the other hand, single adult households have received far less interest. Gregg and Wadsworth (2001: 802) 
concluded that “labour market problems within the population of single men are currently the most worthy of 
further investigation”. This is, indeed, an interesting topic for further research.   
 4 
A word on terminology. The terms “joblessness”, “worklessness” and “non-employment” all 
refer to the same labour market status. I also use “dual” and “coupled” interchangeably. For 
example, “dual joblessness” and “coupled non-employment” mean the same thing. 
Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity, I refer to all male partners as “husbands” and all 
female partners as “wives”, regardless of their marital status. I use this terminology 
throughout the dissertation.  
 
1.2 Coupled joblessness in Europe: a brief overview of previous results 
In this section, I present the basic descriptive results from previous studies on coupled 
joblessness. I discuss the explanations more thoroughly in the third section of Chapter 3. The 
interest in jobless households and couples is not something new, the first studies dating back 
to the economic recession of the 1930s (e.g., Humphrey, 1940). This interest re-emerged in 
the 1970s and 1980s, following the return of mass unemployment. Research on dual 
joblessness has been especially active in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands (Cooke, 
1987; Ultee et al. 1988; De Graaf and Ultee, 1991; 2000; Henkens et al., 1993; Davies et al., 
1994; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1994; 2001; Dex et al., 1995; Doris, 1998; McGinnity, 2002). 
The majority of previous studies have been non-comparative, or have been limited to 
comparisons of a handful of countries (e.g., Ultee et al., 1988; Dex et al., 1995). Due to the 
increase in suitable data, researchers have recently made some comparisons of a larger 
number of countries (OECD, 1998; De Graaf and Ultee, 2000; Gregg and Wadsworth, 2001; 
Iacovou, 2003).  
 
Most researchers have asked why the wives of unemployed husbands have low employment 
rates, contrary to what one might expect (e.g., Cooke, 1987; Garcia, 1991; Davies et al., 1994; 
Dex et al., 1995; Giannelli and Micklewright, 1995; Doris, 1998; McGinnity, 2002). Some 
research has taken a more symmetrical view and has also looked at the effects of female 
labour market status and wages on male labour supply (Henkens et al., 1993; De Graaf and 
Ultee, 2000; Virmasalo, 2002; see also, Juhn and Murphy, 1997). Many studies have shown 
that spouses’ labour market statuses remain positively correlated even after controlling for 
various background characteristics. The overall conclusion has often been that some 
mechanisms counteract the need for an additional worker in times of spouse unemployment 
(see Chapter 3, Section 3, for a more complete survey of these explanations). 
 
 5 
Table 1.2 presents data on dual joblessness from twelve countries, reported by Paul de Graaf 
and Wout Ultee (De Graaf and Ultee, 2000: 271, 274). The first row of the table shows the 
share of dually jobless couples in 1994. The second and the third rows present the associations 
(in odds ratios) between the partners’ unemployment and non-employment, respectively.2 The 
results show rather notable cross-national differences. Dual joblessness rates vary from 2.0 
percent in Denmark and Luxembourg to 8.0 percent in Ireland. Comparing these rates to the 
unemployment rates presented in Table 1.1, we can see that there is no linear correspondence. 
That can be also seen from the odds ratios: for example, the non-employed had a five times 
higher risk of having a non-employed spouse than an employed one in the United Kingdom, 
while in Spain there was no difference. These comparative differences have been usually 
attributed to the differences in social benefit systems and the (dis)incentives they create. There 
has also been some change in dual joblessness over time. The OECD (1998) reported a slight 
overall decrease in the incidence of dual joblessness in the European Union between the mid-
1980s and the mid 1990s. The same study also found that there was an increasing 
concentration of work and worklessness in couples: the growth in employment seemed to 
benefit households which would have had at least one working member otherwise. Similar 
trends have also been reported elsewhere (Ercolani and Jenkins, 1998; Gregg and Wadsworth, 
2003; Gregg et al., 2004). 
 
Table 1.2. Proportions of jobless couples of all couples (%), and odds ratios (OR) between partners’ 
labour market status (unemployment vs. employment and non-employment vs. employment) in twelve 
European countries in 1994. Both partners 25-54 years old. 
 BE DK FR DE GR IRL IT LUX NL PRT SP UK 
% 
 
2.3 2.0 2.7 1.8 3.5 8.0 4.1 2.0 2.7 3.3 7.3 7.7 
OR 
Ue. vs. 
emp. 
5.7 5.7 2.4 3.5 2.8 4.7 3.2 12.1 2.2 4.1 3.1 4.3 
OR 
Ne. vs. 
emp. 
3.8 3.9 1.2 1.1 1.0 3.2 1.4 0.9 1.8 2.0 1.0 5.1 
Source: De Graaf and Ultee, 2000: 271, 274. 
 
Most studies have used cross-sectional data. The most obvious limitation of this is that there is 
a clear lack of longitudinal information on dual joblessness (and household joblessness in 
general). Paul Gregg and Jonathan Wadsworth (2001: Table 4.3.) reported that at the turn of 
                                                 
2 Odds ratios are computed using the formula (p/(1 – p)) / (q/(1 – q)), in which p is the probability that a spouse 
of an employed spouse is employed, and q is the probability that the spouse of a nonemployed spouse is 
employed. In this context, an odds ratio is a measure of the inequality in the distribution of labour market 
statuses across couples.  
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the millennium, over half of the adults in jobless households had not been working in the past 
three years (nor were actively seeking for work) and Dorsett (2001) found that dual 
joblessness can be very persistent. Sexton (1988) showed how the spouses of the longterm 
unemployed have even lower employment rates than the spouses of other unemployed 
workers. In an earlier study (Härkönen, 2005), I reported wide cross-national differences in 
the durations of household joblessness experiences of children. Without focusing explicitly on 
the durations (or repetitiveness) of dual joblessness, some studies have used longitudinal data. 
For example, de Graaf and Ultee (1991) used panel data to analyse the effects of spouse 
education and labour market status on employment dynamics, finding accumulative 
tendencies. Giannelli and Micklewright (1995) and McGinnity (2002) used panel data to 
analyse the labour market dynamics of the wives of unemployed wives in Germany and in the 
United Kingdom. In the latter, having an unemployed husband delayed the employment entry 
of jobless wives, while in Germany, there was evidence of the opposite (McGinnity, 2002). 
Despite these results, there is need for further research on the longitudinal and dynamic 
aspects of dual joblessness, both from a descriptive and an analytical point of view. 
 
1.3.  Objective of the dissertation 
The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of dual joblessness in Europe 
with three empirical studies on topics that have not been sufficiently covered in the literature. 
The three studies focus on the comparative dynamics of dual joblessness in Europe, the 
culturally based rules governing family provision and the division of labour in couples, and 
the effects of childbearing on dual joblessness. Unlike in most earlier research, I approach the 
issue through direct measurement of dual joblessness rates, instead of measures of 
employment polarisation (e.g., Gregg and Wadsworth, 1994; 1996; 2001; 2003; De Graaf and 
Ultee, 2000; Iacovou, 2001). I analyse thirteen European countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom) with data from the European Community Household Panel, a comparative panel 
survey of households in the European Union (Eurostat, 2003). These data refer to the period 
from 1994 to 2001.  
 
The discussion in the previous section pointed to two aspects of dual joblessness that earlier 
research does not sufficiently cover. These are the need for research on the longitudinal 
aspects of dual joblessness and the need for more comparative research. In particular, there is 
a need for comparative research with longitudinal data. The comparative differences in the 
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level of dual joblessness are well established. Longitudinal data can enrich this picture by 
providing information on the comparative differences in the incidence of dual joblessness and 
its durations, and on the institutional factors affecting them. Such dynamic analysis also helps 
in understanding the dynamics that produce dual joblessness (cf. Blanchard and Portugal, 
2001).  
 
Therefore, in the first empirical study (Chapter 5), I analyse the dynamic roots of the variation 
in European dual joblessness. Dual joblessness rates can be broken down into flows into and 
out of dual joblessness; consequently, dual joblessness rates depend on these dynamics. An 
analysis of these dynamics is also of interest in itself. In this chapter, I decompose European 
dual joblessness rates to their inflow and outflow components. I analyse these flows using 
further decompositions and event-history analysis. The results show variation in both flows. 
They also show that both flows contribute to the European differences in dual joblessness 
rates. However, the variation in inflows is more important for the overall cross-national 
variation. I link this to differences in female employment rates and the spread of the dual 
earner model, and to the cross-national variation in employment security. The national 
differences in the durations of dual joblessness are largely governed by similar mechanisms 
that govern the comparative differences in long-term unemployment. 
 
There is also a need for additional research on the mechanisms that produce and maintain dual 
joblessness.3 Most research has focused on economic factors. To gain a more complete 
understanding, non-economic factors need to be incorporated into the analysis. To contribute 
to this understanding, I test the so-called “macho-effect” hypothesis in Chapter 6. This 
hypothesis states that the wives of unemployed men are reluctant to take the single 
breadwinner role of the family, due to cultural codes that regulate the gendered patterns of 
family provision. The hypothesis has its roots in ethnographic research on family responses to 
male unemployment. The hypothesis has been discussed in some studies that have used 
quantitative data, but it has never been tested explicitly. I test this hypothesis against data on 
the transitions between the joint employment statuses of couples. The results support the 
claim that couples avoid female breadwinning. 
 
                                                 
3 Kenneth Cooke (1987) made a similar conclusion already twenty years ago.  
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One of the socially important topics, which has not been covered sufficiently concerns dual 
joblessness and children. Child poverty is of constant concern for policy makers, researchers, 
and the general public. Children living in jobless households can have very high risks of 
poverty. Since most European children live with two (step)parents, dual joblessness has direct 
implications for child welfare. Despite these facts, previous studies have not analysed the link 
between children and dual joblessness beyond simple descriptive tables.  
 
Therefore, in Chapter 7, I ask whether childbearing and the age of the youngest child have an 
effect on dual joblessness. I discuss a theoretical model in which mothers are expected to 
withdraw from work directly after childbearing, but in which fathers are expected to remain 
employed or even increase their labour supplies. This solution is more risky regarding dual 
joblessness than a dual earner model. How long this male breadwinner pattern persists 
depends mainly on the mother’s decisions on returning to work. I also discuss the effects of 
policies that can support the employment of mothers and fathers during the early months and 
years of the child. I test this model using fixed effects logit regression analysis. The results 
show that childbearing increases the risk of dual joblessness in all countries except Italy and 
Spain. The results also confirm the expectation that this effect gradually decreases by the age 
of the youngest child. Furthermore, the results support the hypothesis that policies can shape 
the effects of childbearing on dual joblessness. 
 
1.4 Structure of the dissertation 
In the following chapter (Chapter 2), I discuss the role of unemployment, non-employment, 
and families in common sociological theories of social stratification. The discussion shows 
that the role of these factors has not always been clear. I also discuss research on the effects of 
unemployment and household joblessness. I then move on to discuss European differences in 
welfare states, labour markets, and families, in the lines of welfare regime analysis (Esping-
Andersen, 1999). Finally, I present data on and explanations for the European experiences in 
unemployment and female employment during the 1990s.  
 
In the third chapter, I discuss the literature on the labour supply of individuals and families, 
and the previous literature on dual joblessness. Economists have been mainly interested in the 
responsiveness of labour supply to wages and other incomes. The neoclassical theory of 
labour supply has been extended to cover the labour supply of families. Previous research on 
dual joblessness has often demostrated an interest in the labour supply decisions of the wives 
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of jobless men. The motivating question behind much research is why such women do not 
enter employment following the unemployment of the husband. I review these explanations in 
the third section of Chapter 3. 
 
I begin the fourth chapter by presenting the data. The European Community Household Panel 
is a suitable dataset for analysing dual joblessness, because it contains data on both spouses 
and their households. After introducing the data, I briefly discuss two commonly used tools 
for the analysis of panel data, fixed-effects modelling and event-history analysis. I use both 
methods in the dissertation. I present some preliminary descriptive findings in the third 
section of the chapter.  
 
The fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters include the three empirical chapters discussed above, 
and constitute the core of the dissertation. Chapter 8 summarizes the main findings, discusses 
the implications of the findings for research and policy, and suggests some topics for future 
research. 
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2 UNEMPLOYMENT, EMPLOYMENT, AND SOCIAL INEQUALITIES: 
THEORY AND THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Unemployment is a clear indicator of social inequality. Surprisingly enough, its theoretical 
role has been rather unclear in many sociological approaches to social inequality. 
Nevertheless, unemployment can have negative financial, social, and psychological 
consequences. Many of these consequences depend on the household context in which 
unemployment occurs: if more than one member of the household experiences 
unemployment, the consequences are often worse. This question of the role of the household 
in shaping the consequences of unemployment is linked to a classic question in social 
stratification research, namely, whether the individual or the household should be treated as 
the central unit of analysis. I discuss these issues in the first part of the next section of the 
chapter. 
 
Inequality levels vary across European countries. Likewise, the consequences of 
unemployment and joblessness are worse in some countries than in others. Welfare 
researchers approach these cross-national differences commonly through welfare regime 
theories. Despite European integration, welfare states, labour market institutions, and family 
systems differ between the member states of the European Union. We can detect some 
country groupings of the configurations of these three institutions. These are called welfare 
regimes. These institutions are closely linked, and functioning of one affects the functioning 
of the others. The three institutions also form the broad context that affects the experiences of 
dual joblessness in Europe. I introduce Western European welfare regimes briefly in the first 
part of the third section. 
 
Europe is not a single entity when it comes to the experiences of unemployment and those of 
female employment rates in the 1990s. These differences have direct relevance to dual 
joblessness. The role of unemployment is obvious. Male employment remains the norm 
throughout Europe, whereas female employment rates vary more across the continent.  
 
Several scholars have sought to explain European unemployment problems with European 
labour market institutions and welfare states. These institutions can also affect the experience 
of dual joblessness in Europe. The second part of the second section gives stylised facts and 
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explanations of European unemployment and female employment rates. The third section of 
this chapter provides a summary of the discussion.  
 
2.2 Couples, joblessness, and social inequality 
Unemployment is one of the main features of inequality in modern labour markets (Sen, 2000: 
20-21, 94-96). Therefore, it is surprising that its theoretical role in many sociological theories 
of social stratification has remained unclear (Korpi, 1998: 6-8). Many of the best-known 
social stratification theories focus on occupational category–based social classes (e.g., Wright, 
1985; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). Despite some attempts to include (long-term) 
unemployment as a separate category into the class scheme (Erola and Moisio, 2002), 
unemployment is generally ignored, treated as a redundant category, or analysed as an 
outcome of social class (e.g., Layte et al., 2000). A reason for this apparent neglect is the 
usually non-permanent nature of unemployment. Most unemployment spells last less than a 
year or two, whereas one’s class position remains rather fixed after young adulthood. 
Unemployment is a central defining feature of social class in one strand of social stratification 
research: theories of the underclass (Auletta, 1982; Wilson, 1987; Buckingham, 1999). 
However, these theories focus mainly on chronic joblessness. Many social stratification 
theories have also given theoretical privilege to intergenerational social mobility instead of 
distributional issues and social inequalities here and now (DiPrete, 2007).  
 
It is obvious that unemployment is of interest for students of social inequality. Unemployment 
can have negative effects on the welfare of those unlucky enough to experience it. 
Unemployment usually means a decrease in incomes, and unemployment is an important risk 
factor of poverty. Richard Hauser and Brian Nolan (2000) reported how income poverty 
levels among the unemployed were higher than of the working-age population at large. 
Furthermore, the long-term unemployed had a particularly high risk of poverty. Although 
social policies can soften the effect of unemployment, these findings are generally accepted. 
Unemployment often leads to a loss in psychological welfare and life-satisfaction. Christopher 
Whelan and Frances McGinnity (2000) analysed the link between unemployment and 
satisfaction and found that unemployment has a powerful negative effect on satisfaction. 
Clark (2003) found that unemployment had strong effects on psychological well-being, 
especially of men, and that these effects persisted even after the end of the unemployment 
spell (Clark et al., 2001). Unemployment can have other long-term implications as well. 
Unemployment – especially if it is prolonged – can mean a loss of tenure, human capital, and 
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valuable contacts, which can affect future labour market outcomes (Arumpalam, 2001; Gangl, 
2003; 2004; 2006). Unemployment can also be detrimental to marital stability (Hansen, 
2005), and it can affect the outcomes of the children of unemployed parents (Ermisch et al., 
2004). Finally, work is valued in its own right, and unemployment means that some people do 
not have access to this good.  
  
Many of the consequences of economic inactivity are the same as those of unemployment. For 
example, since economically inactive people do not earn wages, they have a higher-than-
average risk of poverty. Economic inactivity itself – as opposed to searching for work – can 
strengthen this risk, because many social benefit programmes require job search as a 
requirement for entitlement. Like in the case of unemployment, the socio-economic position 
of the non-employed – be it homemakers, students, or discouraged workers – has been 
ambiguous in many social stratification schemes. This ambiguity is rooted in the discussions 
on the socio-economic status of women. Because men are expected to work, unemployment 
was seen as an anomalous case. Women, however, have for long periods remained outside the 
labour market, and therefore their class status needed to be determined through something 
else, rather than their occupational status. 
 
In the “conventional view” of class analysis, the class position of the male breadwinner 
(Goldthorpe, 1983) – or the adult with the highest position in the household (Erikson, 1984) – 
determines the class of all the members in the household (including other employed family 
members). Many scholars contested this position by criticizing its patriarchal assumptions and 
the priority given to labour market relations (Acker, 1973; O’Connor, 1993; Orloff, 1993). 
These criticisms were fuelled by changes in family systems, such as increases in divorce rates, 
female economic activity, and dual career families (Sørensen, 1994; Szelényi, 1994; McRae, 
1997). A solution was to use the individual instead of the family as the basic unit of 
stratification, or to determine the position of the family through the combination of the 
statuses of its members (e.g., Heath and Britten, 1984; Szelényi, 1994).  
 
This brings us to a core question in social inequality research. Should the individual or the 
family be the central unit of analysis? Of course, individuals are rich or poor, happy or 
unhappy. But since one’s family situation clearly affects these outcomes, the case for treating 
families as central units of social stratification remains well-grounded. In particular, research 
concerned with inequality in consumption and levels of living “clearly must consider the 
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interdependence among the members of the group [the family] that shares resources and living 
conditions” (Sørensen, 1994: 32). Indeed, research on income inequality and poverty consider 
the family – or better, individuals within family-units – as the analytical starting point (Jäntti 
and Danziger, 2000: 313-316). 4 On the other hand, research concentrating on the direct 
relationship between individuals and labour markets (for example, wages instead of 
disposable incomes) does better to consider the individual as the basic unit of analysis 
(Erikson, 1984; Sørensen, 1994). Since the units of analysis differ, these two important 
dimensions of stratification do not necessarily coincide. Someone high on one dimension (say 
the consumption dimension) may be low on the other (for example, a McJob worker who 
married money). The proper unit of analysis thus depends on the question at hand. If there are 
reasons to believe that the family shapes the individual’s position on some dimensions of the 
stratification system (such as living conditions) over and above the status of the individual, 
the family situation should be taken into account. If the individual’s position is a direct result 
of his or her status, the individual is the appropriate unit of analysis.  
 
Most labour market research has taken the individual point of view. However, because of the 
important role of the family in shaping consumption outcomes, one can make an argument in 
favour of expanding the focus to the combined labour market status of the family (Sørensen, 
1994: 32; Gregg and Wadsworth, 2001: 778). This is also the argument for studying jobless 
households and polarisation of work at the household-level. There has been a household-level 
polarisation of work in several countries. In line with expectations, there is evidence that this 
has increased income inequality (Ercolani and Jenkins, 1998; Breen and Salazar, 2004). These 
results show that individual-level measures of the state of the labour market do not give a 
sufficient account of the distribution of labour market rewards and its socio-economic 
implications. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 An implicit assumption in most research on income distribution and monetary welfare is that incomes are 
divided equally between household members. This assumption is not without problems (Jenkins, 1991).  
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Figure 2.1. Poverty rates among jobless couples and the overall population in Europe, 1999/2000. 
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Sources: Jobless couples: Iacovou (2001: Figure 1), the husband is aged 25-55; Overall poverty rate: 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) key figures. 
Note: The poverty line is set at 50 % of the median equivalent scaled income 
 
The socio-economic importance of household level employment patterns is shown in a paper 
by Maria Iacovou (2001; Table 1). I present a part of her results in Figure 2.1, which displays 
the poverty rates among jobless couples and the overall population in fourteen European 
countries at the change of the millennium. Jobless couples can have dramatic poverty levels. 
In Ireland, the poverty rate climbs over 50 percent, and is very high in most other countries. 
Poverty among jobless couples is also clearly higher than the overall poverty rate, even in the 
Nordic countries and Austria, where jobless couples seem better off than in the other 
countries. Furthermore, Iacovou reported how the sharpest difference in poverty rates was 
between couples in which neither partner worked, and couples that contain at least one 
working spouse. Other studies have underlined these conclusions. Stephen Nickell (2004: 
Table 3) estimated that three-fourths of the British children whose parents do not work are 
poor. Children in jobless households made up a half of the population of children living in 
poverty. The rise in jobless households with children is a major factor behind the increases in 
child poverty in many countries (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2003; The Economist, 2006). 
Experience of household joblessness in childhood may have long-term effects. Ermisch and 
colleagues (2004) reported how this – especially when experienced in early years – had 
negative effects on later educational, economic, and behavioural outcomes. Household 
joblessness can have other consequences as well. Buckingham (1999) raised it as one of the 
central factors behind underclass formation (also, De Graaf and Ultee, 1991), and Jalovaara 
(2003) reported how jobless couples had highly elevated risks of union dissolution. Finally, 
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unemployment can have negative effects on the well-being of the spouses of the unemployed 
(Clark, 2003). 
 
2.3 Welfare regimes, unemployment, and employment in Europe 
2.3.1 European welfare regimes 
Welfare regimes are a common catchword in modern comparative research. Many researchers 
use the term to refer to differences and similarities in the welfare states of developed countries 
(cf. Korpi and Palme, 1998; Arts and Gelissen, 2002). Others have extended its use to cover 
broader configurations of states, markets, and sometimes, families (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 
1999; Gallie and Paugam, 2000; Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000). These authors claim that 
welfare states are not the only institutions shaping social welfare and social inequality. 
Instead, markets and families have a crucial role. It is clear that markets – and most 
importantly, labour markets – affect inequalities in economic outcomes. The family has kept 
its role as the primary institution of welfare production and redistribution: as discussed in the 
last section, the incomes of the family as a unit affect the financial welfare of its individual 
members. Moreover, most caring and reproductive action takes place in families.  
 
The functioning of each of the three institutions depends on the other institutions. 
Dysfunctional markets or welfare states put strain on families, but families can protect its 
members from social risks arising from markets (or welfare states). A prime example is the 
role of employment of a family head in securing the livelihood of the non-working members 
of the family. At the same time, the employment chances and security of the family members 
depend on the functioning of the labour market and the welfare state.  
 
Here, I use the literature on welfare regimes to orient the discussion on European families, 
labour markets, and welfare states. Much of the literature on welfare regimes has focused on 
discussing Esping-Andersen’s (1990) classification into the Social-democratic, Conservative, 
and Liberal regimes, and suggested numerous alternative classifications (see Arts and 
Gelissen (2002) for a review). Without going into this discussion, I distinguish four groups of 
countries. Of the countries analysed in the empirical part of the dissertation, Denmark and 
Finland belong to the Nordic group; Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg 
form the Continental group; Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain belong to the Southern group; 
and finally, the United Kingdom and Ireland form the Liberal group. The countries in each 
group share certain similarities, but differ in other respects. Some countries also went through 
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rapid changes. For example, rates of female employment and dual breadwinning rose in 
several countries (see below). Unlike some studies, I do not use welfare regimes as dependent 
or independent variables. Instead, I use them as pragmatic tools for structuring the discussion. 
Next, I briefly introduce the four regimes and their characteristics in the 1990s. Table 2.1 
displays some key information.  
 
In Nordic countries, the state has an active role in promoting social equality and the welfare of 
its citizens. Good examples are the large social transfer system and generous social benefits 
(and high taxes). Nordic welfare states have also provided more services than other welfare 
states. For example, every Nordic country has extensive provision of publicly funded 
childcare. Other family policies have also been actively developed. For example, maternity 
leaves are generally longer than elsewhere in Europe; in addition, Finland (and Norway) pay 
contributions to parents who take care of their children at home after the parental leave period. 
Another feature of the Nordic model is the universal nature of many provisions: all citizens 
have the right to these provisions regardless of need or professional affiliation. The labour 
market has been less regulated than in Continental or Southern countries, but more than in the 
Liberal group. Wage setting practices differed, however, during the 1990s. The Finnish wage 
setting system was highly centralised and coordinated, while in Denmark wages were 
negotiated at lower levels, although wage increase levels were coordinated at higher levels. 
Finally, the Nordic family system differed from the other groups. The dual-earner model was 
dominant, divorce and birth rates relatively high, and young people were more autonomous 
from their parents than in many other countries. (Korpi and Palme, 1998; Esping-Andersen, 
1999; Gallie and Paugam, 2000; Scharpf and Scmidt, 2000; OECD, 2004.) 
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Table 2.1. Data on welfare state and labour market institutions in Europe. 
 Employment 
protection index 
Centralisation 
of wage 
bargaining 
Coordination of 
wage 
bargaining 
Coverage of 
bargained 
wages 
Average 
replacement 
rate 
Duration of 
unemployment 
benefits, months 
Share of 
children (0-3) in 
public day care 
Nordic        
Denmark 1.8 2 4 80+ 70 48 58 
Finland 2.2 5 5 80+ 70 23 48 
Sweden 2.2 3 3 90+ 75 28 48 
Continental        
Austria 2.4 3 4 95+ 63 9 3 
Belgium 2.5 3 4.5 90+ 61 No limit 30 
France 2.8 2 2 90+ 75 23 29 
Germany 2.6 3 4 68 69 12 5 
Luxembourg .. .. .. 60+ .. .. .. 
Netherlands 2.1 3 4 80+ 74 24 8 
Southern        
Greece 3.5 .. .. 80+ 55 12 .. 
Italy 3.1 2 4 80+ 54 6 6 
Portugal 3.7 4 4 80+ 83 24 12 
Spain 3.0 3 3 80+ 67 21 5 
Liberal        
Ireland 1.2 4 4 80+ 49 15 2 
United Kingdom 1.0 1 1 30+ 54 6 2 
Notes and sources: Employment protection index, OECD (2004); Centralisation of wage bargaining (OECD, 2004: Table 3.5): 1 = Company or plant level predominant; 2 = 
Combination of industry and company/plant level, with an important share of employees covered by company level bargains; 3 = Industry level predominant; 4 = Predominant 
industry level bargaining, but recurrent central-level bargains; 5 = Central-level agreements of overriding importance; Coordination of wage bargaining (OECD, 2004: Table 
3.5): 1 = Fragmented company/plant level bargaining, little or no coordination by upper-level associations; 2 = Fragmented industry and company level bargaining, little or no 
pattern-setting; 3 = Industry-level bargaining with irregular pattern-setting and moderate pattern-setting among major bargaining actors; 4 = informal coordination by peak 
association, or coordinated bargaining by peak confederations, or government imposition of wage schedules or government wage arbitration, or regular pattern setting with 
high union concentration and/or bargaining coordination by large firms; 5 = informal coordination of industry-level bargaining by an encompassing union confederation, or 
coordinated bargaining by peak confederations; Coverage of bargained wages (OECD, 2004: Table 3.3), except Greece and Ireland, based on EIRO (2002a); Average 
replacement rate at the start of the unemployment spell, OECD (2006); Duration of unemployment benefits, OECD (2006); Share of children in day care, Kamerman (2000).  
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In the Liberal group, the role of the state is more limited, whereas individuals and their 
families have more responsibility in providing for themselves. For this reason, incomes from 
the market or through family distribution are more important. Many welfare state transfers are 
targeted at the needy, and the role of means testing is accordingly higher. In the same way, 
family policies are less extensive than in the Nordic countries. The term “liberal” describes 
well these countries’ approach to labour market protection. In both countries, workers have 
less protection against dismissal than elsewhere in Europe. The wage setting practices 
differed, however, in the 1990s. In the United Kingdom, wages were set at the firm or plant 
level, whereas relatively high centralisation and coordination characterised Irish wage setting 
patterns. Neither were Irish and British family systems alike. In Ireland, divorce was not 
permitted, birth rates were high, the male breadwinner model was rather dominant, and young 
people more dependent on their parents than in Britain, which resembled other Northern 
European countries in these respects. (Ibid.) 
 
The traditional family model has had a more important role in the Continental model than in 
the Nordic countries, even though the differences became less significant in the 1990s. 
Following the subsidiarity principle, the family was the central provider of welfare. The 
traditional male breadwinner model was supported by taxation and a limited provision of 
public childcare. Unlike in the Nordic countries, which actively promoted the dual-earner 
model, Continental countries have sought to secure the male breadwinner against social risks 
through relatively strict employment protection legislation and generous unemployment 
benefits. The latter depend on occupational affiliation, which again increases families’ 
economic dependency on the main breadwinner. In the last decade, wage negotiations took 
place mainly at the level of industries. Wage setting was relatively coordinated in Austria, 
Belgium, and Germany, but far less so in France. (Ibid.)  
 
Finally, many regard Southern European countries as the most family-centered ones in 
Western Europe (e.g., Moreno, 2000). These countries had less developed family policies than 
other European countries, and many families rely more on relatives. Young people also rely 
more on their families, especially as many Southern countries had high rates of 
unemployment, shortages of affordable housing, and little support from the welfare state. The 
social benefit system was strongly polarised, and again, many jobless individuals had to turn 
to their families for support. In these countries, the male breadwinner model remained much 
more dominant than in elsewhere (with the exception of Portugal). As in the Continental 
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countries, taxation policies and a lack of family policies strengthened the male breadwinner 
model. Strict employment protection legislation protected the male breadwinner family 
against unemployment. In the 1990s, the level of wage-setting centralisation and coordination 
differed somewhat across the countries. (Ibid.; Ferrera, 2000.) 
 
2.3.2 Unemployment in Europe: some stylised facts and explanations  
2.3.2.1 Stylised facts 
Unemployment was by many accounts the worst social and economic problem in Europe in 
the 1990s. The EU average hovered between approximately 8 percent and 11 percent. 
However, European countries showed very heterogeneous trends in unemployment rates. 
Figures 2.2a to 2.2d show the development of unemployment through this period.  
 
Unemployment rates were high throughout the period in many Continental and Southern 
European countries. Spain had the worst unemployment record. There nearly one fourth of the 
labour force was unemployed in the mid-1990s. Finland and Sweden saw massive increases in 
unemployment in the beginning of the 1990s, from which they did not fully recover by the 
first years of the new millennium. Other countries fared better. Denmark, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and particularly, Ireland, managed to push down their high and structural 
rates of unemployment. Other countries, like Austria, Luxembourg, and to a lesser extent, 
Portugal, enjoyed lower levels of unemployment through the 1990s.  
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Figures 2.2a to 2.2d. Standardized unemployment rates in Western Europe, 1990-2001. 
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Table 2.2. Indicators of the distribution of unemployment in Europe 
 Incidence of long-
term unemployment1 
Youth 
unemployment2 
Male 
unemployment 
Female 
unemployment 
Unemployment, 
low education3 
Unemployment, 
high education4 
Nordic 
      
Denmark 20.0 7.0 4.0 5.0 6.2 3.5 
Finland 29.0 21.8 9.2 10.6 12.2 4.5 
Sweden 26.4 11.4 6.3 5.4 5.8 3.0 
Continental 
      
Austria 25.8 5.6 4.8 4.6 6.9 1.9 
Belgium 56.3 18.2 5.3 8.3 10.3 3.5 
France 42.6 23.7 8.5 11.9 11.8 5.2 
Germany 52.5 7.5 7.6 8.1 15.3 4.5 
Luxembourg 22.4 7.3 1.8 3.2 3.8 1.8 
Netherlands 26.7 5.9 2.2 3.5 3.8 2.1 
Southern 
      
Greece 56.4 37.7 7.5 16.9 7.3 6.4 
Italy 61.3 35.4 8.2 14.6 9.0 5.3 
Portugal 42.9 11.6 3.3 5.2 4.4 3.9 
Spain 26.4 32.9 9.6 20.6 11.2 7.7 
Liberal 
      
Ireland 33.1 6.9 4.5 4.2 5.9 1.8 
United Kingdom 28.0 10.1 6.1 4.8 8.5 2.4 
Source: OECD (2004) Employment Outlook. 
1 Share of spells of at least 12 months in duration of all unemployment 
2 Unemployment among 15 to 24 year olds 
3 Less than upper secondary education 
4 Tertiary education  
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Unemployment is unequally distributed also within countries (Table 2.2). First, the long 
duration of unemployment spells means that some individuals experience a disproportionate 
share of unemployment. Long-term unemployment has been a European feature of the 
unemployment problem. In fact, job destruction rates and unemployment incidence are both 
higher in the United States, but the short average duration of American unemployment spells 
kept their unemployment rates lower in the 1990s than in many European countries (e.g., 
Gangl, 2003; 2004). The incidence of long-term unemployment varied widely across Europe, 
from more than 50 percent in Greece, Italy, Belgium, and Germany, to 20 percent in 
Denmark. In some countries, unemployment rates were high among young people and 
women. Youth unemployment rates (both absolutely and relative to general unemployment 
levels) were especially high in the Southern countries of Greece, Italy, and Spain, but also in 
France, Finland, and Belgium. In others – such as Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Ireland – the gap is much smaller. Unemployment gaps can be found between male and 
female unemployment rates (Azmat et al., 2006). In the Southern European countries, 
unemployment is markedly a female problem: for example, in Greece, Spain, and Italy, male 
unemployment rates are more or less close to those in many other European countries; female 
unemployment rates, instead, are much higher. In Sweden, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, 
on the other hand, women’s unemployment rates are lower than men’s. Finally, in all 
countries unemployment is negatively correlated with educational qualifications. In Greece 
and Portugal the gap is small, but bigger in Finland, Belgium, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
2.3.2.2 Stylised explanations 
There is a rather broad consensus of the structural nature on unemployment in many European 
countries. Sluggish job creation rates constitute an important part of the explanation (Cahuc 
and Zylberberg, 2004). This sluggishness also explains the long average duration of 
unemployment in many European countries. A common argument is that labour market 
rigidities and generous welfare benefits  – especially when compared to the United States – 
contribute to the low rates of job creation and unemployment in general (e.g., OECD, 1994). 
Among the institutions that have been blamed for labour market rigidity are employment 
protection legislation (EPL), trade unions and the wage bargaining system, and generous and 
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long-lasting welfare benefits (e.g., ibid., Siebert, 1997; Ljunqvist and Sarget, 1998; OECD, 
2004; Bassanini and Duval, 2006; Nickell, 1997; Nickell et al., 2005).5  
 
The aim of employment protection legislation is to enhance employment conditions by 
providing legally enforceable standards that regulate the forming and dissolving of 
employment contracts (e.g., OECD, 2004). Accordingly, empirical research has shown that 
job destruction and unemployment incidence rates are lower in countries with stricter EPL 
(ibid.; Gangl, 2003; Goméz-Salvador et al., 2004). However, an unintended consequence of 
these regulations is an additional labour cost to firms. These costs can translate into lower job 
creation and hiring rates, especially when employers have imperfect information on future 
business prospects and job applicants. This may mean longer unemployment durations, as 
unemployed workers receive less job offers. Therefore, strict EPL can contribute to the 
European long-term unemployment problem (Nickell and Layard, 1999; Gangl, 2003; OECD, 
2004). However, the impacts on overall unemployment rates are less straightforward. On the 
one hand, strict EPL reduces unemployment incidence by making it difficult for employers to 
fire workers, on the other, it also decreases unemployment durations (Bertola, 1990). For 
example, Portugal has one of the strictest employment protection laws in the OECD and the 
United States has the most liberal; however, the unemployment rates of these countries have 
been very similar for a long time (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001).  
 
Wage setting institutions have received considerable attention in the literature (e.g., Nickell 
and Layard, 1999; Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002; Bertola et al., 2002; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 
2004; OECD, 2004; Nickell et al., 2005; Bassanini and Duval, 2006). Wages can be set at 
different levels. Some wages are determined by direct negotiations between workers and 
firms. In other cases, trade unions take an active role in negotiating wages for their members. 
These negotiations can take place at the level of industries or industrial sectors, or at the 
national level. In the latter case these agreements cover more or less the whole economy. 
Different intermediate solutions are of course possible. In most European countries, trade 
unions engage in wage bargaining. In Finland and to a lesser extent in Ireland and Portugal, 
wage bargaining in the 1990s was highly centralized to the national level. In others countries 
(with the exception of the United Kingdom, where plant level negotiations were 
predominant), wages were bargained either at the industry level or both at the industry and 
                                                 
5 Other institutions that have been used to explain employment and unemployment levels include product market 
regulation, tax systems, and home ownership (Nickell et al., 2005; Bassanini and Duval, 2006).  
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plant levels (OECD, 2004). Even if negotiations take place at the firm or industry level, labour 
market partners can set guidelines for wage negotiations, and thus coordinate wage levels at 
the level of the national economy. This was the case in most European countries. In some 
countries, wage deals negotiated at the industry level covered industries and sectors, which 
did not engage in the wage negotiation process. See Table 2.1 for details. 
 
Neoclassical economic theory predicts that wage setting at the lowest possible level – that is 
negotiations between individual employers and employees – delivers the best employment 
outcomes, because individually negotiated wages are expected to best reflect productivity 
differences between workers and differences in competitiveness across firms. The active 
involvement of trade unions in the wage bargaining process, in contrast, would produce worse 
solutions, since unions are assumed to be mainly interested in promoting the wages of those 
already employed, which puts financial pressure on the companies and may price some 
workers out of the labour market.6 However, other theories suggest that the picture is more 
complex. In their famous study, Calmfors and Drifill (1988) suggested that the relationship 
between centralisation and employment is non-monotonic, so that centralized collective 
bargaining may produce as good outcomes as wage setting at the firm level, because 
centralized bargaining outcomes can better reflect macroeconomic conditions and internalize 
the costs of wage increases across a broader spectrum of industries. In this model, wage 
bargaining at the sector or industry level would produce the worst employment outcomes 
(because of no internalising mechanisms and wage competition across unions). Thus, there 
would be a “hump-shaped” curve between centralization and unemployment. Active 
coordination of wage bargaining processes between industries and sectors can bring similar 
outcomes.  
 
High union density, high coverage of bargained wage deals, and high centralisation or 
coordination of the wage bargaining process are closely associated with lower wage 
inequalities. However, the empirical evidence on their effects on employment is ambiguous. 
Some studies support the hypothesis of a “hump-shaped” curve, while others do not. 
Furthermore, it seems that centralized or coordinated wage deals have become less effective 
in the 1990s, suggesting that the optimal level at which wages are set depends on interactions 
with the economic environment and other labour market institutions. In sum, different wage 
                                                 
6 This, of course, depends on whether unions include (active or potential) unemployed workers, in whose welfare 
the unions are interested (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004).  
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setting systems may produce similar outcomes (for reviews, Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002; 
OECD, 2004; Nickell et al., 2005; Bassanini and Duval, 2006).  
 
Unemployment compensation secures workers from excessive income drops during 
unemployment. The level of “decommodification” provided by unemployment compensation 
packages and other social benefits varies notably across the OECD countries (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; 1999; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Table 2.1). Accordingly, unemployment is a 
much stronger poverty risk factor in some countries than others (Haataja, 1999). Following 
the neoclassical theory of labour supply, generous unemployment benefits constitute unearned 
income that decreases labour supply. Therefore, one would expect that generous 
unemployment benefits increase unemployment. Many studies have documented how 
generous benefits increase unemployment duration either by reducing search effort or by 
allowing unemployed workers to reject job offers and search longer for a suitable match. 
However, these effects are rather modest by many estimates (Atkinson and Micklewright, 
1991; Ljunqvist and Sargent, 1997; Gangl, 2003; 2004; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004; Røed 
and Zhang, 2006).7  
 
Unemployment compensation schemes can affect unemployment durations also through other 
mechanisms than benefit generosity. Most unemployment compensation schemes have a limit 
to the duration of these benefits (Table 2.1). Empirical research on the effects of benefit 
exhaustion regulations have found strong effects of these regulations on unemployment exit 
so that the exit rate tends to peak before exhaustion of unemployment compensation 
(Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991; Machin and Manning, 1999; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 
2004).   
 
These three institutions are commonly used to explain European unemployment experiences. 
But why have European unemployment rates increased since the 1960s and the 1970s? A 
common explanation points to the initial shocks from the oil crises and the sluggish job 
creation rates (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). Low rates of job 
creation have also contributed to the rise of long-term unemployment, which was caused by 
an overall decline in unemployment exit rates (Machin and Manning, 1999).  
 
                                                 
7 On the other hand, since unemployed workers can wait longer for better job offers, generous unemployment 
compensation decreases the short- and long-term “scar effects” of unemployment (Gangl, 2003; 2004; 2006).  
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Institutional explanations of European unemployment seem to confront an apparent paradox: 
the institutions discussed above have remained rather stable since the 1960s, whereas 
unemployment rates have increased since then. According to one line of research, European 
labour market institutions have in fact changed enough since the 1960s to explain this paradox 
(Nickell et al., 2005). Others have suggested that the rigid European labour markets cannot 
absorb technological, economic, and labour supply shocks (Katz and Autor, 1999; Blanchard 
and Wolfers, 2000; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). The latter argument has also been used to 
explain the divergence in economic inequalities between the United States and Europe, with 
the former showing higher increases in wage inequality and the latter in unemployment. 
Although the discussion seems to be going on, one should recognize the wide heterogeneity 
across European countries, their institutions, and unemployment experiences: the 
unemployment record of a number of European countries has in fact been better than the 
American one.  
 
The discussion has so far concentrated on the institutional background of overall 
unemployment performance in Europe. However, it is important to notice the possible 
distributional effects of labour market institutions. First, some scholars have argued that EPL 
is positively associated with temporary employment (OECD, 2002; 2004; Polavieja, 2006). In 
the late 1990s, temporary contracts were rare in Ireland and Luxembourg, whereas fifteen 
percent of French and Finnish, twenty percent of Portuguese, and a third of Spanish workers 
had fixed-term contracts (OECD, 2002). Two-layered EPL (with strong protection for core 
workers and more flexible legislation governing temporary employment) together with 
unemployment shocks and a medium level of centralisation/coordination in wage setting 
seems to increase the prevalence of temporary contracts. 
 
Second, it has been argued that a strong role for unions in wage setting and stringent EPL may 
reduce the employment for groups at the margin of employment, including young and older 
workers, women, immigrants, and low-skilled workers (Esping-Andersen, 2001; Bertola et al., 
2002; DiPrete et al., 2006; Kahn, 2007). Similar effects can be assumed of unemployment 
compensation: one can argue that generous unemployment compensation reduces the labour 
supply of those whose supply is the most elastic and whose opportunity costs of 
unemployment are the lowest. Finally, labour market institutions and discriminatory attitudes 
by employers can affect the gender gap in unemployment (Azmat et al., 2006). Employers 
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may prefer male workers to female workers. Furthermore, these preferences can “flourish” in 
situations in which there are high unemployment and long queues for jobs.  
 
2.3.3 Female employment in Europe: stylised facts and explanations 
2.3.3.1 Stylised facts 
Labour force participation and employment rates varied widely across European countries 
(Table 2.3). The norm of male employment remains rather strong in Europe: in every country, 
more than 70 percent of men were in the labour market. However, there is still surprisingly 
wide variation in male participation levels across Europe. Consequently, there have been 
increasing concerns of the rise in the inactivity among prime-aged men (Faggio and Nickell, 
2003; Clasen et al., 2005).  
 
Despite the variation in male participation, the main source of variation in European labour 
force participation rates comes from the variation in female participation. Three fourths of 
Danish and Swedish women participate in the labour market, and in Sweden, the gender gap 
in participation is less than 5 percentage points. In Italy, in contrast, the female participation 
rate is below 50 percent, and the gender gap close to 30 percentage points. Low female 
participation rates combined with high female unemployment rates brought female 
employment rates down to below 50 percent in the Southern European countries (with the 
exception of Portugal). The female employment rate was between 50 and 60 percent also in 
the Continental European countries and Ireland. Many women also work less hours than men. 
The part-time employment rate was especially high in the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom.  
 
Female employment rates relate directly to the prevalent breadwinner model in each country. 
The high female employment rates in the Nordic countries translate to a high share of dual 
earner couples. In contrast, the male breadwinner couple remained common in Southern 
Europe.
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Table 2.3. Labour force participation and employment indicators in Europe, 1999 
 Male participation 
rate  
Male employment 
rate 
Female participation 
rate 
Female 
employment rate  
Part-time 
employment, women 1 
Nordic 
     
Denmark 85.2 81.2 75.8 70.9 24.0 
Finland 77.6 70.2 71.3 63.7 13.9 
Sweden 79.3 73.3 74.6 69.5 21.4 
Continental 
     
Austria 80.6 77.6 62.2 59.8 24.4 
Belgium 72.1 65.9 58.1 50.1 34.5 
France 75.3 68.2 62.7 54.7 24.9 
Germany 80.5 73.9 63.3 57.9 33.9 
Luxembourg - - - - 28.4 
Netherlands 83.1 80.9 64.4 61.5 57.2 
Southern 
     
Greece 75.0 68.3 50.4 41.3 9.5 
Italy 75.3 68.8 46.0 38.8 23.4 
Portugal 83.1 79.9 66.1 62.8 14.9 
Spain 78.4 69.8 50.6 38.5 16.5 
Liberal 
     
Ireland 80.4 75.7 54.9 51.8 33.0 
United Kingdom 82.8 77.2 67.6 61.4 40.8 
Source: OECD Online Labour Force Statistics; OECD (2004) 
1 Share of workers working reduced hours, national definitions (OECD, 2004).  
2 Share of workers on fixed-term contracts of all employment, 25-55 years 
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2.3.3.2 Stylised explanations 
The gender gap in employment was for a long time supported by the gender gap in 
educational attainment. The gradual closing of the latter promoted the closing of the former. 
In fact, recent cohorts of women have taken over men in educational attainment in many 
countries (Buchmann and DiPrete, 2006). The gap in education was not, of course, exogenous 
to the employment gap. Women were expected, and they expected themselves, to remain 
more tied to the home than the labour market. Previously, women did not have similar career 
possibilities as men, and before the contraceptive revolution, they could not control their 
fertility very efficiently (e.g., Hakim, 2000; 2003; Blossfeld and Drobnič, 2001). Changes in 
gender roles, contraceptive techniques, and employment opportunities led women to invest 
more on education, and to enter the labour market more fully. Despite the female takeover in 
education levels, a gender gap in employment remains. Women receive lower wages than 
men. And because women remain more tied to the household than men, women’s labour 
supply is more responsive to wages (Blau and Kahn, 2006; see next chapter). These two 
factors promote the gender employment gap.  
 
Cross-national differences in family models, employment opportunities, wage structures, and 
policies targeted at lessening women’s family obligations can be used to understand 
comparative variation in female employment. In the 1990s, the family system remained more 
traditional in Southern European countries and in Ireland than in Nordic countries. The United 
Kingdom and Continental regime can be found to lie somewhat in between (e.g., Gallie and 
Paugam, 2000; Hakim, 2003). Despite rapid convergence, the European variation in family 
values, such as male-female orientations to work and family life, and views on male and 
female roles during parenthood and job shortages, remained apparent (e.g., ISSP, 1994; 
Hakim, 2003; Algan and Cahuc, forthcoming). Some scholars have linked these differences to 
the legacies of Catholicism and Protestantism (Siaroff, 1994). According to popular 
understanding, this variation in family values is at the root of the variation in female labour 
market activity. Empirical research has produced some supporting evidence (Algan and 
Cahuc, forthcoming).  
 
However, many non-employed European women express wishes to work (Jaumotte, 2003). 
Whether they can do so often depends on policies targeted at reducing the caring obligations 
of mothers. These policies have received major interest in the literature. Childbirth is a big 
divider in the employment of European mothers (Daly, 2000; Blossfeld and Drobnič, 2001). 
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For some women, childbirth does not induce a major career break, whereas for others it may 
mean a long spell outside employment. Public policies play a major role in shaping the effects 
of childbirth on female employment. Of specific importance in this regard are parental leave 
policies that enable mothers to remain attached to work even during pregnancy and the first 
months (or years) of the child and childcare policies that decrease the care burden of mothers 
and enable them to take up market work (e.g., Gornick et al., 1998; Ruhm, 1998; Jaumotte, 
2003). The Nordic countries, but also Belgium and France, have extensive policies that 
promote the employment of mothers. These policies have been developed more recently in 
other countries as well. Public policies promoting mother’s employment were more marginal 
in Ireland, the United Kingdom, and in Southern Europe (Gornick et al., 1997; Bettio and 
Prechal, 1998; Esping-Andersen, 1999).  
 
Finally, changes in the structure of the economy and in particular, the increase in service-
sector jobs (“postindustrialisation”) can help to explain the rise in female employment. 
Several researchers have argued that service-sector jobs are more attractive to women than 
manual industrial ones (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Daly, 2000; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). 
The market or the state can be a provider of such jobs. Regardless of the provider, women are 
clearly over-represented in many parts of the service sector. The private sector has been a big 
provider of service-sector jobs in countries like the United Kingdom, and its role has 
increased elsewhere. However, the public service sector, and the often more “female-friendly” 
employment conditions it provides, has played a major role in employing women in Northern 
European countries (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Consequently, female employment and 
occupational gender segregation are both higher in countries where the welfare state has a 
stronger role as an employer (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006).  
 
Service sector jobs often pay less than production jobs. This has promoted the gender gap in 
wages. On average, women earned 70 to 90 percent lower wages than men in Europe of the 
1990s (EIRO, 2002). Blau and Kahn (2003) argued that since women are at the bottom of the 
wage distribution, highly centralised and unionised wage bargaining processes with high 
coverage reduce the gender pay gap. This can increase female participation (Bertola et al., 
2002). Whether this translates into higher employment or not depends on the labour market 
institutions that affect the gender gap in unemployment. These issues were discussed in the 
last section.  
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2.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I provided a background for analysing dual joblessness in Europe. In the 
second section, I discussed the role of unemployment, joblessness, and the family in theories 
of social inequality. Many major sociological theories on social stratification have focused on 
issues of social class and intergenerational class mobility. Proponents of these theories have 
often had a hard time fitting unemployment into their schemes. However, unemployment is 
clearly an important feature of modern labour markets and has important welfare implications. 
The implications of unemployment depend on the family context in which it occurs. For 
example, dually jobless couples have very high rates of poverty and the polarisation of 
employment across households has contributed to rising income inequalities. Therefore, 
analysis of the distribution of work and worklessness across families is important in 
understanding current social inequalities.  
 
In the third section of the chapter, I used the discussion on welfare regimes to approach 
European national differences. I divided European countries into four welfare regimes, the 
Nordic, the Continental, the Liberal, and the Southern regimes. These regimes differ in their 
family systems, labour markets, and welfare states. These institutions affected European 
unemployment and employment patterns. They also have direct implications on the spread 
and experience of dual joblessness (see Chapters 5 and 7).  
 
I then moved on to discuss the European experiences in unemployment and employment in 
the 1990s. Unemployment rates varied widely across Europe during the last decades. In many 
countries, unemployment was unequally divided across social groups, with youths, women, 
and less educated workers experiencing high unemployment. Furthermore, long-term 
unemployment rates were high in many Continental and Southern European countries. 
Previous research has discussed the role of employment protection legislation, wage-setting 
institutions, and unemployment benefit systems for European unemployment. The empirical 
evidence regarding their impacts on unemployment levels appears partly contradictory, 
although many researchers have claimed that “labour market rigidities” involving strict 
regulation of employment contracts and wages and generous unemployment benefits have 
increased European unemployment. These institutions can also affect the distribution of 
unemployment (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2001). Generous and long-lasting benefits and 
market regulations that depress the growth of jobs can increase unemployment durations. 
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Similar market regulations can also reduce the employment levels and security of workers at 
the margin of employment.  
 
Female employment rates have increased throughout Europe during recent decades. However, 
important cross-national differences remained. European differences in family models, family 
policies, and economic structures and employment opportunities assist us in understanding 
this variation. Northern European (“Protestant”) family models tend to be less traditional than 
Southern (“Catholic”) models when it comes to female employment, and especially the 
employment of mothers. The former countries also have more extensive family policies that 
help women combine work and motherhood. Finally, employment opportunities and wage 
structures can affect female labour force participation. Service sector jobs can be more 
attractive to women than production jobs. Private services provide more jobs for women in 
the United Kingdom than elsewhere in Europe. In Nordic countries, the welfare state employs 
many women. Wage compression by collective bargaining can increase women’s employment 
incentives. However, they can also be discriminated against by employers in hiring decisions, 
as was discussed in the second part of the third section to this chapter.  
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
There is a massive literature on labour supply. Labour economists have been mainly interested 
in estimating the elasticity of labour supply, that is, the responsiveness of labour supply to 
wages and other incomes. Sociologists have been less interested in the elasticity of labour 
supply, but more interested in other factors determining work, careers, and occupational 
success. Many of the theories of labour supply and work have been expanded to cover the 
labour supply of families. Labour economists have been mainly interested in questions of 
family labour supply elasticity, but also in the division of work in families. Sociologists have 
studied the family factors that affect employment and careers, but have also analysed issues of 
work-family balance. In the second section of the chapter, I explore the main literatures on the 
labour supply of individuals and of families, and discuss some sociological work in these 
fields. 
 
Previous research on dual joblessness has mainly asked why the wives of the unemployed 
supply less labour than wives whose husbands work. Some studies have broadened this 
interest to cover both spouses. I surveyed the main descriptive results in Chapter 1. Scholars 
have given various explanations to this puzzling issue. I present the main explanations in the 
third section of the chapter.  
 
3.2 Approaches to the labour supply of individuals and couples 
3.2.1 Approaches to the labour supply of individuals 
According to the neo-classical model, labour supply is the result of the maximization of a 
utility function consisting of consumption and leisure (non-working time) (Killingsworth, 
1983; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Cahuc and Zylbenberg, 2004). Both consumption and 
leisure have their price: leisure because it is time away from work. Labour supply is affected 
by two mechanisms, the income effect and the substitution effect. The income effect works 
through changes in total real incomes, and the substitution effect through changes in the price 
of leisure. If leisure and consumption are normal goods, an increase in incomes increases both 
consumption and the time spent on leisure, and decreases labour supply (the income effect). If 
total real incomes remain constant, an increase in the hourly wage rate increases consumption, 
but it decreases time spent on leisure due to an increase in the cost of leisure, and thus it 
increases labour supply (substitution effect). The net effects of the income effect and the 
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substitution effect determine the wage elasticity of labour supply. Other things being constant, 
an increase in wages may either increase or decrease labour supply, depending on the relative 
strengths of the income and the substitution effects. The theory predicts that the wage 
elasticity of labour supply decreases at higher wage levels; that is, individuals commanding 
low wages are more likely to opt for more consumption produced by an extra hour of work 
than an extra hour of leisure. Since an increase in other incomes does not change the cost of 
leisure, this change has only an income effect, and thus always decreases labour supply. Given 
incomes, different individuals may prefer different combinations of consumption and leisure, 
depending on their preferences. This general framework has been expanded to cover such 
areas as life-cycle labour supply, collective labour supply of the household and household 
production (discussed below), and can be expanded to cover situations in which individuals 
draw other utility from work than just incomes and where decisions of hours worked are 
restricted by external factors (such as legislation).  
 
An important extension of the neoclassical labour supply model concerns job search (Cahuc 
and Zylberberg, 2004; Eckstein and van der Berg, 2006). While the literature also covers on-
the-job search and two-sided search (both by workers and employers), I concentrate here only 
on job search by the unemployed. The job search literature extends the basic labour supply 
model by acknowledging that job search takes time and resources, because the seekers do not 
have perfect information on all the jobs available. In other words, the literature acknowledges 
the status of unemployment separately from non-employment and employment, unlike the 
“pure” neoclassical model. To become a job seeker, that is, to participate in the labour force, 
one first has to want employment. The decision to participate depends on the reservation wage 
(the highest wage at which the individual would not work), which depends on the utility she 
or he derives from not participating (including the value of leisure, the non-earned incomes 
available, and the fixed costs of working). Once the individual decides to participate, his or 
her job searching time depends on his or her reservation wage, search intensity, and the arrival 
rate of job offers. Finally, the individual is expected to take up employment when the wage 
offered from a particular job exceeds the reservation wage.  
 
Empirical work on labour supply has reached some general conclusions (Heckman, 1993; 
Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). Unearned incomes mainly 
reduce labour supply, even though this unearned income elasticity is generally smaller than 
wage elasticity. The effect of wages, however, is more complex, as predicted by the 
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neoclassical model. First, the wage elasticity of labour supply is the greatest at the margin, 
that is, when the individual decides whether to work or not. In fact, most of the wage elasticity 
of a group depends on variation in the participation rate. In line with the neoclassical model, 
an increase in wages increase the hours worked at a certain wage level, after which the hours 
worked decrease.  
 
Empirical work on job search, which has often analysed the determinants of unemployment 
duration, has added to these results by showing how the job offer arrival rate is a very 
important determinant of unemployment duration, as the acceptance rate of job offers is high. 
This result explains the long-term nature of unemployment in European countries with low 
job creation rates (see the previous chapter). The elasticity of the reservation wage and 
unemployment duration to unearned incomes (such as unemployment benefit) is positive, as 
expected, but rather modest in size. The elasticity of unemployment duration to the duration 
of unemployment compensation is also positive, that is, longer lasting unemployment benefits 
tend to produce longer unemployment spells. Furthermore, there is an apparent peak in the 
unemployment exit rate around the exhaustion limit of unemployment compensation. 
Although unemployment exit rates decrease by the duration of unemployment, there is little 
evidence of any substantial duration dependency; instead, heterogeneity plays a bigger role 
(more employable workers exit unemployment faster). (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991; 
Machin and Manning, 1999; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004; Eckstein and van der Berg, 2006.)  
 
A crucial factor affecting the labour supply of an individual is the amount of human capital 
she or he possesses. According to human capital theory (e.g., Mincer, 1974; Becker, 1975), 
human capital (generally seen as consisting of education and work experience)8 increases 
worker productivity. Higher levels of productivity translate into a higher value on the labour 
market, more stability, more and better wage offers, and thus higher employment and lower 
unemployment (Mincer, 1991).  
 
Empirical work on labour supply has also reported that women’s labour supply is more elastic 
than men’s. This higher elasticity applies both to own wages and unearned income (including 
the wages of a spouse). This is usually explained by the division of labour in the family, 
where women have more responsibilities in housework and caring for children. Housework 
                                                 
8 Work experience is commonly further broken down to general and sector-specific experience. In a similar way, 
education can be general or more specific education.  
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and childcare are closer substitutes for market work than leisure, and the substitution effects 
of wages are higher for women (Blau and Kahn, 2006). Consequently, women’s labour supply 
is reduced by marriage and especially childbearing, whereas marriage and parenthood can 
increase the labour supply of men (Mincer, 1962; Becker, 1981; Lundberg, 2005).9 This 
prediction relies on the traditional division of paid and unpaid labour within households. As 
the traditional family model has become weaker, the elasticity of female labor supply has 
approached that of men (Blau and Kahn, 2006; for the United States). There is also 
heterogeneity among women. Hakim (2000; 2004) has argued that women can be roughly 
divided into three groups according to their work-family preferences. The work-oriented (10-
30 percent of women, depending on the country) prefer to work, and their labour supply is 
rather inelastic to economic incentives. In contrast, the labour supply of women in the 
adaptive group (40-80 percent of women) is highly elastic. Family-oriented women (10-30 
percent of women) prefer not to work. These women also react weakly to policy incentives. In 
this framework, there may have been a shift towards work-centeredness in the last decades. 
The discussion on female labour supply is closely linked to the discussions on the labour 
supply of families. I next discuss approaches to the labour supply of couples. 
 
3.2.2. Approaches to the labour supply of couples 
The discussion so far has approached labour supply from an individual point of view. Moving 
on to the labour supply of couples, we can ask whether or not coupled labour supply patterns 
are just the aggregates of the labour supply decisions of the partners, or something different. 
Family labour supply theories argue in favour of the latter (e.g., Killingsworth, 1983: 29-38; 
Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). One of the reasons is that individuals can spend their time off 
work in household production (cooking, cleaning, and caring for children), instead of just 
“pure” leisure. Furthermore, couples can decide on the division of paid work, housework, and 
leisure collectively. 
 
The predominant economic approach to household labour supply – the “common preference 
model” (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996) – assumes that a household is a single unit of 
consumption and labour supply, and that decisions of labour supply are made collectively or 
by a household head. In this model, the couple supplies labour so as to maximize the common 
utility function of the household, and tasks between paid work and unpaid work at home 
                                                 
9 Empirically, the effects of marriage and childbearing on female employment have decreased (Blossfeld and 
Drobnič, 2001).  
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(“leisure”) are rationally divided according to the productivity of each member in each sphere 
(Becker, 1981). This theory predicts that as the value of the time spent at home increases – for 
example, because of children – the incentive for a division of tasks increases accordingly. In 
practice, the theory predicts that the partner with higher wages increases labour supply, while 
the other (who is – usually implicitly – assumed to also have a relative advantage in 
housework) decreases labour supply. In the extreme case, one partner specializes in paid 
work, while the other withdraws from the labour market to concentrate on household tasks. 
Since it is commonly assumed that women have higher relative productivity at home than 
men, this model has been used to explain gendered divisions of labour (Becker, 1981) and the 
higher income elasticity of women’s labour supply (see above).  
 
There have been many critiques of this model. Many scholars have criticized its essentialist 
gender assumptions. Another problem is that the model assumes a common utility function, 
without explaining why two individuals with separate utilities outside the partnership combine 
their utilities as a couple (Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1992: 356). If we ultimately assume an 
individual utility function instead of a common one, can we still expect partners to behave 
collectively, or at least interdependently? A case for assuming collective or interdependent 
behaviour can be made by referring to affection, and conventions and norms that regulate 
partnership practices. Another argument emphasises the utility both partners attain from 
collective behaviour (see, for example, Becker, 1981). However, an increase in the common 
utility can demand decisions, which are not individually rational in the short- or in the long-
run. For example, a wife withdrawing from the labour market for the common good of the 
family may regret this in the occurrence of a divorce. Theories of partnerships as contracts 
(England and Farkas, 1986) or bargaining situations (McElroy, 1990; Lundberg and Pollak, 
1996), have suggested situations in which partners may behave less egoistically. 
 
These approaches view partnership as a bargaining situation, or a more or less explicit 
contract, in which spouses maximize their personal utility functions and take into account 
their utilities in other situations both inside and outside the partnership. However, even though 
the models assume individual utility functions, they predict at least some resource sharing, 
contributions (monetary or non-monetary) to the public good, and interdependent behaviour. 
First, the spouses may have an interest in each other’s welfare. Second, contributions may be 
individually rational if they include expectations of reciprocity. Such expectations may be set 
explicitly by collective decisions, or implicitly through engagement in a long-term partnership 
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that involves favours and counter-favours (England and Farkas, 1986; McElroy, 1990; 
Lundberg and Pollak, 1996). The incentives for interdependent or collective decision-making 
increase when the couple has common interests (for example, children), or partners have 
realistic expectations of future reciprocity. Therefore, the decision to be a housewife may be 
economically rational if she can expect the husband to provide for her now and in the future, 
for example because of a low risk of divorce.  
 
Most econometric studies on family labour supply have used variations of the “common 
preference” of “unitary” model of family labour supply (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999: 1670). 
These studies have generally been interested in own and cross-spouse wage elasticities, and 
generally found the gender differences already reported above. The estimation of bargaining 
models is more complicated, and there has been less work on them. However, a result from 
several studies is that the consumption pooling assumption is indeed too strict, and may only 
describe the behaviour of some groups, such as families with little children (see Blundell and 
MaCurdy, 1999 for a review). For example, Lundberg (1988) reported that the common 
preference model did not describe the labour supply of couples without children, whereas 
spouses with small children had strong interactions between their labour supplies and strong 
cross-spouse wage elasticity.  
 
Outside economics, the labour market patterns and trajectories of families have been of 
considerable interest to sociologists. This literature has had less interest in estimating own and 
cross-spouse wage elasticity, and more interest in the cultural forms governing the division of 
labour, work-family strategies, and the accumulation of advantages and disadvantages across 
families (e.g., Gerson, 1985; Becker and Moen, 1999; Blossfeld and Drobnič, 2001; Moen, 
2003; Moen, 2003a; Jacobs and Gerson, 2004). Given the increases in the dual-earner family 
model, much recent research has paid attention to the time limits such couples face and their 
heterogeneous ways of balancing between work and family life (e.g., Becker and Moen, 1999; 
Jacobs and Gerson, 2004). Couples use different strategies to achieve this balance, for 
example by concentrating only on the career of one spouse, by putting the family before work 
in terms of work hours, moving, and the like, and by trading off the spouses’ aspirations at 
different stages of the life course (Becker and Moen, 1999). This literature has also constantly 
shown how these strategies are gendered – so that, for example, women do most of the scaling 
back and regard themselves mainly as secondary earners (also, Hakim, 2003) – and 
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constrained by cultural presumptions and institutional configurations that structure the life 
course (Moen, 2003a). I discuss some of these gendered mechanisms more in Chapter 6.  
 
A literature of particular interest here concerns the changing inequalities produced by the rise 
of the dual earner family model. The edited volume by Blossfeld and Drobnič (2001) provides 
the largest study in this field. The authors reported how marriage, childbearing, and the 
educational and occupational resources of the husband affect the employment and 
occupational transitions of wives differently across time and between countries. In general, 
the link between marriage, childbearing, and the male breadwinner family model has become 
weaker, and all but disappeared in a number of countries. Furthermore, the effects of the 
resources of the husband have changed. In many countries, an employed and successful 
husband has now a positive effect on his wife’s career, a result the authors interpreted as 
reflecting the possibilities of mutual support through encouragement and human and social 
capital.   
 
3.3 Previous research 
3.3.1 Analytical approaches to studying dual joblessness 
In what follows, I go through the theoretical explanations given to dual joblessness and the 
accumulation of unemployment and non-employment into couples. As mentioned in the 
introduction, previous research has focused on explaining why “unemployment comes in 
couples”, that is, why the jobless have a higher likelihood of having a jobless spouse than the 
employed. More specifically, most studies have looked into the low participation rates of the 
wives of unemployed (or jobless) husbands. Table 3.1 below gives information on the studies 
appearing in this review. Previous reviews of the literature have been made by Cooke (1987) 
and Ström (2003).  
 
Almost unexceptionally, previous studies with quantitative data have approached the question 
through individual workers and their spouses. Leaving out individual subscripts, a common 
specification of the empirical model is of the following type: 
 
 εϕβα +++= XUEy spouse        (3.1), 
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where y is employment (or participation) status, α is the constant term, spouseUE  is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the spouse is unemployed (or jobless), X is a set of control 
variables, β is a vector of parameters, and ε is an error term.10 Often, the analysts have been 
interested in estimating whether β is statistically significant, and whether it remains so after 
introduction of the controls. The remaining association has been at times called a “true cross-
spouse effect” (e.g., Davies et al., 1994). These cross-spouse effects indicate that joblessness 
affects the employment status of the spouse, either through economic factors or something 
else (for explanations, see below). While most previous studies have used static models, the 
framework has also been extended to cover employment dynamics.  
 
A negative effect of unemployment of the husband on the wife’s employment has been 
reported in several studies, including Henkens and associates (1993), Davies and associates 
(1994), and De Graaf and Ultee (2000). Maloney (1991) found that transitory unemployment 
of the husband does not have an effect on the participation propensity of the wife, but 
conditional on participation, reduces her propensity of employment. Furthermore, he found 
that permanent unemployment of the husband does increase his wife’s participation, but that 
the employment effects are negative due to her higher unemployment rates once in the labour 
force. De Graaf and Ultee (1991) reported that unemployment of the husband increases the 
wife’s transitions from employment to unemployment, and decreases transitions from 
unemployment to employment. They also found similar cross-spouse effects on the transitions 
from employment to unemployment of husbands (effects of the wife’s status on the 
employment of the husband were also reported in De Graaf and Ultee (2000)). Bingley and 
Walker (2001) found that unemployment of the husband decreased the participation of the 
wife, mainly by decreasing her propensity of being in part-time employment.  
 
There have also been opposite results. For example, Lundberg (1985) reported that transitory 
unemployment of the husband increased her wife’s employment. Stephens (2002) found a 
strong long-term increase in the wife’s labour supply after the job displacement of the 
husband. Furthermore, many studies have found wide cross-national differences (Dex et al., 
1995; De Graaf and Ultee, 2000; Iacovou, 2001; McGinnity, 2002). For example, McGinnity 
(2002) found a positive correlation between the statuses of spouses in the United Kingdom but 
                                                 
10 Some studies have also included corrections for unobserved factors (e.g., Davies et al., 1994; Giannelli and 
Micklewright, 1995; Bingley and Walker, 2001).  
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not in Germany, which resulted from the lower employment entry rates of the wives of 
unemployed husbands in the former.  
 
An alternative to the “individual approach” to studying dual joblessness is to use the couple as 
the unit of analysis. Here, the dependent variable is the joint labour market status of the 
couple, and the basic empirical model is  
 
 y = α + βX + ε        (3.2), 
 
where y is the employment status of the couple, α is a constant, X are a set of variables 
determining the coupled employment status, β is a vector of parameters, and ε is the error 
term. The employment status of the couple can be, for instance, a four-category choice 
variable, which is the combination of the employment versus non-employment statuses of the 
spouses. This is also the baseline classification used throughout this dissertation. I discuss the 
dependent variables used in each analysis in more detail in Chapter 4.2.3 and the empirical 
chapters. 
 
This approach enables a direct measurement of the employment status of the couple. The 
approach is suitable given my primary interest in the joint labour market statuses of couples 
per se, instead of the (closely related question of) the associations between the labour market 
statuses of partners.11 The usefulness of this approach will become clear in the empirical 
chapters, where the need for a direct measurement of coupled labour market statuses is 
crucial.  
 
The approach has theoretical appeal as well. A problem with the individual approach is that 
the labour market status of the spouse is usually treated as an exogenous factor.12 To the 
extent that couples make joint or interdependent labour supply decisions, as discussed in the 
second section of this chapter, estimates of the effects of the labour market status of the 
spouse are biased.13 The joint approach relaxes this exogeneity assumption. As discussed by 
                                                 
11 In fact, as shown by Lundberg (1985), Blau (1997, 1998), and Blau and Riphahn (1999), the joint approach 
can be also used to analyse the associations between spouses’ labour market statuses and dynamics.  
12 Furthermore, most studies that take unobserved factors into account only control for fixed unobserved effects. 
13 This is because in such a case both statuses are determined simultaneously, leading to a correlation between 
the labour market status of the spouse and the error term in equations like 3.1 (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002: 51). For 
example, couples may decide jointly that only the husband takes up paid work while the wife remains at home. 
Estimating wives’ labour supply with models such as 3.1 would likely lead one to overemphasise the effect of 
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Blau and Riphahn (1999: 233), such a model also relaxes the assumption of a joint utility 
function of the couple; instead, the combined labour market status of the couple can result 
from a combination of independent, interdependent, and joint decisions. The parameters X can 
reflect some combination of the preferences of the spouses and their relative bargaining 
powers.14  
 
 Lundberg (1985) used this approach to study the employment dynamics of the wives of 
unemployment men. Blau (1997; 1998; Blau and Riphahn, 1999) and Jiménez and associates 
(1999) used it to study the joint retirement behaviour of couples. They also showed how the 
approach can be used also to analyse interdependencies between spouses’ labour market 
behaviour.  
 
3.3.2 Explaining dual joblessness and joblessness accumulation into couples 
3.3.2.1 Introduction 
In this section, I go through the main explanations given to dual joblessness. These 
explanations follow the overriding interest in the employment patterns of the wives of 
unemployed men. They are roughly divided into explanations that stress the common 
characteristics and economic environments of the partners (“by-product” explanations (Ultee 
et al. (1988)) and explanations that attempt to understand “true cross-spouse dependency”.  
 
I first discuss two “by-product” explanations, namely marital homogamy by human capital 
and the labour markets conditions shared by couples. I then go through a number of 
explanations for “true cross-spouse dependency”. These discussions focus on the micro-level 
mechanisms of dual joblessness. As mentioned in the Introduction, there has not been much 
comparative work. The majority of explanations of the cross-national differences have 
concentrated on the variation in social benefit systems, and in particular, the role of means 
testing. I discuss these explanations below.  
                                                                                                                                                         
the husband’s employment on her labour supply – in other words, was the husband jobless, we would expect the 
wife to work more than she might in reality. The chances for such misinterpretations are the more likely if 
couples avoid female breadwinning, as analysed in Chapter 6 and discussed below in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.9. It 
is also important to notice that controlling for fixed unobserved factors in Equation 3.1 does not solve the 
problem. An option could be to use unanticipated unemployment (for example, involuntary job displacements 
(cf. Stephens, 2002)) as an instrument for unemployment of the husband. A problem with such an approach is 
that even many seemingly sudden displacements may often be anticipated (because of a downturn of the 
economy, for instance), and wives may thus respond to such anticipation beforehand.  
14 A more sophisticated specification could be based on bargaining models of coupled labour supply (e.g., 
Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1992). However, such models demand a lot from the data and are difficult to 
estimate.  
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Table 3.1. Background information on previous studies on dual joblessness 
Author(s), 
(year) 
Country / 
Countries 
Time period 
covered 
Data source 
and type 
Sample size Unit of 
analysis  
Main method Focus 
Barrère-
Maurisson et 
al. (1985) 
France Late 1970s, 
early 1980s 
(?) 
Four samples Varying sizes, 
(20-2,000) 
Women Qualitative 
interviews 
Family and women’s careers 
McKee and 
Bell (1985) 
Britain Early 1980s Sample of 
unemployed 
partnered 
fathers 
45 couples Couples Qualitative 
interviews 
Unemployment and family 
relations 
Morris (1985) Britain 1982 Male 
redundant 
steelworkers 
40 men and 
their families 
Couples Qualitative 
interviews 
Male job loss and family 
Lundberg 
(1985) 
USA  1969-73 Experimental, 
survey 
1,081 families Couple Event-history AWE 
Ultee et al. 
(1988) 
Canada, 
Netherlands, 
USA 
1981 Files from 
labour force 
surveys 
Several 
10,000s / 
country 
Individual 
partner 
Loglinear 
models 
Explain positive association 
Kell and 
Wright (1990) 
Britain 1983 Surveys 2,051 women Wife Probit Benefits and wives’ labour supply 
De Graaf and 
Ultee (1991) 
Netherlands 1980-86 Survey 2,051 couples Individual 
partners 
Event-history 
analysis 
Associations between spouses’ 
transitions 
Maloney 
(1991) 
USA 1982 Survey 1,958 couples Individual 
(wife) 
Regression AWE 
Henkens et al. 
(1993) 
Netherlands 1985-6 Survey 22,352 married 
couples 
Individual 
partner 
Logit  Explain positive association 
Davies et al. 
(1994) 
Britain 1970-86 Survey 1,171 couples Wife Logistic Explain association 
Dex et al. 
(1995) 
Britain, USA, 
Ireland, 
Sweden, 
Denmark 
1980s 
(varies) 
Surveys 8,476 women 
(from 528 in 
SWE to 2,759 
USA) 
Wife Logit/probit 
regression 
AWE, benefit and tax systems 
Giannelli and 
Micklewright 
(1995) 
Germany 1984-8 Survey 2,021 married 
women 
Wife Conditional 
logit model, 
event-history 
AWE, means tested benefits 
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Table 3.1 (continued).       
Doris (1998) Britain 1983-4 Survey  1,727 couples Wife Fixed-effects 
logit, event-
history, 
mover-stayer 
AWE, means tested benefits 
Halvorsen 
(1999) 
Norway 1995 Survey 1,425 
individuals 
Individual 
partners 
Logistic 
regression 
Association between statuses 
Nordenmark 
(1999) 
Sweden 1992-6 Register, 
survey 
~2,500 
individuals 
Individuals Logistic 
regression 
Association between statuses 
Cullen and 
Gruber (2000) 
USA 1984-8, 
1990-2 
Survey 2,560 married 
couples 
Wives OLS, tobit, 
heckit 
Unemployment compensation 
De Graaf and 
Ultee (2000) 
12 EU 
countries 
1994 Survey 19,408 couples Partners Logistic 
regression 
Association between spouses 
Bingley and 
Walker (2001) 
Britain 1978-92 Survey 43,351 married 
couples 
Wives Unordered 
probit 
Benefits 
Gregg and 
Wadsworth 
(2001) 
Britain 1975-2001 Survey N.A. Partners  Decomposition Polarisation  
Iacovou 
(2001) 
14 EU 
countries 
1999 Survey 24,606 couples Partner Decomposition Polarisation 
McGinnity 
(2002) 
Britain, 
Germany 
1991-7 
(UK), 1988-
93 (D) 
Survey 1,279 (UK), 
1,199 (D) 
Wife Event-history Means tested benefits 
Stephens 
(2002) 
USA 1968-92 Survey 5,422 couples Wife OLS, tobit Impact of male lay-off or wives’ 
employment and hours 
Clark (2003) Britain 1991-7 Survey 
(BHPS) 
9,461 
individuals 
Individuals Ordered 
probit, fixed-
effects logit 
Impact of own and others’ 
unemployment on psychological 
well-being and vice-versa 
Dorsett (2005) Britain 2000-1 Experiment, 
survey 
1,103 couples Couple DID, matching Evaluation of policy change 
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3.3.2.2 Partner selection and homogamy 
The well-known tendency of selecting partners within or close to one’s group (status, 
religious and ethnic) is a common indicator of the openness of social structure (Kalmijn, 
1998: 396). One of the consequences of marital homogamy is an enforcement of social 
inequalities produced elsewhere – such as the labour market – through the accumulation of 
social (dis)advantages into families. Many researchers have sought to explain joblessness 
accumulation into families with homogamy by human capital. Sociologists have often focused 
on homogamy as a central explanation (Ultee et al., 1988; Henkens et al., 1993; Halvorsen, 
1999; De Graaf and Ultee, 2000), whereas many economists have used it as a control variable 
in their overarching interest in the effects of incomes. 
 
The effects of partner matching according to education have received the most attention (e.g., 
Ultee et al., 1988; Henkens et al., 1993; De Graaf and Ultee, 2000). Homogamy by education 
is an important aspect of modern marriage markets, and recent results suggest that educational 
homogamy is on the increase (Blossfeld and Timm, 2003).15 Homogamous tendencies are 
strong also according to age (which is often used to proxy experience in empirical studies on 
labour supply). In both cases, not only preferences, but also the social settings in which people 
meet affect the level of homogamy.  
 
Several studies on coupled joblessness have sought to explain the phenomenon with 
homogamy by education, but also by age and occupation (e.g., Ultee et al., 1988; Henkens et 
al., 1993; Halvorsen, 1999; Nordenmark, 1999; De Graaf and Ultee, 2000). A common result 
is that homogamy provides a partial, but important explanation. Marriage markets thus 
aggravate the inequalities produced in the labour market. An exception to this agreement is 
the study by Henkens and colleagues (1993) from the Netherlands, which did not find that 
shared characteristics played an important role.  
 
In addition to education and age, one can also think of homogamy according to other, often 
unobserved, factors. These include cognitive ability, personality traits, family background, 
and work preferences (e.g., Maloney, 1991: 185, n. 4; Nordenmark, 1999; Dronkers, 2003). 
                                                 
15 Reasons for this include the changes in women’s roles – making female socio-economic resources more 
attractive to men than previously – and increases in the duration of education, lengthening the importance of the 
educational system as a marriage market (Becker, 1981; Kalmijn and Flap, 2001; Blossfeld and Timm, 2003). 
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Nordenmark (1999) incorporated variables on work attitudes to his analysis of Swedish 
couples, but did not find any support for this accumulated low work morale –hypothesis. 
 
3.3.2.3 Local labour market conditions 
There can be important regional variation in dual joblessness, as documented by Gregg and 
Wadsworth (2001) in the case household joblessness in Britain. Local labour market 
conditions may contribute to dual joblessness in two ways. First, local labour market 
problems – such as a shutdown of a major employer in town – can affect both spouses’ 
unemployment risks and their chances of finding a job. Second, local labour market 
conditions can decrease labour market participation through the so-called discouraged worker 
effect. In case of inferior labour market conditions, the individual (or the spouses) may view 
job search as not worthwhile or too costly, and withdraw from the labour market.16  
 
Previous studies have used “local” unemployment rates, whether regional or country, as 
measures of local labour market conditions. Many studies have reported that local 
unemployment rates decrease employment propensities, and contribute to explaining the 
association between spouses’ employment statuses (e.g., Ultee et al., 1988; Maloney, 1991; 
Henkens et al., 1993; De Graaf and Ultee, 2000; Bingley and Walker, 2001). Other studies did 
not find significant effects (e.g., Dex et al., 1995).  
 
Maloney (1991), and Bingley and Walker (2001) decomposed this effect into the discouraged 
worker effect and the difficulties in getting a job in their analyses of the employment of the 
wives of unemployed men in the United States and in Great Britain, respectively. The results 
suggest that the discouraged worker effect plays a stronger role, possibly because of the high 
the labour supply elasticity of married women.  
 
3.3.2.4 The Added Worker Effect 
The Added Worker Effect (AWE) is the most sought after effect in the economic literature on 
the labour supply of the wives of unemployed men. The core of this hypothesis is that such 
wives increase their labour supplies as a reaction to the decreases in family incomes (their 
                                                 
16 It is possible that joblessness of the spouse incurs an additional negative signal of the state of the labour 
market. This possibility has not, however, been explicitly tested, although the labour market status of the 
husband has sometimes been used to indicate a discouraged worker effect through local labour market conditions 
(Doris, 1998: 22-24).  
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unearned income) following the unemployment of their husband.17 This effect works contrary 
to the discouraged worker effect, and the competition between these two effects has been a 
considerable stimulant of empirical research.  
 
In her seminal paper, Lundberg (1985) built on the work by Mincer (1962) that expects that 
the AWE is a reaction to the initial shock of the unemployment of the husband, instead of 
prolonged unemployment. In her transition rate analysis, she reported supporting evidence. 
However, Maloney (1991), who also controlled for unobserved factors, did not find support 
for this argument: instead, he reported that wives do not react to the shock of unemployment 
by entering into the labour market, but do increase their labour supplies if the husband 
experiences prolonged or recurrent unemployment.  
 
Most studies that have found support for the AWE have concluded that this effect is modest in 
size (cf. Stephens, 2002: 505; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004: 19). Maybe the only study that 
found a strong AWE is Stephens (2002). He studied the effects of worker displacement 
instead of unemployment as such, due to the major and long-lasting income falls following 
displacement. Stephens found that the effects of displacement on the labour supply of the wife 
were strong and lasted for long period of time. With this exception, the general conclusion 
from the literature is that the AWE is either weak or non-existing, and the discouraged worker 
effect and other labour supply depressing effects are stronger than any added labour supply by 
the wife induced by unemployment of the husband.  
 
A plausible reason for this is that unemployment benefits crowd out any family responses to 
unemployment (discussed next). Another possibility is that the lower wages of wives would 
not be a good compensation for the lost earnings of their husbands (Cullen and Gruber, 2000). 
Non-employed wives may also not bother taking up job search if they expect their husbands 
to find a new job fast. Doris (1998) considered this possibility, but did not find according 
evidence (even though she underlined the limits of the variable she used). A final possibility is 
that the assumption of income pooling between family members is too strict (Doris, 1998: 
179).18  
                                                 
17 Since male labour supply is less responsive to the incomes of the spouse, it would be less likely that men 
become the added worker if their wife loses her job.  
18 Blau and Kahn (2006) concluded that the elasticity of female labour supply to the earnings of their husbands 
has decreased in the United States. To the extent that this holds elsewhere as well, one could expect that the 
Added Worker Effect is likely to become even smaller.  
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3.3.2.5 Unemployment benefits and means testing  
Many commentators blame unemployment benefits for unemployment. They can also affect 
the labour supplies of other family members by reducing the financial need for any additional 
workers. Cullen and Gruber analysed this possibility (2000). They found that American wives 
of unemployed men would work 30 percent more hours if he did not receive any 
unemployment compensation. Kell and Wright (1990), who studied British wives, similarly 
reported that any unemployment compensation paid to the husband reduced his wife’s 
employment. Further evidence was given by Doris (1998), who concluded that the husband’s 
incomes, whether from work or benefits, determine the wife’s labour supply decisions in the 
expected ways. Thus, unemployment benefits crowd out the labour supply of other family 
members, thus adding to the accumulation of joblessness in households.19 
 
British researchers in particular have often been more interested in the effects of the means 
testing of benefits rather than unemployment compensation as such. This interest stems from 
the empirical findings that show a much wider female employment gap according to 
husband’s labour market status in Britain than in other European countries and from 
theoretical reasoning, which suggests that means testing of benefits may produce disincentives 
for labour supply. The argument is that because means tested benefits take into account the 
incomes of the household as a whole, a decrease in the benefits paid to the husband (or the 
household) decreases the financial benefits of the employment of the wife (who usually earns 
less). Means testing of social benefits can have an additional suppressing effect on the 
AWE.20  
 
Empirical evaluations of the effects of means tested benefit systems are rather numerous. 
Most of the studies have analysed British data. Many studies have measured the effects of 
means tested benefits through receipt of such benefits (e.g., Kell and Wright, 1990; Dex et al., 
1995; Giannelli and Micklewright, 1995; McGinnity, 2002), while other authors have used 
                                                 
19 In this context, it is worth mentioning that even though the absence of unemployment compensation may 
increase the labour supply of additional workers, this additional labour supply may fall far from compensating 
for the income losses induced by unemployment of the main breadwinner (Cullen and Gruber, 2000; also, 
Stephens, 2002).  
20 Although the AWE and the means testing effect appear as similar mechanisms, the AWE depends on 
exogenous incomes of the spouse, while in the means testing mechanism, the effects of spousal incomes on 
labour supply are endogenous (Doris, 1998: 31). The effects of (not means tested) unemployment compensation 
on spousal labour supply, on the other hand, are in a straightforward relation to the AWE, because in this case 
the unemployment benefit received by the spouse is exogenous to labour supply.  
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defined more precise budget constraints (Garcia, 1991; Doris, 1998; Bingley and Walker, 
2001).  
 
The results are not completely robust, although most authors conclude that means testing does 
have negative consequences (e.g., Kell and Wright, 1990; Garcia, 1991; Dex et al., 1995; 
Bingley and Walker, 2001; McGinnity, 2002). Many studies have used these results to explain 
the cross-national variation in unemployment polarization, and especially, its high levels in 
the United Kingdom and Ireland (Kell and Wright, 1990; Dex et al., 1995; Iacovou, 2001; 
McGinnity, 2002). For instance, McGinnity (2002) reported that the employment entry rate of 
British women whose husbands received means tested benefits was much lower than 
otherwise and the high proportion of unemployed men on these benefits explained the lower 
employment rates of these women compared to Germany, where most unemployed men 
receive non-means tested benefits.  
 
Some studies have been more sceptical. For Germany, Giannelli and Micklewright (1995) 
found a negative association between means tested benefits received by the husband and the 
labour market participation of their wives, but no association between means tested benefits 
and labour market transitions. According to Doris (1998: 34), this reflects the endogeneity of 
means tested benefits. Doris herself concluded (for 1980s Britain) that the overall effect of the 
disincentives imposed by means tested benefits does not have an effect on the labour supply 
of the wives of the unemployed. An effect could be found for “potentially working” non-
employed women, but since the group was small, the aggregate effect was driven by other 
mechanisms (Doris, 1998: 177-178).  
 
Finally, a study worth mentioning is Dorsett’s (2005) evaluation of the effects of a British 
policy change, which required both spouses of a couple (instead of just one) to search for 
work. Using difference-in-difference estimation combined with matching techniques, he 
found that the new requirements increased exit from benefits, but the effects on exits from 
worklessness were less clear. This may have to do with the short time-span between the 
implementation of the policy and the evaluation. Preferred outcomes started to evolve at the 
end of the time-frame.  
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3.3.2.6 Complementary or supplementary leisure of spouses 
Another hypothesis drawn from economic theories of household labour supply concerns the 
cross-substitution effects of the labour supply of spouses (Killingsworth, 1983). If the leisure 
times of the spouses are supplementary, an increase in the leisure time of one spouse increases 
the labour supply of the other spouse. If the leisure times are complementary, an increase in 
the leisure time of one spouse increases the time spent on leisure by the other spouse, and thus 
decreases the labour supply. In the former case, we expect a Beckerian division of household 
labour. In the latter case, spouses gain utility from shared leisure. 
 
Some studies have examined this question. In a study of German elderly couples, Blau and 
Riphahn (1999) reported results that support the complementary leisure hypothesis. Other 
results (e.g., Davies et al., 1994; Cullen and Gruber, 2000; cf. Doris, 1998: 26-27) have 
suggested that the presence of an unexplained effect of the unemployment of the husband on 
the unemployment of his wife may partly reflect complementarity, while some researchers 
(Maloney, 1991) have been more sceptical. Doris (1998: 26, 173-174) also found some 
support for the complementary leisure hypothesis. However, she noted that some of her 
results suggested that instead of wishing to spend time with their unemployed husband, wives 
may be not be willing to take over the breadwinner role (see macho-effect below). In general, 
one can expect that the complementarity of leisure times might affect coupled joblessness, but 
mainly for specific sub-groups, such as elderly couples looking forward to retirement (Blau, 
1998; Blau and Riphahn, 1999). On the contrary, the leisure times of couples with children are 
likely to be supplementary, as supported by the research on the labour supply responses to 
parenthood (cf. Lundberg, 1988; Lundberg and Rose, 1999).  
 
3.3.2.7 Psychological effects of own and partner’s unemployment 
An argument closely related to the above discussion concerns the psychological impacts of 
one’s own unemployment and the unemployment of a partner. Unemployment can have 
adverse effects on psychological well-being (e.g., Clark, 2001). Clark (2003) found the 
interesting result that this effect may depend on unemployment in one’s social environment, 
and importantly for our discussion, the unemployment of the spouse. More specifically, he 
found that while own unemployment had psychological costs, unemployment and inactivity of 
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the partner reduced these costs. Moreover, the effect was much bigger for men than for 
women.21  
 
Clark also analysed the labour supply effects of the psychological costs of unemployment. He 
found that the psychological costs of unemployment had a positive effect on exiting 
unemployment, and the effect held after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. An 
implication is that the unemployed, whose partner does not work, have a lower likelihood of 
exiting unemployment. This may explain the accumulation of joblessness into couples.  
 
3.3.2.8 Social capital and spouse resources 
A recent development in the literature on coupled labour market statuses has been an interest 
in the social capital (Lin et al., 1981; De Graaf and Flap, 1988) provided by the spouse 
(Bernasco et al., 1998; Bernardi, 1999; Blossfeld and Drobnič, 2001). This is an extension of 
the research on the effects of social resources provided by friends and acquaintances to those 
provided by the partner. 
 
According to one definition, social capital consists of the size of the network a person can 
effectively mobilize, and of the amount and quality of resources that the people in this 
network possess (Bourdieu, 1986: 204). Other definitions (Coleman, 1990: 302-321) have 
emphasised trust as a necessary pre-requisite for social capital. Trust within a social 
relationship is likely to increase the willingness of the actors to share their resources among 
people with whom they are related. Marriage and partnership is a context for such trust.  
 
Since relying on social networks is a cheap way of acquiring information, the use of such 
links is a popular and effective way of seeking jobs and workers (Lin, 1999). Empirical 
studies on the effects of social resources have shown how the size of one’s network and 
especially the quality of the resources possessed by the people in that network are positively 
associated with individual labour market success (e.g., Lin et al, 1981; De Graaf and Flap, 
1988; Granovetter, 1995). Employment of the spouse can be an important link to the labour 
market, providing both workers and employers with valuable information (Bernardi, 1999: 
                                                 
21 I discuss this difference more in Chapter 6.  
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288).22 Joblessness of the spouse is a break in this link, and thus enforces the accumulation of 
joblessness into couples. Another way in which spouse resources can facilitate success in 
employment is by a direct promotion of human (or cultural) capital (Benham, 1974). This can 
be done by encouragement, by helping with the acquisition of skills, by discussing work 
related matters at home, and by providing information on how to behave in interviews 
(Bernasco et al., 1998; Bernardi, 1999; Róbert and Bukodi, 2002). The resource most 
discussed in this respect is education. 
 
Some studies have found that education of the spouse has a positive effect on employment 
and occupational success (e.g., Bernasco et al., 1998; Bernardi, 1999; De Graaf and Ultee, 
2000; Blossfeld and Drobnič, 2001). Some researchers have interpreted this as reflecting 
spousal resources. De Graaf and Ultee (2000) also suggested that a part of the effects of the 
employment of the spouse may work through social capital effects. Even though testing for 
these effects is difficult with the usual data at hand, it can be speculated that social capital 
mechanisms contribute to explaining the results pointing to employment difficulties of the 
wives of unemployed men, who participate in the labour market (e.g., Maloney, 1991).  
 
3.3.2.9 The macho-effect 
The macho-effect hypothesis refers to the finding by McKee and Bell (1985) and others, 
according to which the wives of unemployed men might be reluctant to assume the role of the 
breadwinner. More precisely, wives might not seek employment because they do not want to 
harm the self-esteem of the husband, do not consider female breadwinning appropriate, do not 
trust in the home making skills of their husband, or their husbands do not want give the 
breadwinner role to their wife (McKee and Bell, 1985; Morris, 1985; Barrére-Maurisson et al, 
1985). The underlying explanation stems from deeply rooted cultural views on the proper 
roles wives and husbands. These values and expectations affect the labour market behaviour 
of couples and obscure utility maximization, as predicted by economic theories.  
 
Qualitative studies are the main source of support for this hypothesis (ibid.). However, Doris 
(1998: 173-174), using a Mover-Stayer model, speculated that some of her results that showed 
a stronger positive effect of the husband’s employment on the labour supply of those wives 
                                                 
22 Although usually willing, the spouse may not be the best provider of information. Spouses are more likely to 
share similar information and contacts, while people with less intensive contacts may possess new, and more 
relevant information. This is what Granovetter has called ”the strength of weak ties” (1973). 
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who were not initially employed reflected a macho-effect like pattern. Despite this result, the 
macho-effect hypothesis has not been explicitly tested with quantitative data. This is the 
objective of Chapter 6, where I test and discuss the hypothesis in more detail.  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
Economists have been active in developing and testing theories of labour supply. The primary 
focus of these theories is on the responsiveness of labour supply to wages and other incomes. 
An extension of these theories is the analysis of the labour supply of families. Not all time 
away from work is leisure. Someone has to keep the household clean, cook meals, and take 
care of the children. This takes time and there is often a trade-off between time spent working 
in the market and at home. Families can divide tasks between their members so that some 
members work more in the market, while others work more at home. The decision-making 
process surrounding these divisions of labour is often complex, and involves considerations of 
financial effects, productivity in housework, and future prospects. Sociologists have pointed 
out that these considerations are not always rational in the neoclassical economics sense of the 
word, but are affected by cultural conceptions of proper gender roles. 
 
In the third section of the chapter, I reviewed the previous explanations for the accumulation 
of joblessness into couples. Most earlier research has sought to explain the low labour supply 
of the wives of unemployed men. One might expect that a non-working wife increases her 
labour supply when her husband becomes unemployed. This is the so-called Added Worker 
Effect. Many studies have searched for this effect. Although a number of results support this 
hypothesis, the estimated effects have generally been modest in size. Mechanisms that depress 
labour supply often overrun this effect.  
 
Spouses tend to be of similar age and have similar levels of education. They are often 
constrained by the conditions of the same local labour market. Both of these factors contribute 
to the similarities in spouses’ employment status. The characteristics of social security 
systems can also depress the Added Worker Effect. Unemployment compensation decreases 
the need for additional workers in the household. Studies interested in the effects of 
unemployment benefits support this claim. This effect can be stronger if the payment and 
level of social benefits depends on the incomes of other household members. Many previous 
studies have found supporting evidence, even though the support is not conclusive, due to the 
complexities in estimating such effects. As we saw in Chapter 2, these means tested benefits 
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play a bigger role in some countries than others. Some researchers have used this variation to 
explain the cross-national differences in the association between partners’ employment status.  
 
Unemployment may “come in couples” (De Graaf and Ultee, 2000) also because spouses 
enjoy leisure together. While some researchers have claimed to find support for this 
hypothesis, the empirical evidence does not seem conclusive. Clark (2003) reported evidence 
that suggested that joblessness of the spouse reduces the psychological costs of 
unemployment; consequently, people with jobless spouses are less likely to exit joblessness. 
Spouses can also provide each other information, contacts to employers, and other valuable 
resources. Joblessness may mean deterioration in the resources that spouses can provide. 
Some sociologists have discussed this social capital explanation. However, direct evidence is 
hard to find. Finally, ethnographic research on jobless couples has found that some wives 
might not want to become the single breadwinner of the family. This explanation has not 
explicitly tested in previous work with quantitative data. I will look for this “macho-effect” in 
Chapter 6.  
 
Summing up, there are several explanations to the puzzle of coupled joblessness. Previous 
research has found maybe the most conclusive support for explanations stressing the common 
characteristics of couples, the conditions of their local labour markets, and the effects of social 
benefits. These mechanisms tend to depress any increase in the labour supply of those with 
jobless spouses. 
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4 DATA, METHODS, AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
 
4.1  Introduction 
In the next section of this chapter, I describe the data I use this dissertation, the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP). The ECHP has become a major tool for comparative 
social scientific research in Europe. The main features of the data are their comparability 
across fifteen European countries and their longitudinal nature. The ECHP contains follow-up 
information on respondents and their households for up to eight years. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, an important aspect is that the data contain information on all members of a 
household. Some researchers have also used it to study dual joblessness in Europe (De Graaf 
and Ultee, 2000; Iacovou, 2001). Neither of these studies exploited the panel structure of the 
data.  
 
Panel data contain more information than cross-sectional data. More specifically, they give 
researchers better opportunities to control for unobserved factors. Many researchers also use 
panel data to study social dynamics. In the empirical chapters, I use ECHP panel data both to 
control for unobserved factors and to study the labour market dynamics of couples. Therefore, 
in the third section of the chapter I briefly introduce the common methods for these purposes. 
I discuss the specific methods for each research question in the respective chapters. 
 
Before we move on to the empirical chapters, I provide some descriptive information on dual 
joblessness in the fourth section of this chapter. I present the trends in dual joblessness in the 
latter part of the 1990s, examine the associations between dual joblessness, unemployment, 
and female employment rates, describe dual joblessness in Europe according to background 
variables, display data on the longitudinal aspects of dual joblessness, and present information 
on the job search activity of dually jobless couples. These results provide a background for the 
three empirical chapters that follow. They also present aspects of dual joblessness that are less 
covered in the empirical chapters.  
 
4.2 The data: European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP) 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The micro-data that I use throughout the empirical part of the dissertation come from the 
European Community Household Panel, the ECHP (see Table 4.1.). The ECHP is a cross-
nationally comparative household panel collected in fifteen countries of the European Union. 
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The countries covered are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. Eurostat coordinated the data production and collection procedures (Eurostat, 
2003), but national partners collected the data in each country. A central feature of the data is 
their cross-national comparability, resulting from the input harmonization of the data (except 
for Sweden and the full British, German, and Luxembourgish panel). Input harmonization 
means that – unlike the case in most comparative data sets – the questionnaire follows the 
same, standardized form in each country. The original data set (first wave) was collected by 
taking a sample of households in each country. The sampling procedures showed some 
variation between the countries (Peracchi, 2002; Eurostat, 2003). Data collectors interviewed 
all household members above the age of sixteen, and collected basic demographic data on the 
other household members. The follow-up was conducted by following “sample persons” – the 
individuals in the original sample, and the children born to women in the original sample – 
and their households. When a sample person left the original household to a new one, the new 
household and its members were included in the study. 
 
The first wave of the data was collected in 1994. Austria joined the project in 1995, Finland in 
1996, and Sweden in 1997. The ECHP was originally planned to cover ten annual waves. 
However, Eurostat decided to stop the collection of the survey after the eighth wave in 2001. 
Due to overlapping data projects and considerable panel attrition, the German, 
Luxembourgish and British partners decided to stop collecting the input-harmonized ECHP 
after the third wave. Instead, the eight-wave panels from these countries are based on output-
harmonized data from the national panels running in these countries (the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), Luxembourgish Panel Survey (PSELL) and the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS), respectively). The Swedish data are also based on their national survey, 
the Swedish Level of Living Survey (ULF). A further limitation of the Swedish data is that 
they are cross-sectional only.  
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Table 4.1.. Basic sampling information on the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). 
 First wave 
(total 
number of 
waves) 
Number of 
households 
in first wave 
(nat. data in 
parentheses) 
Number of 
interviews in 
first wave 
(nat. data in 
parentheses) 
Number of 
individuals 
in first wave 
(nat. data in 
parentheses) 
Household 
response 
rate in first 
wave (%) 
(nat. data in 
parentheses) 
Attrition in 
first five 
waves (%) 
Notes 
Austria 1995 (7) 3,380 7,437 9,579 68.0 -16.7  
Belgium 1994 (8) 3,490 6,710 9,149 84.4 -19.4  
Denmark 1994 (8) 3,482 5,903 7,693 64.2 -25.9  
France 1994 (8) 7,344 14,333 18,916 79.5 -16.5  
Finland 1996 (6) 4,139 8,173 11,214 73.3 n.a.  
Germany 1994 (8) 4,968 
(6,207) 
9,490 
(12,233) 
12,435 
(16,284) 
47.7 
(62.2) 
-7.7 Only three first waves of the original ECHP 
collected, later replaced by data from a national 
panel survey (SOEP). 
Greece 1994 (8) 5,523 12,492 16,321 90.1 -23.6  
Ireland 1994 (8) 4,048 9,904 14,585 55.8 -33.6  
Italy 1994 (8) 7,115 17,729 21,934 90.7 -10.6  
Luxembourg 1994 (7) 1,011 
(2,978) 
2,046 
(6,786) 
2,807 
(8,192) 
40.7 
(65.0) 
-14.3 Only three first waves of the original ECHP 
collected, later replaced by data from a national 
panel survey (PSELL, 1995-2001).  
Netherlands 1994 (8) 5,187 9,407 13,029 87.5 -1.7 No monthly employment data. 
Portugal 1994 (8) 4,881 11,621 14,706 88.9 -4.7  
Spain 1994 (8) 7,206 17,893 23,025 67.0 -16.9  
Sweden 1997 (5) 5,891 9,597 13,361 75.0 n.a. Cross-sectional data only, output harmonized 
from national source (ULF).  
UK 1994 (8) 5,779 
(5,126) 
10,517 
(9,028) 
14,342 
(12,844) 
71.6 
(73.6) 
-2.3 Only three first waves of the original ECHP 
collected, later replaced by data from a national 
panel survey (BHPS). 
Sources: Eurostat (2003); Peracchi (2002); Lehmann and Wirtz (2003); Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, own calculations. 
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The ECHP consist of the following data files. The Household file includes information on the 
demographics, incomes, financial situation, accommodation, durables, and children of the 
household. The Personal file consists of the data gathered from the individual interviews 
(individuals 16 years and more), and includes variables on the individuals’ demographic 
features, employment, unemployment, search for work, previous job, income, education, 
health, social relations, migration trajectories, and life satisfaction. The Register file contains 
basic information on all household members, regardless of their interview status. The 
Relationship file reports the social relationships between the members of the household. The 
Longitudinal link file helps in the construction of the follow-up data set, and includes the 
individual and household identification numbers, and some basic information on the 
respondent. Finally, the Country file has some country level variables on the demographic and 
economic patterns of the countries in the study.  
 
4.2.2  Non-response and attrition 
Non-response rates varied strongly across the countries (Nicoletti and Peracchi, 2005). The 
lowest response rate was in Luxembourg (40.7 percent in the original sample) and the 
Southern European countries had the highest response rates (90.7 percent in Italy). An 
additional problem concerning panel studies such as the ECHP is panel attrition – the 
tendency of sampled individuals and households to drop out of the study between the waves. 
The rates of panel attrition in the ECHP varied considerably across countries and between 
waves. For example, between the first wave and the sixth wave, the overall decrease in sample 
size varied from 1.7 percent in The Netherlands to 33.6 percent in Ireland (Peracchi, 2002). 
Attrition in the British sample of the ECHP was even higher (21 percent between the first two 
waves, and 17 percent between the second and the third wave), in part contributing to the 
British decision to replace the original ECHP with data from the BHPS (Germany and 
Luxembourg had very high rates of non-response in the original sample as well). 
 
The ECHP files include weights to correct for possible non-response and attrition bias. The 
weights were constructed using basic demographic variables (Eurostat, 2003a). There have 
been some questions regarding the effectiveness of the weighting schemes (Peracchi, 2002). 
In Tables 4.2 and 4.3, I compare ECHP estimates of employment and unemployment rates 
using two measures (the ILO main activity status variable (pe003) and self-defined main 
activity status (pe001a) with and without the ECHP cross-sectional weights (pg002)) with 
data from the Employment Outlook published by the OECD (2002).  
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Table 4.2. A comparison of unemployment rates using the ECHP and OECD data 
 1994 2001 
 
OECD 
ECHP 
ILO 
uw 
ECHP 
ILO w 
ECHP 
pe001a 
uw 
ECHP 
pe001a 
w 
OECD 
ECHP 
ILO 
uw 
ECHP 
ILO w 
ECHP 
pe001a 
uw 
ECHP 
pe001a 
w 
Denmark 7.7 9.0 9.5 12.4 12.9 4.4 4.0 3.9 4.9 4.9 
Belgium 9.8 7.9 7.9 11.5 12.6 6.7 3.1 3.0 8.9 9.2 
France 11.9 13.0 13.1 14.0 14.0 8.5 7.7 7.8 10.2 10.4 
Ireland 14.3 12.4 17.0 14.2 19.3 3.9 4.7 6.6 6.6 8.9 
Italy 11.0 17.3 16.8 16.2 16.1 9.5 13.4 12.0 13.7 12.1 
Greece 8.9 14.8 15.0 15.3 15.5 10.4 7.0 7.1 8.5 8.5 
Spain 19.8 23.1 23.4 19.9 20.4 10.6 11.1 11.1 12.0 12.4 
Portugal 6.9 7.2 7.3 9.6 9.7 4.1 2.9 3.8 5.4 6.5 
Austria 3.9 4.0 3.6 5.1 4.8 3.6 3.6 3.4 4.9 4.7 
Finland 14.6 11.9 15.0 14.0 17.1 9.1 6.4 6.4 7.8 8.5 
Germany 
SOEP 
8.2 8.6 8.6 11.0 10.8 7.8 5.2 4.9 9.5 9.6 
Luxembourg 
PSELL 
2.9 .. .. 0.6 0.5 2.1 .. .. 2.4 2.6 
UK BHPS 9.2 .. .. 8.7 8.6 5.0 .. .. 4.1 3.9 
 
Table 4.3. A comparison of employment rates using the ECHP and OECD data 
 1994 2001 
 
OECD 
ECHP 
ILO 
uw 
ECHP 
ILO w 
ECHP 
pe001a 
uw 
ECHP 
pe001a 
w 
OECD 
ECHP 
ILO 
uw 
ECHP 
ILO w 
ECHP 
pe001a 
uw 
ECHP 
pe001a 
w 
Denmark 72.9 75.0 73.6 71.5 69.5 75.9 82.0 81.2 77.2 76.6 
Belgium 56.0 65.5 60.8 62.6 57.8 59.7 69.7 64.0 67.6 63.7 
France 59.5 57.9 57.9 58.5 58.3 62.0 64.3 63.6 65.1 64.2 
Ireland 53.7 58.0 52.5 54.3 49.0 65.0 66.2 65.5 63.4 63.1 
Italy 51.7 53.4 53.4 52.0 52.0 54.9 55.7 54.2 55.1 55.7 
Greece 55.9 56.1 55.7 55.0 54.6 55.6 59.0 58.3 58.4 57.8 
Spain 47.0 49.1 50.0 46.5 47.2 58.8 58.9 58.5 58.0 57.4 
Portugal 67.0 63.8 67.3 62.0 65.3 68.6 70.1 71.6 69.1 70.3 
Austria 69.2 65.5 69.5 63.9 68.0 67.8 67.6 71.4 65.7 69.4 
Finland 62.2 67.2 63.4 65.2 61.4 67.7 71.5 70.9 68.8 68.8 
Germany 
SOEP 
65.4 72.0 69.0 65.7 64.0 65.8 73.4 70.6 66.9 64.3 
Luxembourg 
PSELL 
58.9 57.8 62.6 63.0 68.7 63.0 70.8 74.2 69.6 72.9 
UK BHPS 69.9 71.5 71.2 65.5 65.2 72.8 72.9 76.4 74.0 73.4 
Sources for both tables: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1 and 8, annual data; 
OECD (2002).  
Notes and abbreviations: uw = unweighted data; w = weighted data; ILO measure comes from the ECHP 
variable pe003; pe001a reports self-defined main activity status. 
 
The results show generally an acceptable match, but in some cases also big differences 
between the measures. These seem to be mainly country specific: the Belgian and 
Luxembourgish ECHP data fare the worst in reproducing the employment rates reported by 
the OECD, and the Italian data overestimate unemployment. Interestingly, the differences 
between the estimates often become smaller by the maturation of the panel. Another 
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interesting finding is that the weighted data do not appear superior to unweighted data. Often, 
the employment and unemployment rate estimates without weights produce closer matches 
with OECD data.  
 
Table 4.4. Average number of months observed for those experiencing dual joblessness, those not, and 
all couples. 
 Experienced dual 
joblessness 
Did not experience dual 
joblessness 
All 
Denmark 47.6 51.7 51.3 
Belgium 56.5 56.9 56.8 
France 54.5 58.3 57.9 
Ireland 57.1 49.1 50.7 
Italy 59.1 57.3 57.6 
Greece 61.7 57.7 58.3 
Spain 58.6 52.5 54.0 
Portugal 61.8 59.0 59.3 
Austria 50.7 50.4 50.4 
Finland 40.7 39.5 39.6 
Germany SOEP 55.1 57.0 56.8 
Luxembourg PSELL 51.2 47.6 48.1 
UK BHPS 58.4 58.1 58.1 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, monthly data of couples, husband 
25-55 years. 
Note: The maximum number of months is 84.  
 
There has been some research on the randomness of attrition in the ECHP (Watson, 2003; 
Behr et al., 2005; Nicoletti and Peracchi, 2005; Vandecasteele and Debels, 2007). Although 
attrition in the ECHP is not random, studies on the effects of attrition on the quality of the 
data have for the most part concluded that selective attrition does not pose a major problem in 
terms of biasing the results of most of the questions the ECHP is used to answer (Watson, 
2003; Behr et al., 2005). The attrition patterns also show some variation across countries and 
across the waves. Interesting for this study, Behr and colleagues (2005: 502) reported that 
while the unemployed show higher rates of attrition, the economically inactive are less likely 
to drop out. Regarding the effects of education, the highly educated have higher dropout rates 
in the Southern countries, while the opposite holds for the Northern countries. However, 
interviewing technicalities (such as interviewer change) and household move had the biggest 
effects on attrition. The former is clearly exogenous to the processes under study (Nicoletti 
and Peracchi, 2005; Vandecasteele and Debels, 2007). Vandecasteele and Debels (2007) 
found that attrition affected estimates of the distribution of education and social class, and 
they used this as an argument for their longitudinal weighting scheme. However, as can be 
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seen from Tables 4.2 and 4.3, the accuracy of employment indicators do not seem to decline 
by time.23  
 
Table 4.4 shows the average number of months observed for couples who experienced dual 
joblessness during the follow-up, and those who did not. We can observe some differences 
(the biggest ones being in Ireland), mainly so that couples that experienced dual joblessness 
were observed for more months than couples that did not experience dual joblessness. These 
patterns may result in a (slight) overestimation of the rates of dual joblessness in these 
countries.  
 
The original weighting scheme of the ECHP is rather simple and straightforward (Eurostat, 
2003a). Since the benefits of using these or other weights are not clear, I decided not to use 
weights in my analyses.24 Furthermore, the variables of the ECHP weights enter into normal 
regression models, and weighting in this case may not reduce the bias of the estimates, but 
does decrease their accuracy (Winship and Radbill, 1994). In some models, I also tested for 
attrition bias of the estimates by specifying Heckman-type two-stage selection models, in 
which I used interview technicalities at wave t as instruments for remaining in the panel at t + 
1 (not shown). The results did not support any additional benefits from this procedure, as the 
estimates remained more or less the same.  
 
4.2.3 The matched partner-files 
For the empirical analyses, I constructed data files in which couples are the unit of analysis. I 
made some restrictions to the data. First, I excluded the Netherlands and Sweden from the 
files. The Dutch data did not have information on the monthly main activity statuses of the 
partners. This information (see below for description of the variable) is central for the 
analyses in Chapters 5 and 7, and used to construct an estimate of monthly benefit receipt and 
levels in Chapter 6. I also excluded the Swedish data, which are not panel data. Therefore, the 
countries included in the analyses are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The final 
number of countries analysed varies between the chapters and the specific analyses at hand. I 
explain the reasons for further exclusions in the appropriate places. The age restrictions differ 
                                                 
23 Here, an additional source of attrition may come from union dissolution and its correlation with background 
factors, such as education (Härkönen and Dronkers, 2006). Since the number of dissolutions observed in the 
ECHP is relatively modest (Uunk, 2004: 273), this is unlikely to pose a problem. 
24 In some cases, however, I use country-level population weights to construct EU-level estimates. 
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across the empirical chapters.25 In the basic age restriction, the sample includes couples, in 
which the husband is aged 25 to 55. In this group, one can expect couples to provide 
themselves through the labour market. As a rule, I excluded students and cases with missing 
values from the analyses. I did not, however, make any restrictions on the basis of marital 
status. Therefore, the sample includes both married and cohabiting couples. In some analyses, 
I include marital status as an independent variable. For the sake of simplicity, I continue to 
call all male partners “husbands” and all female partners “wives’, regardless of their marital 
status.  
 
The ECHP contains data on the economic statuses of all household members. In addition, it 
includes information on the relationships between the members of the household. I used these 
data to construct the matched partner files, which I use in the empirical analyses. There are 
some differences in the variables included in the files and the sample restrictions across the 
chapters. However, each file includes information on the labour market status of the partners, 
their demographic characteristics, their education, health, and so on. The files also include 
household level variables, such as the number and age of children. I discuss the specific 
variables chosen for each analysis further in the empirical chapters themselves.  
 
I constructed the matched partner-files in the following way. In the first step, I matched each 
wife (married or cohabiting) to her husband at each year. After this, I linked individual-level 
information on both the husband and the wife for each year. I did the same for the household-
level variables and the variables on the number and ages of the children in the household. 
Last, I linked the monthly labour market status measure (retrieved from wave t+1, since the 
variable refers to each month of the preceding year) to the partners (when applicable), and 
constructed variables on the joint labour market status of the couple. Because the monthly 
measure refers to the previous year, one wave is lost. Therefore, the maximum number of 
months recorded is 84 months (years 1994-2000, waves 2 to 8).   
 
                                                 
25 Due to the strong correlation between the spouses’ ages, I use the age of only one spouse in each analysis. 
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Table 4.5. Some descriptive statistics of a matched partner file, husband aged 25 to 55 years. 1994-2000.    
 AT BE DK FIN FR GER GR IRL IT LUX PRT SP UK 
Couples  1,316 1,471 987 1,236 3,157 2,522 2,380 1,583 3,819 1,311 2,357 3,221 1,615 
Couple-months 66,172 83,890 48,776 46,665 178,386 130,088 138,176 80,776 219,698 62,884 139,663 174,926 94,081 
Dual employment 56.6 64.6 80.8 71.7 66.0 63.6 44.3 41.6 42.1 37.0 60.5 32.2 69.8 
Male breadwinning 37.1 27.4 14.0 20.7 28.0 28.0 49.6 45.2 46.6 56.3 32.0 55.1 20.5 
Female breadwinning 3.3 2.5 3.1 4.8 3.1 4.5 2.3 2.6 3.9 2.3 3.7 3.8 4.9 
Dual joblessness 3.0 5.5 2.2 2.8 2.9 3.9 3.8 10.6 7.4 4.5 3.8 8.9 4.9 
Mean age, husband 41.8 41.0 41.5 42.0 41.2 41.1 42.8 42.3 42.8 41.1 42.1 41.7 41.2 
Low education, 
husband 1 
11.8 27.0 16.9 22.7 37.7 17.6 50.0 46.4 54.4 38.5 84.3 61.2 38.6 
Middle education, 
husband  
80.7 34.5 46.9 45.5 39.5 56.8 29.4 35.6 36.3 39.5 9.8 17.4 13.0 
High education, 
husband  
7.5 38.5 36.2 31.8 22.9 25.7 20.6 18.0 9.3 22.0 5.9 21.4 48.4 
Low education, wife  26.7 27.4 18.7 19.3 41.2 23.8 52.3 42.0 54.9 55.4 83.2 65.8 45.3 
Middle education, wife 65.7 32.5 43.7 38.0 34.1 60.1 30.0 43.3 36.9 32.3 9.5 16.7 12.7 
High education, wife 7.7 40.1 37.6 42.7 24.7 16.1 17.7 14.6 8.1 12.3 7.4 17.5 42.0 
Bad health, husband 4.0 2.9 1.7 3.1 3.9 11.3 2.3 2.0 4.6 .. 8.6 4.1 7.4 
Bad health, wife 2.5 2.5 3.1 3.0 5.0 13.2 2.0 1.7 4.3 .. 11.2 5.3 8.3 
Number of children 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.4 2.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 
With kids 0-6 yrs  28.2 29.9 31.7 30.3 30.3 22.8 27.9 36.7 26.6 29.6 25.0 28.0 29.4 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel (ECHP), waves 1-8, monthly data of couples, husband 25-55 years, no students. 
1 Education is coded in the ECHP as: Low (less than second stage of secondary education, ISCED 0-2); Middle (Second stage of secondary level education, ISCED 3); High 
(Tertiary education, ISCED 5-7). 
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See Table 4.5 for a description of some basic variables of a matched partner file.26 
 
The dependent variable differs slightly across the empirical chapters. In every case, the 
dependent variable is a combined measure indicating the joint labour market status of the 
couple. In Chapter 7, the dependent variable is binary (dually jobless – not dually jobless). In 
Chapters 5 and 6, the basic dependent variable contains the four combinations of the partner’s 
employment statuses (employed – not employed). Throughout the empirical chapters, I do not 
separate unemployment as a separate category. The reasons behind this are both theoretical 
and practical. For the inequality outcomes of dual joblessness, the biggest difference is 
whether the couple is dually jobless or not, instead of whether either spouse is looking for a 
job. The practical reason is that incorporating unemployment into the dependent variables 
resulted in implausibly small cell sizes. I present some descriptive data on job search among 
jobless couples in the next section of this chapter. For the same practical reasons, I did not 
differentiate between full-time and part-time workers, although some authors have argued in 
favour of such a distinction when analysing dual joblessness (Bingley and Walker, 2001). 
 
Table 4.6. Average dual joblessness rates (%) according to four different measures, 1994-2000 
 pe003 
(ILO) 
pe001 pe001a pc001-pc012 
(monthly) 
Denmark 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Belgium 4.8 5.1 5.1 5.5 
France 4.1 3.3 3.4 2.9 
Ireland 9.1 10.3 10.3 10.6 
Italy 6.1 6.6 6.6 7.4 
Greece 3.9 4.2 4.2 3.8 
Spain 7.5 8.2 8.2 8.9 
Portugal 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.8 
Austria 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.0 
Finland 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 
Germany SOEP 3.4 4.4 4.4 3.9 
Luxembourg PSELL 3.6 3.7 3.8 4.5 
UK BHPS 4.7 4.4 4.6 4.9 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel (ECHP), waves 1-8,  
monthly data of couples, husband 25-55 years, no students. 
 
The ECHP contains variables on the respondent’s labour market status at the time of the 
interview, and monthly data on main activity status (see Eurostat, 2003b). The variables on 
                                                 
26 The share of partners reporting bad or very bad health is high in Germany and Portugal, and the United 
Kingdom. The German and British figures were lower in the original ECHP than their national replacements 
(SOEP and BHPS), and the share of those reporting fair health was higher. The difference may have to do with 
the specific wording of the questions. However, the associations between self-reported health and other health 
variables (such as whether one has chronic health problems, and whether one is hampered by these in daily 
activities) were very similar in both surveys.  
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the respondent’s status at the time of the interview are the respondent’s ILO main activity 
status (pe003), and two self-defined main activity status variables (pe001 and pe001a). The 
monthly data refer retrospectively to the self-defined main activity status at each month of the 
previous year. Because of its retrospective nature, it is subject to recall bias. However, the 
monthly measure of dual joblessness shows a high degree of overlap (over 95 percent) with 
dual joblessness variables measured at the time of the interview, although the overlap is lower 
for dual joblessness than for being outside dual joblessness.  
 
Table 4.6 shows the estimated dual joblessness rates from the four different variables. For the 
most part, the variables produce very similar results. With the exceptions of France and 
Greece, and partly Finland and Denmark, the monthly variable produces slightly higher 
estimates than the variables recording the status at the time of the interview. The differences 
are bigger in Spain and Italy. The monthly measure differs the most from the ILO labour 
market status-based measure (especially in Ireland, Spain, Italy, and Greece), while the 
differences are smaller between the monthly measure and the self-defined main activity 
statuses. The questioning and the coding of the latter are more similar to each other than to the 
ILO status variable. More specifically, the differences between the status-at-interview 
measures seemed to occur for the following reasons. First, those working less than 15 hours 
were coded as non-employed in pe001 and pe001a in the first two waves, but as working in 
the ILO variable. For example, some self-declared housewives and unemployed in fact 
worked, often part-time (and were coded as employed according to the ILO measure). Second, 
there were more missing values for the ILO variable than the others, especially for wives. I 
excluded these cases. The differences between the status-at-interview measure and the 
retrospective monthly measure may also occur because of seasonal variation in dual 
joblessness, recall bias, or different coding.  
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Table 4.7. Number of monthly transitions between the joint employment statuses.  
  Dual emp. Male bread. Female bread. Dual jobless Right-
censored 
Denmark  Dual emp. 38,054 393 137 * 770 
 Male bread. 426 8,029 * 58 178 
 Female bread. 162 * 1,583 (29) 46 
 Dual jobless * 78 36 1,646 42 
Belgium Dual emp. 52,573 517 139 (14) 876 
 Male bread. 501 22,300 * 135 382 
 Female bread. 132 * 2,003 (28) 45 
 Dual jobless (17) 105 (23) 4,440 102 
France Dual emp. 113,812 1,013 399 30 2,027 
 Male bread. 1,101 49,258 * 286 899 
 Female bread. 412 (10) 5,331 81 144 
 Dual jobless 29 285 92 5,131 152 
Ireland Dual emp. 32,295 468 111 (12) 673 
 Male bread. 540 35,473 * 219 691 
 Female bread. 124 * 2,112 55 40 
 Dual jobless (12) 253 63 8,229 142 
Italy Dual emp. 89,328 1,096 332 62 1,589 
 Male bread. 1,056 99,235 (25) 678 1,754 
 Female bread. 287 (22) 8,008 189 182 
 Dual jobless 48 592 190 15,177 393 
Greece Dual emp. 58,864 944 232 92 1,016 
 Male bread. 921 66,192 (15) 375 1,236 
 Female bread. 201 (19) 2,834 56 86 
 Dual jobless 80 337 61 4,666 153 
Spain  Dual emp. 53,298 1,320 366 147 1,080 
 Male bread. 1,367 92,870 45 1,128 1,648 
 Female bread. 393 36 5,870 235 140 
 Dual jobless 153 1,141 248 13,737 314 
Portugal Dual emp. 82,099 697 223 (23) 1,442 
 Male bread. 754 43,384 * 187 733 
 Female bread. 185 * 4,881 70 119 
 Dual jobless (21) 162 72 4,972 121 
Austria Dual emp. 36,061 430 166 * 743 
 Male bread. 403 23,860 * 175 469 
 Female bread. 156 * 2,109 (24) 67 
 Dual jobless * 176 (18) 1,812 61 
Finland Dual emp. 31,739 642 191 (13) 853 
 Male bread. 691 10,260 * 133 289 
 Female bread. 229 (12) 2,366 54 69 
 Dual jobless (12) 158 61 1,559 50 
Germany Dual emp. 79,673 614 442 (10) 1,356 
 Male bread. 737 35,028 (11) 252 614 
 Female bread. 406 * 5,686 62 139 
 Dual jobless (11) 211 56 4,869 131 
Lux. Dual emp. 22,281 372 69 * 528 
 Male bread. 406 34,295 * 120 681 
 Female bread. 46 * 1,307 (17) 45 
 Dual jobless * 96 (17) 2,632 72 
UK Dual emp. 63,585 655 253 20 1,060 
 Male bread. 700 19,128 (11) 120 333 
 Female bread. 240 * 4,529 63 93 
 Dual jobless (14) 132 68 4,476 86 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel (ECHP), waves 1-8, monthly data of couples. 
Husband aged 25-55, no students. * n < 10; ( ) 10 < 30 
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I use the monthly variable in Chapters 5 and 7. In Chapter 5, I analyse monthly transitions. 
Table 4.7 shows the number of monthly transitions between each of the four states, following 
Eurostat regulations.27 The number of some of these transitions is small. Generally the lowest 
number of transitions can be found in cases in which both partners are mobile, and especially 
in transitions from male breadwinning to female breadwinning and vice versa.28 In Chapter 7, 
the monthly variable is used to link dual joblessness and childbearing more closely and to 
increase sample size. In Chapter 6, I use the joint status variable, which is based on the ILO 
definition. While a comparison of the rates in Table 4.6 might suggest that it would be more 
consistent to use the self-defined variables instead of the ILO one, I chose the latter, because 
of its familiarity and “objectivity”. The possible implications of this decision for the results 
are discussed in the concluding section of Chapter 6. 
 
4.3 A brief introduction to the methods used  
In this section, I briefly introduce and summarize the econometric approaches used to analyse 
the data. The specific methods vary between the empirical chapters, and I discuss them in 
more detail in the appropriate chapters.  
 
Panel data are useful in two important ways: to control for unobserved heterogeneity and to 
analyse change over time (Wooldridge, 2002; Halaby, 2004; Petersen, 2004: 331). Panel data 
contain more information than cross-sectional data (Hsiao, 2003). This feature enables one to 
estimate more sophisticated methods and in particular, to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity refers to unobserved factors, which do not change 
across time, but which have an effect on both the dependent variable and the independent 
variable of interest (Halaby, 2004). Equation (1) gives an example of a regression model with 
unobserved factors: 
 
yit = a + β1xit + β 2zi + ui + vit + εit        (4.1). 
 
Here, yit is the dependent variable, a is the constant term, xit is an observed time-dependent 
independent variable, zi is an observed time-constant variable, β:s are the coefficient to be 
estimated, ui a time-constant (fixed) unobserved term, vit a time-dependent unobserved term, 
                                                 
27 These regulations prevent reporting any cell size number below 10, when longitudinal data are used. There is 
one zero cell in this monthly transition file, in transitions from male to female breadwinning. This transition is 
analysed only in Chapter 6, where I use annual transition data, which does not have zero cells. 
28 There are less transitions with low cell sizes in the annual data used in Chapter 6. 
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and εit a true error term with the usual properties. The panel (or cross-sectional time-series) 
nature of the model comes from the fact that the values of some of the variables can vary by 
time. Otherwise, the model is static, in the sense that we analyse the factors determining the 
values of the dependent variable (e.g., employment, wages) at different time-points instead of 
changes in these values.  
 
If ui is correlated with xit and zi, normal regression models yield biased estimates of the β:s. A 
well-known solution to this problem is fixed-effects (FE) modelling. FE models use time-
demeaning (that is, they use the deviation of each variable at each point in time from the unit-
specific mean of the variable over time) as a way of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity: 
  
 )()()()( iitiitiitiit vvxxyy εεβ −+−+−=−     (4.2). 
 
Both the unobserved and the observed time-constant variables disappear in this 
transformation. The former is just want we wanted, but the latter can be a problem if we are 
interested in estimating the effects of time-constant variables as well. There are some 
solutions to estimate the effects of time-constant variables while keeping the advantages of FE 
models (Wooldridge, 2002; Halaby, 2004). If we are interested in the effects of x on y, the FE 
transformation gives us estimates that are free of heterogeneity bias. However, FE models 
continue to yield biased estimates of β if v is correlated with x. Again, different solutions for 
this problem have been suggested, although they demand more from the data and/or rely more 
heavily on identifying assumptions than the FE models (ibid.). I use FE estimation in Chapter 
7 to estimate the effects of childbearing and the age of the youngest child on the risk of dual 
joblessness. The chapter includes a further discussion of the particular specification used.  
 
Panel data also allow analysis of change. In our specific case, I use the ECHP to analyse 
transitions between the joint labour market statuses and in particular, transitions to and from 
dual joblessness. I use transition models in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
In Chapter 5, I exploit the fact that the rates of dual joblessness (or unemployment, poverty, 
marriage, and so on) are easy to decompose into inflows to dual joblessness and outflows 
from dual joblessness. Building on this fact, I analyse the cross-national variation in dual 
joblessness as a function of these flows.  
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I further analyse specific transitions to and from dual joblessness with event-history (or 
survival/hazard regression) models. These models express the transition probability (or more 
precisely, the hazard) of a transition in terms of selected covariates, as in normal regression 
analysis (Yamaguchi, 1991; Blossfeld and Rohwer, 2002). Event-history models were 
explicitly developed to model duration data, where a number of spells are routinely censored 
from the right, that is, the spell has not ended at the time of measurement (person is still 
unemployed, for example). If right-censoring is exogenous to the process, event-history 
methods can easily handle it. A bigger problem is left-censoring, that is, the spell has started 
before the observation window. Left-censoring is common in panel data, where retrospective 
information before the first interview is not available. In such cases, the estimates may suffer 
from sample-selection bias. This problem is particularly serious in case of duration 
dependency, that is, the duration in a state affects the exit rate from it. There has been quite 
some research on duration dependency in unemployment. According to a survey of the 
results, there is very little evidence of true duration dependency in most countries (Machin 
and Manning, 1999: 3117).29 
 
I analyse transition data also in Chapter 6. In this case, I model the transition rates between the 
four-class joint employment status variable. A standard approach to this is the so-called 
competing risk model (ibid.), in which the unit of analysis can move between more than two 
statuses. For example, a single person may start cohabiting or get married. In our case, a 
dually jobless couple may move to dual employment, employment of the husband only, or 
employment of the wife only. I extend the competing risk framework to take into account not 
only the characteristics of each couple, but also the utility of being in a specific status (in this 
case, the expected social benefits in each status), with conditional logit modelling. I explain 
the details of this analysis in the chapter.  
 
4.4   Some preliminary results 
In what follows, I present some preliminary results of dual joblessness in Europe. Tables 4.5 
and 4.6 already presented some data on average European dual joblessness rates between 
1994 and 2000. The rates of dual joblessness varied widely. The lowest rates were in 
Denmark and the highest in Ireland. Dual joblessness was rather common also in Italy and 
                                                 
29 There can of course be sample selection on a range of unobservable factors.  
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Spain. The dynamic sources of this cross-national variation are analysed more closely in the 
next chapter. In this section, I instead present descriptive results, namely on the trends in dual 
joblessness, dual joblessness by background variables, information on the longitudinal nature 
of dual joblessness, and job search among dually jobless couples. The dual joblessness 
variable used in this section is the monthly one, except in the job search figures, in which I 
use annual data.  
 
4.4.1 Trends and cross-national variation 
Figures 4.1a to 4.1d show the trends in dual joblessness rates from 1994 to 2000. In general, 
dual joblessness rates remained rather stable or decreased. The rates fell dramatically in 
Ireland and Spain, which are also the countries where unemployment fell from high levels 
during this period (see Figures 2.2a to 2.2d). Dual joblessness rates fell with the economic 
recovery also in other countries, such as Finland and the United Kingdom (cf. Gregg and 
Wadsworth, 2003).  
 
Next, I briefly examine the ways in which dual joblessness rates corresponded to overall 
labour market conditions and developments. I use unemployment rates as a measure of labour 
market performance, as it measures the share those workers who want a job but do not have 
one. Employment rates obviously depend partly on unemployment rates, but also reflect other 
aspects of labour supply. Since male employment rates are rather similar across our countries 
(e.g., OECD, 2004: 295), the main component explaining the country variation in average 
employment rates is the large variation in female employment rates, as discussed in the third 
section of Chapter 2.  
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Figures 4.1a to 4.1d. Trends in dual joblessness in Europe  
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Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel (ECHP), waves 1-8, monthly data of couples. 
Husband 25-55 years, no students.  
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Therefore, Figures 4.2 and 4.3 plot the average dual joblessness rates against average 
unemployment and female employment rates, respectively. Unsurprisingly, average 
unemployment rates are positively (r = 0.44),30 and average female employment rates 
negatively correlated (r = -0.63) with dual joblessness rates. Visual inspection of the plots also 
reveals outliers from the general trend: for example, Ireland has a higher joblessness rate than 
expected on the basis of the unemployment and female employment rates.  
 
Figure 4.2. Average unemployment and dual joblessness rates, 1994-2000. 
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Sources: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel (ECHP),  
waves 1-8, monthly data. Husband aged 25-55, no students.  
OECD Database on Labour Force Statistics, online [stats.oecd.org]. 
 
Figure 4.3. Average female employment and dual joblessness rates, 1994-2000. 
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Sources: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel (ECHP),  
waves 1-8, monthly data of couples. Husband aged 25-55, no students.  
OECD Database on Labour Force Statistics, online [stats.oecd.org]. 
 
In Table 4.8, I regress the dual joblessness rates for each year (based on the monthly measure) 
on unemployment and female employment rates as a simple further examination of these 
associations and cross-national differences in dual joblessness. The data are thus a panel of the 
                                                 
30 Spain drives this correlation. Spain excluded, the correlation falls to 0.17. 
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thirteen countries with up to seven waves. In the first model, I include both independent 
variables but do not control for country fixed effects. The signs of the estimates are as 
expected and support the results in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. The second model controls for country 
fixed effects. The estimate of the unemployment rate nearly triples, and a 1 percent increase in 
unemployment increases dual joblessness by 0.4 percent. The estimate of female employment 
rates, however, decreases and becomes significant only at the 10 percent level. An 
interpretation of these models is that labour market performance (as measured by the 
unemployment rate) is an important factor driving the dual joblessness rates within countries. 
This corresponds to the interpretations of trends in dual joblessness discussed above (Figures 
4.1a to 4.1d). Net of unemployment rates, female employment mainly affects the cross-
national differences in dual joblessness instead of changes in them. Gregg and Wadsworth 
(2003) reported similar results in their analysis of the effects of the British economic recovery 
on household joblessness. The recovery decreased the rate of household joblessness, but not 
employment polarisation across households, which appeared more structural. In a similar 
manner, economic trends affect the rate of dual joblessness within countries. On the other 
hand, the factors affecting the cross-national variation in female employment help also in 
explaining differences in the more structural “baseline” rates of dual joblessness. 
 
Table 4.8. The effects of unemployment rates and female employment rates on dual joblessness, OLS 
and fixed-effects regression. Country-level analysis. 
 OLS 
(1) 
Fixed-effects 
(2) 
Unemployment rate 0.145 
(0.063) 
0.434 
(0.078) 
Female employment rate -0.126 
(0.048) 
-0.094 
(0.054) 
Constant 10.176 5.867 
Country fixed effects No Yes 
R squared 0.509 0.452 (overall) 
N observations 87 87 
N countries 13 13 
Sources: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel (ECHP),  
waves 1-8, monthly data of couples. Husband 25-55 years, no students.  
OECD Database on Labour Force Statistics, online [stats.oecd.org]. 
 
In the next chapter, I examine how differences in female employment rates affect the dynamic 
sources of the cross-national variation in dual joblessness rates in more detail. Next, I examine 
how dual joblessness varies across background characteristics, longitudinal measures of dual 
joblessness, and job search among dually jobless couples. 
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4.4.2 Background characteristics and dual joblessness, longitudinal measures, and job 
search among dually jobless couples 
Unemployment does not hit everyone in the same way; it is also reasonable to expect 
differences in dual joblessness rates according to the characteristics of the family. Table 4.9 
confirms this expectation. In many countries, dual joblessness hits older (here, where the 
husband is 45 to 55 years old) couples more than younger ones. The difference is most 
distinct in Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal. In some countries, like Denmark, the 
age group differences in dual joblessness are smaller. In other countries, the middle age group 
usually has the lowest rates of dual joblessness.  
 
Another clear background correlate of dual joblessness is education, both of the husband and 
of the wife. In all countries, those with high education have low, or very low, rates of dual 
joblessness. In contrast, couples in which the husband or the wife has a low level of education 
(which often go together, given the high levels of educational homogamy) have high rates 
dual joblessness. The educational gradient of dual joblessness is the most pronounced in 
Ireland, followed by Belgium and Italy.  
 
An even clearer distinguishing line goes between couples with husbands who report having 
poor health, and those who do not; wife’s health is of less importance.31 Again, we can find 
large cross-national differences. The link between the poor health of the husband and dual 
joblessness is the strongest in Ireland and Belgium. An amazing half of these couples is dually 
jobless.32 In other countries, such as Finland or Germany, husband’s health is less associated 
with dual joblessness. With the exceptions of Ireland and the United Kingdom, childless 
couples have lower levels of dual joblessness than those with children. The levels are mainly 
similar among couples with children of less than school age. The effects of children are 
analysed further in Chapter 7. 
 
 
                                                 
31 One should keep in mind the precautions for the use of this variable, as discussed above.  
32 I use health as an explanatory or control variable in all the empirical analyses. However, I do not focus on it 
specifically in any chapter, despite its strong correlation with dual joblessness in some countries. I return to the 
issue in Chapter 8, where I suggest topics for future research.  
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Table 4.9. Dual joblessness by background characteristics, 1994-2000.    
 AT BE DK FIN FR GER GR IRL IT LUX PRT SP UK 
All 3.0 5.5 2.2 2.8 2.9 3.9 3.8 10.6 7.4 4.5 3.8 8.9 4.9 
Husband aged 25-34 2.0 2.8 2.8 3.4 2.7 3.3 3.2 11.0 5.8 1.3 1.5 8.3 5.2 
Husband aged 35-44 2.1 4.0 2.1 1.8 2.3 2.0 1.9 8.7 3.5 2.8 1.8 6.7 3.7 
Husband aged 45-55 4.5 9.1 1.9 3.3 3.7 6.0 5.7 12.2 11.3 8.4 6.8 11.4 5.7 
Low education, 
husband  
1.3 2.2 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.5 1.8 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.3 2.1 2.4 
Middle education, 
husband  
2.5 4.4 1.3 3.3 2.0 3.4 3.3 5.1 3.4 3.1 0.8 4.9 1.9 
High education, 
husband  
8.0 11.9 6.4 4.5 5.2 9.1 5.0 18.5 11.0 7.8 4.4 12.4 8.9 
Low education, wife 0.3 1.6 0.7 1.6 0.9 0.6 1.3 1.0 0.4 1.2 0.6 2.1 2.3 
Middle education, wife 2.0 4.2 1.0 2.9 2.0 2.8 3.3 4.9 3.1 2.7 0.8 3.7 2.5 
High education, wife 6.4 13.3 8.0 5.3 4.7 9.1 5.0 19.9 11.0 6.2 4.5 12.0 7.4 
Bad health, husband 18.3 49.0 21.2 14.0 17.8 12.2 22.6 54.0 27.8 .. 19.2 34.9 20.7 
Bad health, wife 12.7 16.6 12.5 10.4 8.7 9.2 8.5 28.0 16.6 .. 10.8 20.1 14.9 
Childless 4.3 7.3 2.3 3.2 3.5 4.5 6.0 6.0 11.5 7.4 6.0 10.0 3.5 
Children (yes) 2.6 4.8 2.1 2.6 2.7 3.6 3.2 11.4 5.9 3.0 3.1 8.6 5.6 
With kids 0-6 yrs  2.4 4.5 3.0 3.9 3.3 5.6 2.8 11.8 5.3 2.4 3.0 8.1 6.2 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel (ECHP), waves 1-8, monthly data of couples. Husband 25-55 years, no students.  
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Table 4.10 goes on to display some longitudinal information on dual joblessness. The first 
column presents the share of couples, which experienced dual joblessness during the seven-
year period. The experience of dual joblessness was more widespread than suggested by Table 
4.9. In Denmark, for example, where the average dual joblessness rate was around 2 percent, 
10 percent of the couples experienced dual joblessness during these seven years. In Spain, 
every fourth couple experienced dual joblessness, and in Ireland and Italy, every fifth and 
every sixth couple, respectively, was dually jobless for at least one month during the period. 
The difference between the average rates and the share experiencing dual joblessness suggests 
that dual joblessness is not only a problem for some more or less permanently excluded group.  
 
Table 4.10. Longitudinal measures of dual joblessness and weak coupled labour market attachment in 
Europe, 1994-2000. 
 Experienced 
dual 
joblessness 
Repeated dual 
joblessness 
Expected duration 
of dual joblessness, 
months3 
Austria 1 10.8 4.1 11.0 
Belgium 12.1 3.0 33.7 
Denmark 10.9 3.8 13.7 
Finland 2 13.1 5.0 8.3 
France 11.2 4.3 14.6 
Germany 12.1 3.6 19.9 
Greece 13.3 5.9 11.6 
Luxembourg 1 12.2 1.8 24.4 
Ireland 20.0 6.2 27.0 
Italy 17.9 6.1 20.5 
Portugal 11.4 3.0 21.0 
Spain 25.5 12.5 11.0 
UK 13.4 10.0 22.9 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel (ECHP), waves 1-8, monthly data of couples. 
Husband 25-55 years, no students.  
1 The Austrian and Luxembourgish data cover only 72 months 
2 The Finnish data cover only 60 months 
3 Calculated as 1/exit rate, from Table 5.4. 
4 Refers to the share of couples, who experienced half of the observed spells in dual joblessness  
 
The second column shows the share of couples, which experienced repeated dual joblessness, 
that is, experienced at least two spells. The shares were the highest in Spain and the United 
Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, a spell of dual joblessness is often followed by another 
spell, as we can see by comparing the figures from the first and the second columns. In the 
other countries, the difference is smaller. In Luxembourg, one sixth of couples that 
experienced dual joblessness had at least two spells. In the rest of the countries, the share is 
between 25 and 50 percent. The last column of the table displays the expected duration of dual 
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joblessness.33 Again, we see wide cross-national variation. In Finland, a couple that becomes 
dually jobless can expect to remain in the state for 8 months. In Belgium, the expected 
duration is an astonishing 34 months. The expected durations are above two years also in 
Ireland and Luxembourg. The expected durations of dual joblessness are less than a year also 
in Austria, Greece, and Spain. The cross-national variation in the durations of dual joblessness 
are analysed further in Chapter 5.  
 
Finally, Figure 4.4 gives the share of husbands and wives of dually jobless couples, who were 
looking for work. In every country, husbands are more likely to look for work than their 
wives.34 What is more striking is the low rate of job seekers in many countries, even among 
husbands. Gregg and Wadsworth presented similar results on household inactivity in the 
United Kingdom (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2001). The job search rate of husbands is 50 percent 
or above only in six countries. These are interesting results. Although I do not analyse dual 
unemployment or dual inactivity in any of the empirical chapters, I return to these figures in 
the concluding chapter, Chapter 8. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Job search among dually jobless couples 
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 Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel (ECHP), waves 1-8, annual data of couples. 
Husband ages 25-55 years, no students.  
 
                                                 
33 I calculated the expected duration of dual joblessness as 1/(exit rate from dual joblessness) with the figures 
from Chapter 5. This relationship holds, if the exit rates do not vary by duration. Since this assumption may not 
hold, the expected durations here are rather rough estimates.  
34 In all countries except Denmark, Finland, and France, more than half of these wives mentioned “housework” 
as their main activity during dual joblessness (not shown). 
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4.5   Conclusions 
In this chapter, I presented the data, some common methods for analysing panel data, and 
descriptive results on dual joblessness in Europe. The European Community Household 
Panel, the ECHP, is a widely-used data-set for comparative studies on the levels of living in 
Europe. It contains data on fifteen European countries. I include thirteen of these countries in 
the dissertation: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In the following chapters, I 
make some further restrictions to this sample. The ECHP is a household panel, and it contains 
information on all household members. I used this feature to match information on partners 
and their households to create the data files that are used in the empirical analyses. The 
baseline data file includes couples, in which the husband is aged 25 to 55 and neither partner 
is a student. In Chapter 7, I use a different age restriction, which I discuss respectively.  
 
Panel data enable users to control for unobserved heterogeneity, that is, time-invariant 
unobserved factors that affect both the outcome and the independent variables. A common 
group of methods used for this purpose is fixed-effects regression methods. I use fixed-effects 
logit modelling to analyse the effects of the number and age of children on dual joblessness in 
Chapter 7. Many researchers also use panel data to analyse social dynamics. Event-history 
regression is well suited for analysis of transition rates. This method relates transition rates to 
explanatory variables in the same way as normal regression methods. I analyse transition rates 
with event-history models and related methods in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
Dual joblessness rates varied widely across Europe in the 1990s. The lowest average rate was 
in Denmark and the highest in Ireland. In several countries, the rates of dual joblessness 
decreased from the mid-1990s to 2000 as responses to economic recoveries. Dual joblessness 
risks vary by the characteristics of the family. Dual joblessness was particularly high among 
couples, in which the husband had health problems, or in which the partners had low levels of 
education. In some countries, older couples were also more likely to be dually jobless than 
other couples. Over the seven-year span (1994-2000), dual joblessness hit 10 to 25 percent of 
the couples. This suggests that dual joblessness was not a problem of a particular group only. 
However, the expected duration of dual joblessness can be very long. Many dually jobless 
couples were practically inactive and had low rates of job search.  
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5 DUAL JOBLESSNESS IN EUROPE: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Why do rates of dual joblessness rates vary across Europe? Despite the importance of this 
manifestation of social inequality in Europe (Table 5.1), limited research has aimed to answer 
this question. The preliminary results from the analyses with country-level panel data in the 
previous chapter suggested that labour market performance (as measured by unemployment 
rates) is more important for explaining changes in dual joblessness within countries than 
female employment rates. However, the latter do contribute to understanding the cross-
national variation in dual joblessness. Previous cross-national research, which has focused 
mainly on employment polarisation and the labour supply of the wives of unemployed men 
has often stressed the differences in social provision systems across countries, and in 
particular, the role of means testing in the United Kingdom and Ireland in explaining the high 
rates of polarisation in these countries (see Chapter 3.3.2.5). 
 
The understanding of the causes underlying the cross-national differences in dual joblessness 
and employment polarisation remains limited. Iacovou (2001: 23-24) pointed out that social 
benefits–based explanations are likely to have their limits, and a better understanding of the 
cross-national differences should look in more detail into the institutions of each country. She 
also stressed the limits of simple explanations based on welfare regime categories: the 
variation within welfare regimes is too wide to be unacknowledged. Furthermore, she 
suggested dynamic instead of static approaches as a potentially fruitful line of future research. 
 
Table 5.1. Dual joblessness rates in thirteen European countries, 1994-2000 (average). 
 AT BE DK FI FR GER GR IRL IT LU PO SP UK 
Dual 
joblessness 
3.0 5.5 2.2 2.8 2.9 3.9 3.8 10.6 7.4 4.5 3.8 8.9 4.9 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, monthly data of couples, husband 
25-55 years old, no students. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to improve understanding of European differences in dual 
joblessness with a dynamic approach. I decompose the differences in the rates of dual 
joblessness into dynamic differences in inflows and outflows. These dynamics are also of 
interest in themselves. Moreover, static differences in dual joblessness rates can result from 
differences in either dynamic. On the other hand, two similar dual joblessness rates can hide 
considerable differences in the dynamics of dual joblessness (see, e.g. Blanchard and 
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Portugal, 2001, for a similar analysis on unemployment rates and dynamics, and Bane and 
Ellwood, 1986, on poverty). A shortcoming of the previous literature is, I believe, precisely 
the shortage of analyses that combine country comparisons with dynamic approaches, despite 
calls for such research in the methodological literature (Blossfeld, 1996; Mayer, 2005). The 
dynamic analyses that exist have focused primarily on the labour market dynamics of the 
wives of jobless men (Giannelli and Micklewright, 1995; McGinnity, 2002; however, De 
Graaf and Ultee, 1991). However, as we will see in this chapter, the employment dynamics of 
husbands are crucial for understanding the dynamics of dual joblessness.  
 
I first discuss the expected European differences in dual joblessness flows – and consequently, 
in rates of dual joblessness – building on a dynamic model of dual joblessness, previous 
studies, and the literature on welfare states, families, and labour markets in Europe. This 
model drives the empirical analyses of monthly labour market data from thirteen ECHP 
countries (EU15 minus Sweden and the Netherlands) and 28,517 couples, in which I first 
decompose dual joblessness rates into their inflow and outflow components, and then analyse 
the most important factors producing the observed cross-national differences in dual 
joblessness with further decompositions and event-history analysis.  
 
5.2 Explanations for the comparative differences 
5.2.1 A dynamic approach 
Differences in the rates of dual joblessness depend on differences in flows into and out of dual 
joblessness, as shown by the following equation (cf. Azmat et al., 2006: 11): 
 
   
inout
inr λλ
λ
+
=        (5.1). 
 
Here r is the steady-state rate of dual joblessness, inλ is the transition rate to dual joblessness 
(from at least the other partner employed), and 
outλ  is the transition rate from dual joblessness 
(to employment of at least the other partner). The rates of dual joblessness thus depend on the 
incidence risks of dual joblessness and its durations. The decomposition of rates into flows is 
a common analytical approach in research on unemployment differences between countries 
and social groups (e.g., Mincer, 1991; Blanchard and Portugal, 2001; Azmat et al., 2006), but 
has not yet been applied in research on household joblessness.   
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It is possible to decompose the inflow and outflow rates further by recognizing more than two 
joint labour market statuses and the transitions between them. Here – to keep the model 
manageable – I use a simple four-state model of the partners’ employment – non-employment 
combinations: dual employment (both work), “male breadwinning” (husband only works), 
“female breadwinning” (wife only works), and dual joblessness (both jobless). The inflows 
and the outflows decompose to 
 
  fumuduin aaa λλλλ 321 ++=       (5.2),  
 
and 
 
  ufumudout λλλλ ++=        (5.3), 
 
where 
mudu λλ , and fuλ are the transition rates to dual joblessness from dual employment, male 
breadwinning and female breadwinning, and 
umud λλ , and ufλ are the transition rates from dual 
joblessness to these states, respectively. The weights 21 , aa , and 3a are the couple’s 
probabilities of dual employment, male breadwinning, and female breadwinning, respectively, 
conditional on not being dually jobless. They add up to one. In event-history analysis 
language, they represent the different origin states (cf. Blossfeld and Rohwer, 2002). The first 
decomposition (Equation (2)) tells that the country differences in inflows depend on the 
distribution of the origin states – that is, the national “breadwinner models” – and the inflow 
rates from these origin states. The second equation (3) implies that the differences in outflows 
depend on the outflows from dual joblessness to the alternative destination states.  
 
Based on these decompositions, I next discuss the expected mechanisms behind the 
differences in the dynamics, and consequently, the rates of dual joblessness in Europe.  
 
5.2.2 Differences in inflow rates 
The national differences in the incidence (inflows) of dual joblessness depend on the cross-
national differences in breadwinner models and the differences in the inflows from each 
breadwinning status. It is safe to expect that the risk of dual joblessness is lower when both 
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partners work instead of just one. This generalizes to a hypothesis that the incidence rates of 
dual joblessness are lower in countries with more dually working couples (cf. Esping-
Andersen, 1999: 162). Female breadwinner couples constitute a small minority (less than 5 
percent) everywhere in Europe (see Table 4.5 in the previous chapter). We can thus expect 
that the European variation in the shares of dual earner versus male breadwinner families 
create the main source of difference in the breadwinner component of inflows. 
 
Despite the lower risk of dual joblessness and the other economic benefits of the dual earner 
model, many European couples divide market work and household tasks so that only one 
partner, practically always the husband, is in paid employment. This can be a rational strategy 
in resource-constrained households (Becker, 1981), particularly when wages are high, 
marriages stable, and unemployment risks low. Cultural views of the proper gender division 
of work have further strengthened this division of family labour (see Chapter 2). However, 
female homemaking has often changed from a marriage-long career to a transitional phase 
during special periods, such as the children’s early years (Blossfeld and Drobnič, 2001). 
Consequently, dual earner couples have become increasingly common across Europe.  
 
Despite this partial convergence, female employment rates and the shares of dual earner 
couples varied visibly in Europe, as seen in Chapter 2 and Table 5.2. In the 1990s, the Nordic 
countries had the highest rate of female employment and the highest share of dual earner 
couples, while Greece, Italy, Spain, and Luxembourg were at the other end of the scale. In that 
chapter, I also discussed some explanations for this variance. Summing up the discussion, 
researchers have paid maybe the most attention to the role of public policies that support the 
employment of mothers. Parental leave schemes and publicly provided or substituted 
childcare promote female employment (Gornick et al., 1998; Ruhm, 1998; Esping-Andersen, 
1999; Jaumotte, 2003). In Chapter 2, I also discussed explanations that stress the role of 
“female friendly” employment possibilities, labour market regulation, and wage setting 
systems. The expansion of the service sector, and especially in the European context, the 
increases in public sector service jobs has made employment more attractive to women (e.g., 
Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). Compressed wages may increase female labour supply, but 
tight labour market regulation can reduce female employment. Finally, variation in gender 
roles and employers’ preferences for male employment may contribute to the differences in 
female employment.  
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If the breadwinner component drives the differences in dual joblessness incidence, we may 
expect that the incidence of dual joblessness is low in the Nordic countries, followed by the 
United Kingdom and the Continental countries. Dual joblessness incidence should be the 
highest in the Southern countries (with the exception of Portugal), Ireland, and Luxembourg.   
 
Alternatively, the national differences in dual joblessness incidence can result from variation 
in employment security (Equation 5.2). Despite claims of a general downgrading of 
employment security, unemployment risks vary remarkably across the industrialized 
countries, including Europe (OECD, 1997; 2004; DiPrete, 2005; Azmat et al., 2006; Blossfeld 
et al., 2006). Inside countries, there are important group differences. Workers with high 
education and experience have relatively low unemployment risks partly because of lower 
lay-off risks and partly because of higher probabilities of instantly finding a new job (Mincer, 
1991). Furthermore, smaller and younger firms within the service sector tend to have higher 
rates of job destruction (Gómez-Salvador et al., 2004). Thus, the structure of the economy and 
the workforce can shape the comparative differences in employment security. 
 
However, there has been more interest in the effects of employment protection legislation 
(EPL). Strict employment protection both reduces lay-off risks and gives workers time to 
respond to expected job losses. As one would expect, strict EPL is associated with low 
unemployment incidence (e.g., Gangl, 2003: 36; OECD, 2004). Even though EPL is tighter 
everywhere in Europe than in the United States, European labour markets are very 
heterogeneous in this respect. Liberal dismissal rules characterise the British and Irish labour 
markets. At the other end, Southern European countries have strict employment protection 
laws (OECD, 2004; Table 5.2).  
 
However, not all workers enjoy strict employment protection. Job insecurity can be 
remarkably high even in such high or modest employment protection countries as Spain, 
France, and Germany, primarily because of the rising share of workers on temporary contracts 
(DiPrete, 2005; Maurin and Postel-Vinau, 2005). In the 1990s, increases in temporary 
employment were responsible for most job growth in Europe. Yet its share ranged from a low 
of less than five percent in Luxembourg to fifteen percent and above in France, Finland, and 
Portugal, and up to approximately one third in Spain (OECD, 2002; Polavieja, 2002).35 Many 
                                                 
35 Within countries, it is mainly the young and the low-skilled who take the brunt of work on temporary contracts 
(e.g., DiPrete et al., 2006). 
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workers on temporary contracts move to joblessness after the expiration of the contract, and 
the dynamics of temporary jobs have become a major component of overall employment 
dynamics in Europe (European Commission, 2004; Gagliarducci, 2005; DiPrete et al., 2006). 
 
Table 5.2. Descriptive data on thirteen European countries 
 Dually 
employed 
couples, % 
Employment 
protection 
index 
Temporary 
contracts, % 
Centralisation/ 
Coordination 
of wage setting 
Unemployment 
benefit system 
Austria 57 2.4 8 Intermediate UI, UA (MT) 
Belgium 65 2.5 9 Intermediate UI 
Denmark 81 1.8 10 Intermediate UI  
Finland 72 2.2 17 High UI, UA (MT) 
France 66 2.8 15 Low UI, UA (MT) 
Germany 64 2.6 13 Intermediate UI, UA (MT) 
Greece 44 3.5 13 Intermediate UI 
Ireland 42 1.2 4 Intermediate UI, UA (MT) 
Italy 37 3.1 10 Intermediate UI 
Luxembourg 37 n.a. 3 Intermediate MT 
Portugal 61 3.7 21 High UI, UA (MT) 
Spain 32 3.0 32 Intermediate UI, UA (MT) 
United Kingdom 70 1.0 7 Low UI, UA (MT) 
Abbreviations: UI = Unemployment insurance, UA = Unemployment assistance, MT = Means-tested 
Sources: % dually jobless of couples in which the husband is 25-55 years old and neither partner is studying, 
ECHP, own calculations; Employment protection index, late 1990s, OECD (2004), version 2; Temporary 
contracts at 2000, OECD (2002); Centralisation/coordination of wage setting, OECD (2004) except Greece, 
based on Kapopoulos and Papadimitriou (2004); Unemployment benefit system, MISSOC (various years).  
 
Summing up, we can expect that dual joblessness incidence rates are lower in countries with 
tight EPL, few jobs with temporary contracts, and a well-established dual earner model. 
However, there is no such country in our European sample. In contrast, EPL tends to be 
tighter in countries with more male breadwinner couples (with the opposite exceptions of 
Ireland and Portugal). This no coincidence, since the strict employment protection regimes in 
Continental and Southern Europe were in part built precisely to protect the male breadwinner 
family against unemployment (Esping-Andersen, 1996; 1999). The share of temporary jobs 
correlates positively with EPL (Polavieja, 2006: Figure 5), but there is no clear relationship 
between the spread of temporary employment and the dominant male breadwinner pattern. 
We can expect that countries with a prevailing male breadwinner model combined with low 
employment protection (Ireland) or a large share of temporary jobs (Spain) have high rates of 
dual joblessness incidence.  
 
Whether European variation in breadwinner models is more important in explaining variation 
in dual joblessness incidence than the differences in employment protection remains an open 
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question. We can expect that dual earner couples have low risks of dual joblessness. However, 
employment protection tends to be stricter in male breadwinner countries. Therefore, the ways 
in which the dual joblessness risks of couples translate to differences at the population level is 
fundamentally an empirical question. 
 
5.2.3 Differences in outflow rates 
Following Equation (5.3), differences in dual joblessness outflows (and thus, durations) 
depend on country variations in outflows to some or all destination states. Since the transition 
rates from dual joblessness to dual employment are likely to be small, the former depend 
mainly on differences in transitions to male versus female breadwinning.  
 
One of the central explanations for the low labour supply of the wives of jobless men states 
that the budget constraint created by means tested social benefits that depend on the incomes 
of other family members create disincentives for accepting work if the spouse is jobless (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3). Accordingly, comparative studies on the topic have concluded that the 
European differences in the role of means tested benefits explain part of the variation (Dex et 
al., 1995; De Graaf and Ultee, 2000; McGinnity, 2002). In Europe, last resort social assistance 
is means tested in every country, whereas the situation is more heterogeneous in the case of 
unemployment benefits (MISSOC, various years; Table 5.2). Means testing has an important 
role in the United Kingdom and Ireland, and researchers have used this feature to explain the 
high accumulation joblessness in these two countries (ibid.; Garcia, 1991; Davies et al., 1994; 
Giannelli and Micklewright, 1995; for a sceptic, see Doris, 1998).  
 
The above explanation stresses social benefits that are likely to affect dually jobless couples 
more strongly than other non-working people. However, dual joblessness can be part of the 
wider unemployment problem in Europe so that similar mechanisms affect the duration of 
both. Unemployment durations vary widely across Europe (e.g., OECD, 2004; Machin and 
Manning, 1999; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). I discussed the institutional factors affecting 
unemployment durations in Chapter 2. Here I summarise the main arguments. The previous 
literature has in particular discussed the importance unemployment compensation, EPL, and 
wage bargaining processes. Generous unemployment benefits reduce the exit rate from 
unemployment, although the estimated effects are generally modest. What seems to be more 
important is the duration of these benefits. Indeed, unemployment exits peak around the date 
of exhaustion of unemployment compensation. (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991; Machin 
 86 
and Manning, 1999; Cahuc and Zylbergberg, 2004.) The generosity and duration of 
unemployment benefits varies across Europe (Table A5.1 in the appendix to the chapter), and 
this can explain variation in the durations of dual joblessness (see Table 4.8).  
 
Strict employment protection laws may depress job creation and thus increase unemployment 
duration (OECD, 2004). There is also some evidence that EPL may have relatively worse 
effects on the employment of groups with poorer labour market characteristics (Esping-
Andersen, 2001; Kahn, 2007). Strict EPL can thus increase the duration of dual joblessness by 
reducing job flows in general, and by harming the employment prospects of dually jobless 
couples, which often have low labour market resources (see Table 4.7).  
 
Wage bargaining systems can have similar effects. The empirical evidence on the 
(un)employment effects of wage bargaining systems is somewhat ambiguous (e.g., OECD, 
2004). Some research suggests that centralised wage bargaining systems depress employment, 
whereas other studies suggest that the relationship is non-linear, with highly centralised or 
coordinated and highly dispersed systems both producing high employment (Calmfors and 
Drifill, 1988). Centralised and unionised wage setting practices can also decrease the relative 
employment possibilities of sub-groups (Bertola et al., 2002).  
 
We can also point to a factor that I did not discuss in Chapter 2, namely home-ownership. The 
role of home-ownership for employment performance has gained recent interest (cf. Nickell et 
al., 2005; Bassanini and Duvall, 2006). Home-owners are less likely to migrate to another 
region with better employment prospects. Since home-ownership rates vary strongly across 
Europe (OECD, 2005), and dual joblessness often has a strong regional character (Gregg and 
Wadsworth, 2001), we can expect that dually jobless home-owners can have lower transition 
rates to employment.36 
 
Finally, the characteristics of dually jobless couples may vary across countries, as suggested 
by Table 4.7. For example, dually jobless couples in countries with low incidence of dual 
joblessness may represent a “hard core” of coupled joblessness (Esping-Andersen, 2002). In 
other words, it is important to control for the labour market characteristics of dually jobless 
couples. 
                                                 
36 On the other hand, home-owners with mortgages to pay have higher incentives for quick re-employment.  
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As will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, dually jobless couples may be more 
inclined to choose male instead of female breadwinning (see also Chapter 3). The reasons 
include family obligations, human capital and wage differentials between the spouses, and 
couples’ cultural distaste for female breadwinning – the so-called macho-effect (McKee and 
Bell, 1985). These mechanisms can increase the durations of dual joblessness by reducing the 
number of job seekers from two to one. This can vary across countries. Considering the 
European differences in female employment and family institutions, one could expect that 
wives are more reluctant to take the breadwinner role in some countries than in others. For 
example, Danish women who commonly partake in employment can be expected to take the 
breadwinner role more eagerly than Spanish women. If so, Danish couples may have two 
suppliers of labour instead of one, which should shorten the duration of the spell of dual 
joblessness.  
 
Wrapping up the discussion on the country variation in the durations of dual joblessness, we 
can expect that the spells of dual joblessness are especially high in countries where means 
testing has an important role in the social security system, EPL is strict, unemployment 
benefits are generous and long-lasting, and the family institution is more “traditionalist”. 
Again, these features do not accumulate in any straightforward manner. The UK and Ireland 
are the countries most relying on benefit means testing, but only the latter has a more 
traditionalist family model, both have low EPL, and neither is known for benefit generosity. 
The Southern countries have strict EPL and more traditional family patterns, but do not rely 
on means testing and do not usually have generous benefits, unlike the continental countries, 
which score lower on the other two features. There are no a priori reasons to expect that one 
institutional or structural feature would dominate the others.  
 
5.3 Data 
The sample used in this chapter includes thirteen of the fifteen ECHP countries. The main 
dependent variable – the joint labour market status of the couple – was constructed using the 
retrospective monthly labour market status variable, the “Calendar of activities” (Eurostat, 
2003). For the Netherlands, this variable was missing. The Swedish data were cross-sectional 
only, and thus not suitable for the dynamic analyses. In the following analyses, I use matched 
partner data from the remaining thirteen countries for 28,517 couples, where neither spouse 
was a student, and the husband was 25 to 55 years old. Since the monthly activity variable is 
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retrospective and records labour market activity for the previous year to the interview, I 
merged the independent variables to the labour market variables for each year, when 
appropriate. The complete sample thus corresponds to the years 1994 to 2000.  
 
I describe the methods in more detail during the course of the analysis. 
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Table 5.3. Descriptive information of the variables: means and percentages of couple-months 
 Inflow analysis Outflow analysis 
N couples 13,315 3,860 
Average transition rate 0.65 6.17 
Age of husband: 25-34 yrs, % 20.87 18.02 
Age of husband: 35-44 yrs, % 37.29 25.40 
Age of husband: 45-55 yrs, % 41.84 56.58 
Education of husband: High, % 16.75 6.24 
Education of husband: Middle, % 36.56 20.14 
Education of husband: Low, % 46.69 73.61 
Education of wife: High, % 9.97 4.96 
Education of wife: Middle, % 35.84 17.90 
Education of wife: Low, % 54.19 77.14 
Bad health – husband, %  4.02 20.16 
Bad health – wife, %  13.13 
Jobless > year, husband, %  84.52 
Jobless > year, wife, %  93.84 
Number of children  1.42 
Children <3 years, %  19.29 
Regional unemployment rate  13.74 
Permanent contract 55.42  
Atypical contract 6.28  
Contract type unknown 38.29  
Tenure husband – 0-1 yrs. 12.80  
Tenure husband – 2-4 yrs. 12.71  
Tenure husband – 5+ yrs. 74.48  
Professional profession 26.67  
Intermediate profession 15.10  
Skilled manual profession 49.32  
Unskilled manual profession 8.91  
Service sector 46.34  
Industry sector 45.79  
Agriculture sector 7.86  
Private sector, <50 employees 46.42  
Private sector, ≥ 50 employees 45.62  
Public sector 7.97  
Employment protection index 2.84 2.67 
Social assistance or housing benefits, %  21.49 
Unemployment benefit - husband, %  40.46 
Unemployment benefit - wife, %  13.03 
Average replacement rate  0.64 
Duration of unemployment benefits  1.28 
Centralization/coordination  3.12 
Wage bargaining coverage  78.65 
Structural change indicator  7.28 
Denmark 1.99 1.45 
Finland 2.74 1.88 
Germany 18.73 6.79 
Austria 3.98 2.74 
France 4.96 7.04 
Belgium 8.49 5.94 
Portugal 5.50 6.97 
Spain 8.82 21.38 
Italy 17.74 21.48 
Greece 18.93 7.20 
Ireland 5.96 11.08 
United Kingdom 2.70 6.06 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, monthly data of couples, husband 
25-55 years old, no students. 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Country variation in inflows and outflows 
Table 5.4 describes the country variation in inflows and outflows. The first three columns 
present the average monthly transition rates (in percentages) to and from dual joblessness, and 
the static-state dual joblessness rate estimated from Equation (5.1), separately for each 
country. The countries are in the ascending order of the estimated steady-state rates of dual 
joblessness. The estimated rates differ somewhat from those in Table 5.1, because of the non-
static state of the (coupled) labour market.  
 
Table 5.4. Flows into and out of dual joblessness 
 Monthly 
inflow rate, % 
(1)  
Monthly 
outflow rate, 
% 
(2) 
Implied 
static rate  
 
(3) 
Ratio of 
inflows 
 
(4) 
Ratio of 
outflows  
 
(5) 
Ratio of 
static-state 
rates 
(6) 
DK 0.13  7.32 1.74 1 1 1 
FR 0.21  6.84  2.98 1.62 0.93 1.71 
AT 0.31  9.10 3.29 2.38 1.24 1.89 
FIN 0.33  12.04 2.67 2.53 1.64 1.53 
PO 0.21  4.76 4.23 1.62 0.65 2.43 
GR 0.39  8.36  4.46 3.00 1.14 2.56 
UK 0.21  4.37  4.59 1.62 0.60 2.64 
DE 0.25  5.02  4.74 1.92 0.69 2.72 
LUX 0.23  4.09  5.45 1.77 0.56 3.13 
BE 0.21  2.97  6.60 1.62 0.41 3.79 
IT 0.45  4.87  8.46 3.46 0.67 4.86 
ES 0.94  9.06  9.40 7.23 1.24 5.40 
IRL 0.39  3.71 9.51 3.00 0.51 5.47 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, monthly data of couples, husband 
25-55 years old, no students. 
 
The monthly dual joblessness incidence rates are less than one percent in each country. It is 
worthwhile noticing that these small transition rates are in general not dramatically lower than 
individual transition rates to unemployment (e.g., Azmat et al., 2006: 13-4). More 
importantly, the inflow rates to show visible cross-national variation. The lowest inflow rate is 
in Denmark. In half of the countries, the monthly inflow rates are approximately 0.20 percent. 
Spain is the clear outlier with a high inflow hazard of 0.94.37 The monthly hazard rates in the 
other countries are between 0.3 and 0.45 percent. Note also that the inflow rates do not 
correspond in any straightforward way to the rates of dual joblessness. In general, however, 
countries with more traditional family patterns have higher inflow rates (over 0.3). Finland is 
                                                 
37 High transition rates into unemployment for Spain have also been found for individual labour market dynamics 
(Azmat et al., 2006: Tables 3 and 4). Azmat and colleagues checked their results against national Spanish data 
and found similar transition rates. Therefore, the results presented here are unlikely to be artefacts of the data 
used.  
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a partial exception. At the other end, Luxembourg, a country with a continuously strong male 
breadwinner family model, has a low inflow rate.  
 
The monthly outflow rates vary widely as well. Unlike the inflow rates, which cluster more, 
the outflow rates spread out. Again, no direct relation with the outflow rates and rates of dual 
joblessness can be observed. This spread also escapes any common country classifications. 
The lowest rates – and thus, the longest average durations – are found from Belgium and 
Ireland, while the highest exit rates and shortest average durations are in Finland (see Table 
4.8). The outflow rates are below five percent in the “liberal” countries of the UK and Ireland, 
but also in Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Luxembourg. Of the Nordic duo, the Finnish outflow 
rates are nearly the double of the Danish ones.  
 
Which flows are more important in explaining the European variation in dual joblessness 
rates? Columns 4 and 5 present the ratio of the inflow rates and the ratio of the outflow rates 
between each country and Denmark. The last column displays the ratio of the estimated 
steady-state rates. An increase in the ratio of the inflow rates has the same effect on the ratio 
of the steady-state rates as a proportionately equal decrease in the ratio of the outflow rates 
(cf. also Azmat et al., 2006: 17). The ratio of the steady state dual joblessness rates between 
country i ( ir ) and the country of reference (Denmark, refr ) can be expressed as: 
 
 
bar
r
outrefinref
outrefinref
ref
i
/λλ
λλ
+
+
=      (5.4), 
 
where the hazards are the inflow and outflow rates in the reference country, and a and b are 
the ratios of the inflow rates and the outflow rates, respectively. It is clear that the ratio of the 
dual joblessness rates depends on the ratio of the inflow rates and the outflow rates. If the 
former is larger than 1, then the differences in inflow rates are more important (see Column 
6). 
 
In most cases, the inflow rates are more important than the outflow rates. Belgium is the main 
exception: there the lower outflow rate explains more of its higher rate of dual joblessness 
compared to Denmark than its higher inflow rate (0.41-1 > 1.62). In Portugal, the UK, and 
Luxembourg the inflow and outflow rates are of similar importance. In these countries, in 
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Germany, Italy, Ireland, and to a lesser extent in France, the low exit rates strengthen the 
effects of the high inflow rates. On the contrary, in Austria, Finland, Greece, and Spain the 
higher outflow rates lower the impact of the higher inflow rates. Finland is the best example. 
Had the outflow rate from dual joblessness been the same as in Denmark, the Finnish dual 
joblessness rate had been 1.5 times higher than it actually was.  
 
Both the incidence and durations of dual joblessness vary across the thirteen European 
countries. While both dynamics are important for understanding the differences in the levels 
of dual joblessness, the variation in dual joblessness incidence matters more for the overall 
differences. The countries do not fully cluster into any self-evident groupings according to 
these dynamics, thus ruling out simple welfare regimes–based conclusions. The results 
already support some of the predictions. For example, the incidence rates are high in Spain 
and Ireland, both countries with a strong male breadwinner model and either weak EPL 
(Ireland) or a high share of temporary workers (Spain). However, the inflow rates are also 
rather high Finland with a strong dual earner family model and moderately strict labour 
market regulation, but low in Luxembourg with a prospering male breadwinner family model. 
The outflow rates, on the other hand, are high in some of the countries with high inflows 
(Spain, Finland), a generous unemployment compensation system (Finland, Austria), and 
tightly regulated labour markets (Spain, Greece). They are low in Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, which rely heavily on means testing, but also in Belgium, which does not. It is clear 
that the inflows and the outflows need to be analysed further.  
 
5.4.2 Analysis of the cross-national differences in inflow rates 
5.4.2.1 Descriptive results 
Following the discussion on the factors shaping the country variation in inflows, Table 5.5 
shows the distribution of the origin states (the a:s in Equation (5.2)) and the inflow hazards 
from each of these origin states. The countries are in the ascending order of the overall inflow 
rates. Columns 4, 7, and 10 further show the share of dual joblessness entries from each origin 
state to give an impression of the importance of each transition.  
 
In each country, the inflow rates are the lowest (as expected) from dual joblessness, and the 
highest from female breadwinning.38 In every country, inflows from male breadwinning 
                                                 
38 In reality, the transition rates from dual employment are likely to be even lower. This is suggested by the 
results (not shown) indicating that approximately 40 percent of the entries from dual employment are made in 
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account for most of the inflows to dual joblessness. This is true even in Denmark, which has 
the lowest proportion of male breadwinners in our sample. In Austria and Luxembourg, 85 
percent of the entries to dual joblessness are from male breadwinning. Inflows from dual 
earning account for a small share of all entries to dual joblessness, while up to one third of the 
entries are from female breadwinning (in the UK).  
 
Table 5.5. Inflows to dual joblessness from three origin states: transition rates, distribution of origin 
states, and share of inflows (%). 
 Overall 
inflow 
rate 
Dually employed → dually 
jobless 
 
Male employed → dually 
jobless 
Female employed → dually 
jobless 
  
 
 
 
(1) 
Transi-
tion rate 
 
 
(2) 
In 
origin 
state 
(a1) 
(3) 
Enter 
from 
origin 
 
(4) 
Transi-
tion rate 
 
 
(5) 
In 
origin 
state 
(a2) 
(6) 
Enter 
from 
origin 
 
(7) 
Transi-
tion rate 
 
 
(8) 
In 
origin 
state 
(a3) 
(9) 
Enter 
from 
origin 
 
(10) 
DK 0.13 0.02 82.59 12.90 0.60 14.31 64.52 1.00 3.13 22.58 
PO 0.21 0.03 62.90 8.27 0.42 33.23 66.91 1.31 3.87 24.82 
BE 0.21 0.03 68.36 9.04 0.55 28.96 76.51 1.16 2.68 14.46 
UK 0.21 0.03 73.35 11.05 0.59 21.50 59.47 1.18 5.14 29.47 
FR 0.21 0.02 67.99 7.73 0.52 28.82 72.10 1.30 3.19 20.17 
LU 0.23 0.02 38.72 2.84 0.34 58.93 85.11 1.19 2.36 12.06 
DE 0.25 0.01 66.16 3.21 0.68 29.15 79.81 0.89 4.70 16.99 
AT 0.31 0.02 58.30 3.05 0.70 38.29 86.80 0.91 3.41 10.15 
FIN 0.33 0.04 73.78 8.00 1.06 21.30 68.00 1.59 4.91 24.00 
GR 0.39 0.15 46.03 17.66 0.54 51.58 71.59 1.73 2.39 10.75 
IRL 0.39 0.04 46.49 4.26 0.59 50.55 77.30 2.38 2.96 18.44 
IT 0.45 0.07 45.47 6.92 0.66 50.30 72.86 2.13 4.23 20.22 
ES 0.94 0.26 35.32 9.70 1.16 60.52 74.75 3.41 4.16 15.55 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, monthly data of couples, husband 
25-55 years old, no students. 
 
5.4.2.2 Decomposition analysis 
Table 5.5 shows major country differences in breadwinner models and the inflow rates from 
each joint employment status. Which differences matter? To analyse this, I decompose the 
overall inflow differences to differences in breadwinner models and the origin-state dependent 
transition rates with 
 
   ∑ ∆+∆=∆
j
injjinjjin aa )( λλλ      (5.5), 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
January, whereas the January entry rate from the other origin states is approximately 20 percent. In the former 
case, country variation in this “hipping effect” exists but I did not find any obvious idiosyncratic peaks in Greece 
or Spain, which have high inflows from dual employment. 
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where ja∆ and jλ∆  are the differences between each country and Denmark in the proportion 
of couples in each breadwinner type j, and in the inflow rate from this origin state, and ja and 
injλ are the means (between each country and Denmark) of the proportion of couples in each 
joint employment status and the transition rates, respectively. The decomposition tells us the 
relative importance of each difference and thus enables us to assess their contribution to the 
differences in the overall inflow rates. The decomposition is also exact, and is thus preferable 
to simple counterfactual simulations, which often do not have this property. Similar 
decompositions are often used to understand changes in the income distribution (e.g., 
Mookherhee and Shorrocks, 1982).   
 
Table 5.6. Decomposition of inflows rates 
 Inflow 
rate 
   Difference    
   Due to difference in breadwinner type Due to difference in transition rate 
  Overall Dual Male Female Dual Male Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DK 0.13 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
PO 0.21 0.08 -0.005 0.096 0.011 0.007 -0.043 0.011 
BE 0.21 0.08 -0.004 0.084 -0.005 0.008 -0.011 0.005 
UK 0.21 0.08 -0.002 0.043 0.022 0.008 -0.002 0.007 
FR 0.21 0.08 -0.003 0.081 0.001 0 -0.017 0.009 
LUX 0.23 0.10 -0.009 0.210 -0.008 0 -0.095 0.005 
DE 0.25 0.12 -0.002 0.094 0.015 -0.007 0.017 -0.003 
AT 0.31 0.18 -0.005 0.156 0.000 0 0.026 -0.003 
FIN 0.33 0.20 -0.003 0.058 0.023 0.016 0.082 0.024 
GR 0.39 0.26 -0.031 0.212 -0.008 0.084 -0.020 0.020 
IRL 0.39 0.26 -0.011 0.216 -0.003 0.013 -0.003 0.042 
IT 0.45 0.32 -0.017 0.227 0.017 0.032 0.019 0.042 
ES 0.94 0.81 -0.066 0.407 0.023 0.141 0.210 0.088 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 2-8, monthly data of couples, husband 
25-55 years, no students. 
 
Table 5.6 presents the results of the decomposition. The countries are in the ascending order 
of the inflow rates. The main finding is that the difference in breadwinner models, and 
particularly, in the strength of the male breadwinner model, is the single most important 
factor. Compared to Denmark, Finland is the only country where the higher inflow rate 
depends on other factors. There, but also in Spain, the high inflow rate from male 
breadwinning accounts for an important part of the higher inflow rate. In Portugal, Belgium, 
and France, the male breadwinner component is similar or larger than the overall difference in 
the inflow rates. Each country has also factors, which operate in the opposite direction and 
decrease the difference to Denmark. An important offsetting factor is the low transition rate 
from male breadwinning to dual joblessness. Luxembourg is the best example. Luxembourg 
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has a prevailing male breadwinner family model, which is protected against dual joblessness 
by the employment security enjoyed by the male breadwinner. This finding is in line with the 
above theoretical discussion on the roles of dual employment and employment security in 
protecting families against social risks. In the UK, the higher incidence of female 
breadwinning also increases dual joblessness incidence.  
 
Despite the importance of breadwinner models, the decomposition also showed the role of 
transitions from male breadwinning. This was particularly evident in explaining the higher 
inflow rates in Finland and Spain. On the contrary, the low inflow rates from male 
breadwinning protect couples from dual joblessness in many countries, offsetting the effect of 
a less favourable breadwinner model. Therefore, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at the 
hazard rates from male breadwinning in order to get a more complete understanding of the 
forces shaping dual joblessness incidence.  
 
5.4.2.3 Event-history analysis 
In the following, I estimate a set of discrete-time event-history models for inflows from male 
breadwinning to dual joblessness. Event-history analysis enables a regression-based analysis 
of transition data, given that the transition has not already happened (e.g., Yamaguchi, 1991). 
Discrete-time models are more efficient in handling ties (events happening at the same point 
in time) than continuous-time models, and the incorporation of time-dependent independent 
variables is also easier with the former.39  
 
I estimate the models using monthly data from twelve countries due to missing data on some 
of the variables in the Luxembourgish sample (namely, health and EPL). However, the 
independent variables used in the model were collected annually. I therefore linked the annual 
data on worker and job characteristics to the monthly data.40 The initial problem with this 
solution was that the job characteristics for those male breadwinners who lost their jobs before 
                                                 
39 Due to a lack of instruments, I do not control for selection bias. However, when testing with the education 
difference between the spouses, which should increase male breadwinning (Becker, 1981; Blossfeld and 
Drobnič, 2001), no evidence for such bias was found. Neither do I control for unobserved heterogeneity, due to 
the lack of instruments and equal interest in all the independent variables. Since male breadwinning can also end 
in dual employment or, more theoretically, in female breadwinning, I also tested a competing risks model, 
without changes to the results. 
40 The use of annual data for this exercise was not reasonable due to the wide cross-national variation in the 
monthly outflow rate from dual joblessness (Table 2) and the transition rate from male breadwinning to dual 
employment (from a low of 1.14 percent in Luxembourg to a high of 5.73 percent in Finland): the annual data 
thus produces a very different picture of the country variation in question. 
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the annual interview were not observed. Since the interviews mainly took place at the end of 
the year, this led to a (positively) selected sample. Therefore, I included in the sample only the 
months at and after the interview each year. Although this results in a reduced sample size and 
a loss of efficiency in estimation, there is no bias to the parameter estimates, due to the 
exogeneity of the month of the interview to the process studied.41  
 
A main focus of the models is on the country effects. I express them as the average deviation 
of each country from the predicted transition rates from each model (multiplied by 100). The 
estimates show how well the models describe the data in each country. This approach is 
analogous to estimating the (latent) country effect in a random intercepts multilevel model 
(e.g., Snijders and Bosker, 1999).  
 
I express the coefficients for the independent variables as standard logit estimates. The 
independent variables include measures of the human capital of the male breadwinner 
(education, age, job tenure, and health), characteristics of his job (contract type, occupation, 
and size and sector of the local work unit), and characteristics of the local and national labour 
market (EPL, regional unemployment rate). The choice of the variables follows the discussion 
in the theoretical part of the chapter.  
 
                                                 
41 The estimates could, however, be biased if inflows from male breadwinning showed strong seasonality. To test 
this, I controlled for quarter of the year, which did not affect the other estimates.  
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Table 5.7. Transitions from male breadwinning to dual joblessness, discrete-time event-history models  
 Model 1 
Constant only 
Model 2 
+ Job contract type 
Model 3 
+ Employment 
protection 
Model 4 
+ Controls 
  
Average residuals (x 100) 
     
Portugal -0.271*** -0.331*** -0.215*** -0.085 
France -0.151* -0.097 -0.079 -0.201** 
Greece -0.191*** -0.321*** -0.233*** -0.025 
Belgium -0.191*** -0.061 -0.069 -0.175* 
Denmark -0.116 -0.114 -0.280* -0.235† 
UK -0.040 0.097 -0.183† -0.086 
Ireland 0.032 0.034 -0.264*** -0.137† 
Italy -0.099* -0.102* 0.045 -0.139** 
Germany -0.001 0.131* 0.132* 0.078† 
Austria 0.291** 0.461*** 0.400*** 0.653*** 
Finland 0.541*** 0.587*** 0.493*** 0.484** 
Spain 0.600*** 0.406*** 0.426*** 0.220** 
     
 Logit coefficients 
  0.984*** 1.022*** 0.711*** 
   -0.185* -0.194** 
    0.026 
Contract type (ref. Permanent)     
Atypical  2.162*** 2.207*** 1.353*** 
Unknown  0.984*** 1.022*** 0.711*** 
Employment protection   -0.185* -0.194** 
Regional unemployment rate    0.026 
Age (ref. 25-34)     
35-44    -0.094 
45-55    0.133 
Education (ref. High)     
Middle education    0.429** 
Low education    0.609*** 
Health: Bad or very bad (d)    0.692*** 
Job tenure (ref. 0-1 years)     
2-4 years    -0.873*** 
5+ years    -1.595*** 
Occupation (ref. Professional)     
Intermediate    0.373** 
Skilled manual    0.518** 
Unskilled    0.883*** 
Sector (ref. Services)     
Industry    0.244** 
Agriculture    0.198 
Private, >50 emp. (ref. <50)    -0.015 
Public    -0.049 
Missing value    1.159*** 
Constant -4.967*** -5.727*** -5.227*** -5.661*** 
Log-likelihood -7707.967 -7307.601 -7291.244 -6472.927 
Pseudo R 0 0.046 0.048 0.125 
N couple-months 186,685 186,096 186,096 180,855 
N events 1,219 1,282 1,282 1,223 
† p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, monthly data of couples, husband 
25-55 years old, no students. 
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The education variable is the ECHP’s three-class variable indicating a high (tertiary, ISCED 
5-7), medium (second stage of secondary, ISCED 3), or low level of attained education 
(ISCED 0-2). The health variable measures experienced health problems. The contract type 
measure has three categories, permanent contract, “atypical” contract (other than standard 
permanent), and “unknown”. Occupation is classified as professional, intermediate, skilled 
manual, and unskilled. The sector of the workplace is classified according to the familiar 
service, industrial, and agricultural sectors-classification. Due to a large fraction of missing 
data for the “size of local work unit” variable in the public sector (Eurostat, 2003b), I made a 
variable, which combines information on the sector (public or private) and the size of the local 
unit, if the job is in the private sector (up to 50 employees, 50 or more employees). The EPL 
measure is the OECD’s EPL index, obtained from Bassanini and Duval (2006) and OECD 
(2004) (see also Table A5.1 in the appendix to the chapter). I use the regional unemployment 
rate variable to proxy local labour market conditions. The models also include a variable 
denoting missing values for the job characteristics.42 See Table 5.3 for descriptive data on the 
variables. 
 
Table 5.7 presents the results of the event history analysis. Model 1 is an empty model with 
the constant only. We observe the familiar pattern with Spain having the highest inflow rates 
from male breadwinning. Model 2 enters the job contract type, and we see that male 
breadwinners with permanent contracts are well secured against dual joblessness, and the 
effect remains even after entering the control variables in Models 3 and 4. The third model 
introduces the OECD’s employment protection index, and we have the expected result that 
stricter employment protection decreases the incidence of dual joblessness. The fourth model 
includes the control variables. Well-educated male breadwinners with good health, a 
permanent contract, and good employment protection, and who have worked for five or more 
years in a professional job in the service sector are particularly well insured against dual 
joblessness.43  
 
                                                 
42 Other variables of interest, such as immigration, were excluded due to missing or unreliable information from 
a number of countries, such as Germany and the UK. In preliminary analysis, immigrant status had the expected 
effects of increasing flows into and decreasing flows out of dual joblessness, without changing the country 
differences very much. 
43 The “missing value” estimate is notably high. This is because many of the male breadwinners with missing job 
characteristics were already jobless at the time of the interview, even though the retrospective job history 
variables erroneously tell that they lost their job a month or few later. Omitting these cases would have resulted 
in important selection bias.   
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But do these controls explain the national differences, the main interest of the analysis? 
Overall, the models are not completely successful. However, they do provide insights to the 
forces driving the particular country differences. For example, in Spain, Greece, and Portugal 
the dual joblessness incidence rate for male breadwinners would be higher were it not for the 
high incidence of non-permanent jobs, while French, Austrian, Belgian, and German male 
breadwinners would have a higher risk of dual joblessness were it not for their relatively good 
job contracts. The employment protection regimes in Portugal, Greece, Italy, and Finland 
reduce the dual joblessness incidence rate, whereas the Irish, Danish, and British rates would 
be even lower with stricter employment protection.  
 
The Portuguese and the Greek (and partly the Belgian and Irish) lower rates of dual 
joblessness incidence for male breadwinners are explained by their and their jobs’ 
characteristics. The controls also explain part of the Spanish and German stories. In Austria 
the situation would be worse were it not for the favourable characteristics of the male 
breadwinners. Summing up, we can say that employment protection, job contracts, and the 
characteristics of the male breadwinners and their jobs all matter, and they partly explain the 
country variation. As to Spain and Finland, the two countries of primary interest, the models 
were more successful in explaining the high joblessness incidence of Spanish breadwinners 
than Finnish ones. The Finnish estimates remained surprisingly stable throughout the model 
building process, suggesting some idiosyncratic factors behind the high dual joblessness 
incidence rates for Finnish male breadwinner couples.  
 
5.4.3 Analysis of the cross-national variation in outflow rates 
5.4.3.1 Description and decomposition 
Table 5.4 revealed a wide spread in dual joblessness outflows in Europe. In Table 5.8 the 
outflows rates are broken down into transition rates separate to each destination state 
(Columns 2 to 4). This time the countries are ordered in the descending order of the outflow 
rates (and thus, the ascending order of the durations of dual joblessness), with Finland holding 
the pole position and Belgium coming last. The outflow rates are by far the highest to male 
breadwinning, also in Denmark, Finland and the UK, where female employment rates are 
high. Recall from Table 5.5 that most entries to dual joblessness are from male breadwinning. 
This implies that most of the dynamics of dual joblessness are in fact dynamics of male 
breadwinners becoming jobless and the husbands in dually jobless couples becoming 
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employed. With the exception of Greece, the monthly exit rate to dual employment is less 
than one percent, and its share of all exits is small.44 
 
Table 5.8. Outflow rates by destination state (columns 1-4) and decomposition of outflow differences 
(columns 5-8) 
 Outflow hazards to  Decomposition of outflow differences 
 All 
 
 
(1) 
Dual 
employment 
 
(2) 
Male 
bread-
winning 
(3) 
Female 
bread-
winning 
(4) 
 Overall 
difference 
 
(5) 
Dual 
employment 
 
(6) 
Male 
bread-
winning 
(7) 
Female 
bread-
winning 
(8) 
FIN 12.04 0.41 7.20 2.67  Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
AT 9.10 0.32 7.84 0.69  -2.94 -0.09 0.64 -1.98 
ES 9.06 0.91 6.66 1.44  -2.98 0.50 -0.54 -1.23 
GR 8.36 1.39 5.85 1.06  -3.68 0.98 -1.35 -1.61 
DK 7.32 0.70 4.20 1.93  -4.72 0.29 -3.00 -0.74 
FR 6.84 0.50 4.45 1.41  -5.20 0.09 -2.75 -1.26 
DE 5.02 0.26 3.82 0.91  -7.02 -0.15 -3.38 -1.76 
IT 4.87 0.33 3.45 1.09  -7.17 -0.08 -3.75 -1.58 
PO 4.76 0.45 2.90 1.28  -7.28 0.04 -4.30 -1.39 
UK 4.37 0.29 2.62 1.26  -7.67 -0.12 -4.58 -1.41 
LUX 4.09 0.27 3.27 0.58  -7.95 -0.14 -3.93 -2.09 
IRL 3.71 0.16 2.82 0.69  -8.33 -0.25 -4.38 -1.98 
BE 2.97 0.36 2.05 0.44  -9.07 -0.05 -5.15 -2.23 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 2-8, monthly data of couples, husband 
25-55 years, no students. 
 
 
Despite these similarities, the destination state specific transition rates and their relative 
importance vary across countries. What is the role of this variance for the overall outflow 
hazards? Recall from Equation (5.3) that the overall outflow rate is the sum of the exit rates to 
each destination state. Therefore, the country differences in the outflow rates can be 
decomposed with a simple equation  
 
   ∑∆=∆
j
outjout hh       (5.6), 
  
where the 
jh  are the outflow rates to each destination state. The results of this decomposition 
are reported in Columns (5) to (8). Overall, country differences in the exit rates to male 
breadwinning explain most of the European differences in the durations of dual joblessness. 
Compared to Finland, the only exceptions are Spain, Austria, and Greece, where the 
differences to Finland in the exit rates to female breadwinning are larger than those to male 
                                                 
44 In Greece, a smaller share of exits to dual employment happens at the change of the year than to the other 
destinations or in many of the other countries, contrary to what one would expect were the high Greek exit rates 
to dual joblessness created by recall error.  
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breadwinning. However, only in Austria does the lower exit rate to female breadwinning 
contribute a major share to the overall outflow difference in comparison to Finland. However, 
the overall difference between the countries is minor.  
 
Overall, the European variation in dual joblessness durations depends mainly on the variation 
in exits to male breadwinning, that is, the likelihood that the husband of a jobless couple finds 
a job. Therefore, the data do not support the hypothesis that the cross-national variation in 
dual joblessness durations depends on the differences in the labour supply of wives. At least 
in times of household level labour market difficulties, European countries still appear as male 
breadwinner societies, where the economic role of the wife seems limited. I will analyse this 
further in the next chapter. Here I continue with event-history analyses of the exit rates from 
dual joblessness.  
 
5.4.3.2 Event-history analysis 
Can we explain the cross-national variation in the exit rates from dual joblessness? In the 
following, I again build discrete-time event-history models for a closer look at the 
determinants of the cross-national variation. Because of the limited role of the variation in the 
destination state specific outflows, I estimate single-risk models of dual joblessness exit. In 
the same way as in the event-history analysis of inflows, I use monthly data combined with 
annual information for each respective year. I also use the same strategy as above to report the 
country effects and the effects of the covariates in the models. Again, I exclude Luxembourg 
due to a lack of information on crucial variables. 
 
The covariates include information on social benefit receipt, labour markets indicators, and 
characteristics of the couples. The social benefit variables include information on the receipt 
of social assistance and housing benefits, and unemployment compensation. Information on 
the social benefits received refers to the previous year from the data collection, and the ECHP 
does not include detailed information on the monthly variation of the receipt of these benefits. 
In the following analyses, I use data from the subsequent year to indicate – as dummy 
variables – whether a couple received the benefit in question during the year of dual 
joblessness. This carries the assumption that couples received the benefits during the months 
in which the couple was dually jobless. Although this is likely to be the case, this approach is 
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indeed a second best solution in the absence of better data, and the estimates should be dealt 
with some caution.45  
 
I use the social assistance/housing benefits variable as a proxy for means tested benefits. 
Social assistance is means tested in all countries. Furthermore, means tested housing benefits 
constitute an important part of the basic income provision system in many countries (Adema, 
2006). However, unemployment compensation can also be means tested. Unfortunately, 
means-tested unemployment benefits cannot be distinguished from others.  
 
I use a set of measures that characterise the unemployment benefit system. I include a variable 
on the receipt of any unemployment benefit during the year, separately for husbands and 
wives. To measure the generosity of unemployment benefits, I calculated average net 
replacement rates for couples with and without children at 100 and 67 percent of the average 
production worker’s wage, with data from the OECD’s Benefits and Wages database (OECD, 
2002a).46 To measure the duration of benefits, I use data from the OECD (OECD, 2006). I 
measure market institutions using three variables. The OECD’s EPL index from the end of the 
decade (Bassanini and Duvall, 2006) measures the strictness of employment protection.47 The 
average of the centralisation and the coordination indexes (and the square of this average) 
measure the centralisation and coordination of wage setting (OECD, 2004; for Greece based 
on Kapopoulos and Papadimitriou (2004)). Since collectively bargained wage deals can also 
include non-unionized workers, I also include a measure on the coverage of collectively 
bargained wage deals (OECD, 2004; the Greek and Irish estimates are based on estimates by 
EIRO (2002a)). As measures of the state of the labour market, I use the local unemployment 
rate and an indicator of labour market restructuring (from Gangl, 2006). Intense restructuring 
of the labour market, in terms of the shifting of economic activity from one sector to another, 
can mean adjustment difficulties for the workless as vacancy rates fall, competition for jobs 
                                                 
45 This does not result in any important loss of cases or sample selection bias. Monthly data were again used 
instead of annual, because the ECHP lacks good measures on the receipt of various benefits at the time of 
interview.  
46 The usual way to calculate average replacement rates is over single persons and couples with and without 
dependent spouses. To better approximate the replacement rates faced by couples, I restricted the calculations to 
couples. The data were available for 1997 and 1999, and were extrapolated back and fort, the cutting line being 
1997.  
47 The average of this measure (Table A5.1 in the appendix) differs somewhat from the OECD figures reported 
in Table 5.2. This is because I preferred to use Bassanini and Duvall’s time-varying measure (Bassanini and 
Duvall, 2006).  
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becomes more intense, and the qualification demands change (ibid.). See Table A5.1 in the 
appendix to the chapter for more details on the institutional variables. 
 
I also control for observed characteristics of dually jobless couples as a simple control of 
compositional differences between the countries. The control variables include the age of the 
husband; education, health status (both coded as in the inflow analysis), and a dummy 
variable for prolonged joblessness (more than one year), each separately for both spouses; 
housing tenure status (homeowner or not); and the number of children and presence of a small 
child (less than three years).48 See Table 5.3 for descriptive data.  
 
Table 5.9 displays the results. Model building proceeds in the same way as in the inflow 
analysis of Table 5.7. I consider the role of means testing first due to the interest it has 
received in the literature (Model 2). Couples, who received social or housing assistance during 
the year of dual joblessness had an approximately 40 % lower chance of moving to 
employment each month, although the estimate is only weakly significant. This estimated 
difference becomes bigger and more significant in the subsequent models. This suggests that 
selection by observed weaker characteristics does not explain this difference. However, this 
variable alone does not explain much of the country differences. As expected, they explain 
part of the lower exit rates in Ireland and the UK, but also part of the higher exit rates in 
Spain. In Finland, France, and Denmark the exit rate would be even higher were it not for the 
relatively common receipt of social assistance and housing benefits (over 50 % of the couple-
months, also Ireland and the UK). In Belgium and Portugal, few jobless couples receive these 
benefits (less than 10 % of the couple months). In these countries, the estimated the exit rates 
are even lower when social assistance is controlled.  
 
Model 3 enters unemployment benefit receipt, the average replacement rate, unemployment 
benefit duration, labour market regulation, the wage bargaining variables, structural change, 
and the regional unemployment rate. Couples, in which the husband or the wife received 
unemployment compensation had a higher probability of exiting dual joblessness. This 
counterintuitive finding reflects positive selection into unemployment benefit receipt. Most 
husbands receive benefits (over half of the couple-months except in Southern Europe), while a 
                                                 
48 Again, I do not control for selection bias. I tested the Heckman-model using the education difference of the 
spouses as the exclusion restriction (should increase male breadwinning, who have higher risks of dual 
joblessness) without changes to the results.   
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minority of wives receive these benefits (except in the Nordic countries). Model 4 supports 
the selection story. In this model, the estimated effect for husband’s unemployment receipt 
disappears, even though the estimate of the benefits of the wife remains positive and 
significant. Unobserved factors are the likely explanation. The average replacement rate does 
not seem to affect exits from dual joblessness. The estimate for the duration of unemployment 
benefits is negative and significant. An additional month of unemployment benefits increases 
the duration of dual joblessness by 1.7 percent,49 which at the average exit rate (6.2 percent) 
translates to eight more days of dual joblessness. These results remain in Model 4.  
 
The estimated effect of EPL is not significant in Model 3. However, it becomes more 
significant and slightly bigger in the fourth model. This can reflect the sample of countries 
included: the effect becomes non-significant and weaker when Ireland or the UK is excluded. 
The result can also reflect behavioural responses by dually jobless couples. Jobless couples 
may not want to take up temporary or insecure employment, because termination of the 
contract may lead to lower (means tested) benefits than a continued spell of dual joblessness. 
In analyses not shown here, I found – using a measure on the strictness of regulating 
temporary work (Bassanini and Duvall, 2006) – that the interaction term between regulation 
of temporary contracts and the receipt of social or housing benefits was positive (0.193) and 
significant at the 0.1 percent level. The result persisted (but became less significant) even 
when I excluded Ireland and the United Kingdom.  
 
The centralisation/coordination measure shows an inverse hump-shaped pattern, as what one 
would expect if wage setting at the industry level produced less employment. The estimate is 
not significant in Model 3, and is significant only at the 10 percent level in Model 4. Coverage 
of collectively negotiated wage deals is positively related to exits from dual joblessness.50 A 
possible explanation is that an extension of the coverage of collectively bargained wage deals 
raises lower wages, which makes employment more attractive to dually jobless couples. 
Finally, structural change in the labour market decreases exits from dual joblessness and 
increases its durations, as expected. The regional unemployment rate measure has, 
surprisingly, a positive sign, although it is not significant. In the fourth model, its sign is 
negative but not significant. This suggests that this measure might fail to measure the relevant 
features of the state of the regional labour market very well.  
                                                 
49 e-0.017–1 
50 The estimate is similar, although not significant, when Ireland and the United Kingdom were excluded. 
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Table 5.9. Event-history analysis of exits from dual joblessness.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  
Average residuals (x 100) 
     
Finland 5.871*** 6.424*** 1.133 1.090 
Spain  2.836*** 2.351*** 0.440* 0.015 
Austria 2.808*** 2.386*** 0.138 0.138 
Greece 2.196*** 1.967*** 1.399*** 0.105 
France 0.660* 1.610*** -0.992** -0.242 
Denmark 1.231† 1.776* 3.239*** 2.662*** 
Germany -0.950*** -0.892** -1.726*** -0.386 
Italy -1.272*** -1.261*** -0.178 0.196 
Portugal -1.493*** -1.937*** 0.410 0.379 
United Kingdom -1.815*** -1.091*** 0.182 -0.049 
Ireland -2.479*** -1.787*** -0.468* -0.535* 
Belgium -3.198*** -3.804*** -0.343 -0.490* 
     
 Logit coefficients 
     
Social or housing assistance (d)  -0.466† -0.579** -0.662*** 
Unemployment benefits – husband (d)   0.456*** 0.093 
Unemployment benefits – wife (d)   0.599*** 0.373*** 
Average replacement rate   -0.272 0.006 
Duration of ue. benefits (months)   -0.017*** -0.014** 
Employment protection   0.079 0.114* 
Centralisation/Coordination   -0.652 -0.560† 
Centralisation/Coordination squared   0.100 0.087† 
Collective bargaining coverage   0.014* 0.012*** 
Structural change   -0.068* -0.060*** 
Regional unemployment rate   0.515 -0.393 
Husband’s age (ref: 25-34 years)     
35-44 years    -0.249*** 
45-55 years    -0.889*** 
Husband’s education(ref: High)     
Intermediate    -0.050 
Low    -0.094 
Wife’s education (ref: High)     
Intermediate    -0.077 
Low    -0.212** 
Husband jobless > 1 year (d)    -0.402*** 
Wife jobless > 1 year (d)    -0.453*** 
Bad health – husband (d)    -0.778*** 
Bad health – wife (d)     -0.124* 
Children     0.033 
Child aged 0-3 years (d)    -0.125** 
Homeowner (d)    -0.009 
Constant -2.722** -2.163*** -2.418*** -0.857*** 
Log-likelihood -18487.173 -18261.384 -17395.95 -16120.126 
Pseudo R 0 0.004 0.031 0.069 
N couple-months 79847 79847 76051 73251 
N events 4,924 4,924 4,901 4,740 
† p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, monthly data of couples, husband 
25-55 years, no students. 
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The variables included in Model 3 do a good job in explaining some of the national 
differences. The Finnish, Italian, Portuguese, British, and Belgian estimates decrease and lose 
their significance. The Greek, Spanish, and Irish estimates also become smaller and less 
significant. The French, Danish, and German estimates are anomalies in this respect, since 
they either become stronger, or change sign (France). 
 
In the fourth and final model, I include the couple-level controls. The results are more or less 
as one would expect. Younger and older couples51 and those where the partners have been out 
of work for a long time, have health problems, and a small child have low exit rates. 
Education does not seem to matter, with the exception of low education of the wife. 
Homeownership does not matter, either.  
 
In Model 4, the estimates for France, Greece, and Germany become non-significant, whereas 
the Belgian estimate become somewhat larger and significant at the 5 percent level. Even 
though the Danish estimate becomes smaller, the model does not seem to fit the Danish data 
very well. Nevertheless, the models are more successful in explaining the cross-national 
variation in dual joblessness than those used to explain in the variation in inflows to dual 
joblessness from male breadwinning (Table 5.7). 
 
The overall conclusion of this analysis is that the European variation in dual joblessness 
durations is linked to the wider problem of long-term unemployment in Europe. Although the 
estimated effect of means tested benefits was important, they do not remarkably contribute to 
the understanding of the overall European variation.  
 
5.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I analysed the dynamic roots of the variation in European rates of dual 
joblessness, by comparing thirteen countries with data from the European Community 
Household Panel. In the period from 1994 to 2000, the average dual joblessness rates ranged 
from approximately two percent (Denmark) to a high of over ten percent (Ireland).  
 
                                                 
51 I also included receipt of pensions (not shown). As expected, the effect was negative, but apart from 
decreasing the effect of old age, it did not contribute to the model otherwise. The same holds for receipt of 
sickness benefits.  
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Both the flows into and out of dual joblessness contributed to the cross-national variation in 
dual joblessness rates. Of these flows, the national variation in inflows explains more of the 
national differences than the variation in outflows. I decomposed the variation in inflows to 
variation in breadwinner models and variation in inflows from different joint employment 
statuses. Dually employed couples have a low risk of dual joblessness, while single 
breadwinner couples were more vulnerable, in particular if the wife was the breadwinner. 
Consequently, the European variation in breadwinner models – and especially in the spread of 
the male breadwinner model – was more important in explaining the variation in inflow rates 
than the European variation in employment security. On this basis, we can conclude that 
female employment is an especially important factor affecting dual joblessness: countries with 
higher female employment rates and less male breadwinner families have lower rates of dual 
joblessness. This corresponds to the preliminary results in Chapter 4, Section 4. 
 
Despite this general conclusion, job security measures – such as employment protection 
legislation and permanent contracts – naturally protect couples against dual joblessness.52 
Employment protection measures have been stricter in European countries with a more 
dominant male breadwinner model: in other words, promotion of the dual-earner family 
model and employment protection can have complementary effects in securing families 
against labour market risks. For example, in Finland employment security was lower during 
the period covered. The dominance of the dual-earner family model kept dual joblessness 
incidence at lower levels than they would have been otherwise. At the same time, 
Luxembourg remained a male breadwinner country par excellence. However, Luxembourgish 
workers enjoyed a high level of job security, which kept dual joblessness incidence rates low. 
High job insecurity and a dominant male breadwinner model is the worst combination. This 
explains why the incidence risk of dual joblessness was high in Spain.  
 
Outflow rates from dual joblessness also varied across the thirteen European countries. Even 
though this variation was less important in explaining differences in dual joblessness rates, 
prolonged spells of dual joblessness are a more pressing problem than short-term spells. The 
first conclusion of this analysis is that differences in female employment do not explain 
European variation in dual joblessness durations. Transitions from dual joblessness to female 
breadwinning were marginal. Wives do not seem to become added workers. Therefore, female 
                                                 
52 Job and worker characteristics also explain dual joblessness incidence among male breadwinner families. 
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employment decreases the risk of dual joblessness, but not its durations. Whether the latter 
finding can be explained by spouse differences in labour market resources, or a possible 
cultural effect that makes couples avoid female breadwinning will be analysed in the next 
chapter.  
 
The second conclusion is that “long-term dual joblessness” is a specific aspect of the wider 
long-term unemployment problem in Europe. Means tested benefits, which have received a lot 
of interest in the literature, seem important, but they contribute less to explaining the overall 
variation in European dual joblessness durations than institutional and couple-level variables, 
which can also be used to explain long-term unemployment. The duration of unemployment 
benefits appeared important, as countries with longer-lasting benefits had longer spells of dual 
joblessness. Extended coverage of collectively bargained wage deals increased exits from dual 
joblessness and strong structural changes in the economy decreased them. The former may 
reflect the increases in the lower wages it entails: Gregg and Wadsworth (2000: 518) 
suggested that dually jobless couples may suffer particularly from low (entry) wages, and the 
OECD (2004) reported that wage deal coverage associated positively with the relative 
employment of less-skilled workers. The level and coordination of wage setting can also be 
important, in line with the “hump-shaped” curve hypothesis, although the evidence was not 
very strong. I also found surprising estimates for unemployment benefit receipt and 
employment protection. While selection bias (or problems in the empirical measure, in the 
benefits variable case) is a possible explanation, I also speculated on the positive behavioural 
impacts of employment regulation for dually jobless couples: they may prefer well-protected 
employment, especially when confronted with means tested benefits.  
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
 
Table A5.1. Description of country level variables, means 
 Regional 
unemp. 
rate 
EPL 
index 
Average 
replacement 
rate 
Av. duration 
of unemp. 
benefits, 
months 
Centralization/ 
Coordination 
index 
Collectively 
bargained 
wage deal 
coverage 
Struc-
tural 
change 
Denmark 6.16 1.62 0.82 48 3 80 6.6 
Finland 12.3 2.10 0.82 23 5 90 3.3 
Germany 9.28 2.81 0.69 12 3.5 68 4.3 
Austria 3.97 2.20 0.70 9 3.5 95 5.1 
France 1.09 3.00 0.77 23 2 90 2.2 
Belgium 8.67 2.70 0.63 60 (no limit) 3.75 90 10.5 
Portugal 5.27 3.76 0.82 24 4 80 9 
Spain 22.28 3.02 0.74 21 3 80 6.1 
Italy 19.14 3.22 0.47 6 3 80 10.5 
Greece 9.84 3.50 0.47 12 3 80 5.4 
Ireland 8.96 0.90 0.61 15 4 85 9.9 
UK 6.07 0.61 0.67 6 1 30 3.9 
Notes and sources: (1) Regional unemployment rate, European Community Household Panel, own calculations. 
(2) Employment protection index, corresponds to the scale by OECD (2004), extracted from Bassanini and 
Duval (2006), time-varying, except for Greece and Austria, where the data correspond to the late 1990s, from 
OECD (2004). (3) Average replacement rate is averaged over two family types, a childless couple and couple 
with two children, and two earnings levels, 100 % and 67 % of average production worker wage, from OECD’s 
Benefits and Wages Database (2002a). The years 1994 to 1997 correspond to the levels at 1997, from 1998 to 
2000 correspond to the levels at 1999. (4) Duration of unemployment benefits OECD (2006). There are no limits 
for unemployment benefit duration in Belgium. However, I top-coded them to 60 months. (5) The 
centralization/coordination index corresponds to the index by the OECD (2004), expect for Greece it is estimated 
on the basis of information from Kapopoulos and Papadimitriou (2004). (6) The data for the coverage of 
collectively bargained wage agreements come from the OECD (2004), except for Greece and Ireland, from EIRO 
(2002a). (7) The structural change indicator measures the sectoral discrepancy in job creation and destruction, 
and comes from Gangl (2006).  
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6 IN SEARCH OF THE MACHO-EFFECT: GENDER AND THE 
EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS OF COUPLES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter showed that most of the dynamics of dual joblessness are in fact 
employment dynamics of the husband. In all thirteen countries, most spells of dual joblessness 
are a consequence of the male breadwinner losing his job, and most spells of dual joblessness 
end with the husband entering employment. The explanation for the former is the higher 
exposure to dual joblessness in male breadwinner couples compared to dual earner couples 
and the commonality of male breadwinning compared to female breadwinning.  
 
But why do wives in jobless couples supply little labour? One explanation is that women 
overall have lower labour supplies than men, and dual joblessness does not make a difference. 
Women are more constrained by, for example, family-related factors, which decrease their 
labour supplies. Furthermore, in many European countries women find it harder to enter 
employment than men (Azmat et al., 2006). However, the fact that the transition rates from 
dual joblessness to female breadwinning are very much lower than to male breadwinning – 
even in high female employment countries such as Denmark – suggests that women with 
jobless husbands may supply less labour than those with employed husbands.  
 
Table 6.1. Joint employment statuses in twelve European countries (%) 
 Both work Husband only 
works (male 
breadwinning) 
Wife only works 
(female 
breadwinning) 
Both jobless 
Austria 64.92 29.19 3.15 2.74 
Belgium 69.58 23.36 2.41 4.65 
Denmark 82.55 12.46 2.95 2.04 
Finland 77.79 15.52 4.19 2.50 
France 59.13 32.75 4.11 4.01 
Germany 66.32 25.98 4.37 3.33 
Greece 45.15 48.69 2.39 3.77 
Ireland 46.82 40.98 3.37 8.83 
Italy 44.06 46.23 3.68 6.03 
Portugal 62.50 30.74 3.52 3.24 
Spain 35.43 52.94 4.35 7.28 
United Kingdom 73.08 17.70 4.58 4.63 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, annual data of couples, husband 25 
to 55 years, no students.  
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This economically counterintuitive finding has been a topic of considerable interest in 
previous research, and several explanations have been put forward (see Chapter 3, Section 3). 
One line of research has suggested that part of the explanation lies in cultural conceptions and 
expectations of economic provision between husbands and wives, and that wives are reluctant 
to assume the status of the single breadwinner. This cultural explanation – sometimes called 
the “macho-effect” – emerged from the qualitative literature on family responses to male 
unemployment. It has also been pointed out as a possible explanation in several quantitative 
studies (e.g., Garcia, 1991; Davies et al., 1994; Doris, 1998). Most studies with quantitative 
data have, however, focused on the effects of economic variables, such as wages, social 
benefits, and education. The macho-effect hypothesis has been left to qualitative researchers, 
and has never been the focus in quantitative research.53  
 
The objective of this chapter is to narrow this gap by assessing the macho-effect hypothesis 
with quantitative data on the joint employment dynamics of European couples. This 
assessment enables, I believe, shedding light on gendered patterns of family provision more 
broadly. Despite the increases in female employment and the share of dually employed 
couples, the share of couples where the wife is the sole earner is very small everywhere in 
Europe (Table 6.1),54 and female breadwinning seems to be associated with stigma in the 
popular imagination (cf. Dunleavey, 2007). The case of dually jobless couples, and their joint 
employment decisions, provides an interesting test case for assessing the force of cultural 
codes. Analysing these, and other, employment dynamics thus can provide interesting insights 
to the gendered construction of family provision patterns. 
 
In the next section of the chapter, I introduce the macho-effect hypothesis and its theoretical 
context, and discuss alternative explanations. I then present the analytical approach used to 
study joint employment transitions, after which I describe the statistical tools, and the data. 
The preceding section presents the results, and the last section provides a conclusion.  
 
                                                 
53 However, as mentioned in the Chapter 3, Doris (1998) speculated that some of her results might reflect the 
macho-hypothesis.  
54 The share of dual earner couples in this table is bigger, and the share of male breadwinner families smaller, 
than in Table 4.5. This is due to the differences in the variables: the ILO labour market status variable includes as 
employed also those who do part-time work, who sometimes reported other activities than paid work as their 
primary activity in the retrospective monthly questions (this was discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.2.3). I 
discuss possible implications of this in the concluding section of the chapter. 
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6.2 The macho-effect, alternative explanations, and evidence 
6.2.1 The macho-effect  
Several ethnographic studies on the labour supply of the wives of unemployed men have 
found that wives may be reluctant to assume the breadwinner role of the household. Several 
reasons for this reluctance were mentioned (Barrère-Maurisson et al., 1985; McKee and Bell, 
1985; Morris, 1990; also Cooke, 1987; Irwin and Morris, 1993). While economic concerns – 
especially when faced with means-tested social benefits – often played a role, many women 
mentioned non-economic reasons, such as wishes of not harming the self-esteem of their 
husband, husbands’ reluctance of giving the breadwinner role to their wives, and the wives’ 
lack of trust in their husbands’ homemaking skills. These statements reflected the couples’ 
unwillingness to challenge the prevalent order in which the husband is an – and sometimes the 
– economic provider for the family. The belief in this order was strong. For example, in their 
study of British couples, McKee and Bell (1985: 394) reported how “wives and husbands 
frequently became emotional at the prospect of wives becoming the chief breadwinner”. This 
reluctancy in challenging the gendered presumptions of economic provision as a solution for 
dual joblessness has at times been called the “macho-effect” (cf. Irwin and Morris, 1993; 
Halvorsen, 1999). 
 
The macho-effect is an example of the ways in which partners “do gender” in their daily 
activities (West and Zimmerman, 1987). The doing gender –theory was developed and has 
been widely used to explain the persistence of gendered behavioural patterns across various 
spheres of life (ibid.; Deutsch, 2007; Wicken and Emmison, 2007). The theory distances itself 
from explanations that stress the role of biological differences and socialization in producing 
gender differences and from views of gender as a stable “role” of learned and enacted sex-
linked expectations (Fenstermaker, 2002: 110). Instead, the core claim of the approach is that 
gender identities and gendered behavioural patterns are produced and reproduced in daily 
social interactions (e.g., West and Zimmerman, 1987; cf. also Goffman, 1977; Blossfeld and 
Drobnič, 2001; Fenstermaker and West, 2002).55 In these interactions, individuals display 
their gender, taking into account the prevailing expectations of the kinds of behaviour deemed 
proper for men and women in each situation; in other words, “gender is a socially scripted 
dramatization of the culture’s idealization of feminine and masculine natures” (West and 
Zimmerman, 1987: 130, original italics). Because of the mental and emotional importance of 
                                                 
55 Adopting this approach need not mean that one denies the role of biological and socialization differences. 
Doing gender can simply add to or enforce other sources of gender difference. 
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these displays, doing gender “is the mechanism by which both the material and symbolic 
products of the household are realized” (Berk, 1985: 201; cited in West and Zimmerman, 
1985: 144). In other words, doing gender “enters the utility function of the couple” (cf. 
Fenstermaker, 2002). Acknowledging this can make seemingly irrational behaviour more 
intelligible. 
 
The allocation of tasks within a household is a classic example of doing gender (ibid., Brines, 
1994). While housework and caring are fields where wives can display their femininity, paid 
work and economic provision give husbands the chance to show their masculine worth (West 
and Zimmerman, 1987: 144; Lamont, 2000; Fenstermaker, 2002). These salient and largely 
taken-for-granted expectations can bias evaluations of competence in different tasks so that 
men are evaluated (both by men and women, and even against “objective facts”) as more 
competent than women in instrumental tasks (such as paid work) as opposed to expressive or 
caring behaviour (Ridgeway, 1997; Ridgeway and Correll, 2004). These processes help to 
sustain a gendered division of work.   
 
Summing up, the basic claim of the macho-effect hypothesis is that couples avoid situations 
where the wife is the sole earner. Female breadwinning can be rare for other reasons as well. 
These will be discussed next. 
 
6.2.2 Alternative explanations 
Women earn, on average, less than men in every Western country (e.g., Blau and Kahn, 
2003). On average, wives also command lower wages than their husbands (e.g., Sørensen, 
2001). The Beckerian theory of the family division of labour states that couples divide the 
time between paid work and housework according to the relative efficiencies of the spouses in 
each task (Becker, 1981). Therefore, one would expect that if husbands command higher 
wages than their wives, it is more likely that the husband is the breadwinner. The likelihood of 
a similar division of labour increases even when the spouses have the same human capital and 
can command the same wages if the wife’s time at home is more valuable than that of the 
husband. Although the increases in dually employed couples suggests that Becker’s theory is 
outdated, the theory may still explain why female breadwinning has not taken root anywhere 
in Europe. Wage differences between husbands and wives have also helped explain why 
wives with jobless husbands have low employment rates (Maloney, 1991).  
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The effects of wage inequalities within families can be strengthened by the incentive 
structures created by social benefit systems. For example, Cullen and Gruber (2000) found 
strong “crowdout-effects” of unemployment compensation in the sense that unemployment 
compensation received by the husband decreased the labour supply of his wife. With 
sufficient unemployment compensation received by the husband, the wife may remain non-
employed, especially if the husband’s unemployment spell is likely to be transitory (Doris, 
1998). Finding a job may take time and resources, and wives may not enter the labour market 
just to withdraw from it once the husband has found a job.  
 
Wives of jobless husbands may not become breadwinners also due to other economic 
considerations. The wife’s disincentives for taking up paid work can be enforced by means 
testing of social benefits. If benefits are means tested, an increase in household earnings can 
cut received benefits so that total household incomes may not rise. In such a situation, 
employment of the (higher-wage) husband may be more rational from the couple’s point of 
view, even if it means a longer waiting period. In all European countries, some (most often 
social and housing assistance) benefits are means tested. In Ireland and in the United 
Kingdom, most unemployment compensation benefits are also means-tested. In others, such 
as Finland and Germany, means tested unemployment benefits play a smaller role. The 
eligibility criteria for enjoying non-means tested benefits depends usually on employment 
experience and previous contributions to the unemployment scheme (MISSOC, various 
years).  
 
The presence of (small) children in the household increases the likelihood of a male 
breadwinner solution. Women are expected to (and do) care for children more than men, and 
consequently, the value of women’s home time is increased by the presence of children 
(although affordable childcare reduces women’s childcare obligations). Health status of the 
spouses can also affect the joint employment status of the couple. Studies on the joint 
retirement patterns of couples have found that health problems of the husband can affect the 
employment status of the wife, but usually not vice versa (see, Jiménez-Martin et al., 1999 for 
Spain; Blau and Riphahn (1999) for Germany; for somewhat different effects in the United 
States, see Blau (1998)).  
 
Finally, gender differences in unemployment – women’s chances of finding a job if they want 
one – may contribute to the rarity of female breadwinning. Azmat and colleagues (2006) 
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reported sizable gender gaps in unemployment rates in many European countries. In high-gap 
countries, women had both a higher incidence rate of unemployment and a lower exit rate 
from unemployment to employment.56  
 
6.2.3 Direct and indirect evidence: for and against 
As mentioned above, most evidence for the macho-effect come from ethnographic work on 
family strategies and labour market behaviour at times of male unemployment. Quantitative 
studies have not explicitly tested the hypothesis. However, Doris (1998) found using a Mover-
Stayer model that the effects of husband’s employment were stronger for wives, who were 
jobless during the first measurement than for those, who were at work. She suggested that this 
may indicate that the wives of unemployed men are not willing to become breadwinners. 
Preliminary evidence for the macho-effect could also be found from Blau (1998) for the 
United States, and Blau and Riphahn (1999) for Germany, who reported descriptive data that 
showed that wives (close to retirement-age) are more likely to move to non-employment, and 
less likely to move to employment if their husband is non-employed. This association was 
stronger than for husbands. However, the authors did not pay more attention to these results.  
 
It is easy to argue that the macho-effect hypothesis is outdated, given the changes in women’s 
position in the family and in the labour market. However, it is important to stress that the 
macho-effect hypothesis only predicts that couples avoid female breadwinner solutions. 
Therefore, the increases in female employment rates and the shares of dual earner couples are 
not empirical evidence against the hypothesis. Alternatively, one could find contrasting 
evidence from data on attitudes to female breadwinning. For example, data from the 1994 
round of the International Social Survey Programme show that a minority of Europeans 
thought that female breadwinning was “not good” (ISSP, 1994).57 However, it is important to 
acknowledge that the predictive value of such general attitudes on behaviour is low (e.g., 
Hakim, 2004). Therefore, husbands and wives may be positive to female breadwinning in 
general, but when confronted with the real-life prospect of female breadwinning, gendered 
evaluations and behavioural codes may be enough to reproduce old patterns of economic 
                                                 
56 Another hypothesis could point to the gendered differences in the role of social resources (“social capital”) 
provided by employed and nonemployed spouses (De Graaf and Ultee, 2000). If employed husbands are more 
effective in providing valuable links to the labour market for their jobless spouses than employed wives, macho-
effect-like dynamics may be observed.  
57 The specific wording was “It is not good if the man stays at home and cares for the children and the woman 
goes out to work”. Of the countries then covered, the share of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with this 
claim ranged from 11 percent (The Netherlands) to 40 percent (Spain).  
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provision (cf. Ridgeway, 1997). Whether this is so, should be judged with data on actual 
behaviour.58 
 
We can find some indirect evidence in support of our expectations. First, it is still expected 
that men take part in the economic provision of their families (e.g., Lamont, 2000; Legerski, 
2004). Support can also be found from related literatures. For example, Clark (2003) reported 
how own unemployment had a higher adverse effect on the psychological well-being of 
British men than of women. Furthermore, he reported how unemployment of the partner had a 
negative impact on the well-being of women but not of men. Interestingly enough, the blow of 
unemployment for men was decreased by unemployment of the partner, but he found no such 
effect for women. Gender differences in housework provide another case in point. Even in 
Nordic countries, women take most of the childcare leaves, work more often part-time, and do 
more housework than men (OECD, 2006; Halleröd, 2005). Moreover, some results suggest 
that couples where the wife earns more than the husband seem to resort back to a more 
traditional division of housework as a way of restoring the gendered order (Brines, 1994; 
Bittman et al., 2003; Halleröd, 2005). As a consequence, Cooke (2006) documented how 
traditional gender roles in housework enhanced marital stability in Western Germany, 
Jalovaara (2003) showed how female breadwinning was detrimental to marital stability in 
Finland, and Kalmijn and colleagues showed how a move to female economic dominance 
destabilized marriages and cohabitations in the Netherlands (Kalmijn et al., 2007). Finally, as 
a historical curiosity, many researchers expected in the 1970s and 1980s that wives would 
start taking the breadwinner role as a reaction to their husbands’ unemployment, unlike in the 
1930s (e.g., Pahl, 1980; see also Morris, 1990). However, the results from ethnographic 
studies failed to confirm these predictions (Morris, 1990: 189). 
 
6.3 Modelling partners’ joint employment transitions  
I follow an approach by David Blau (1998; also Blau, 1997; Blau and Riphahn, 1999) for 
modelling joint labour market transitions of couples to formulate empirical predictions of the 
macho-effect hypothesis. Husbands and wives are considered either employed or jobless at 
each point in time. This results in a four-state joint choice variable, where 
 
 1 = Both partners are employed; 
                                                 
58 It is interesting that this belief is shared by ethnomethodologists (on evaluating “doing gender”, see Wickes 
and Emmison, 2007) and economists alike.  
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 2 = Husband is employed, wife is jobless; 
 3 = Wife is employed, husband is jobless; 
 4 = Both partners are jobless. 
 
We assume that a couple chooses one of these states, depending on the utility attached to 
each. These decisions can be made jointly, interdependently, or independently, although at 
least some degree of interdependence is assumed. Thus the model approximates common 
models of family labour supply (Blau and Riphahn, 1999: 233; see also Chapter 3, Section 
3.1).  
 
The couple derives utility from consumption, C, – the level of which depends on wages and 
unearned income – and leisure of the husband, 
hL  and of the wife, wL . Additionally, we can 
expect that the couple’s utility is shaped by conformity to cultural norms. In our case, we 
expect that the utility derived from a joint employment status depends on the social 
acceptability of the status is question, M (as for the “macho-effect”). Then a simple utility 
function for the couple is ),,,( MLLCU wh , where M < 0 in the case of a female breadwinner 
solution, and zero otherwise. Obviously, this framework could be extended to cover the social 
acceptability of other joint states as well. For example, in a strong male breadwinner regime, 
M can be positive for male breadwinner families. To keep the framework simple, these 
situations are not considered here.   
 
In a dynamic setting, the utility gained from occupying state k at period t, given occupancy of 
state j at period t – 1 is 
kjU (t). Then the probability that state k is optimal at t given that j was 
occupied at t – 1 is the probability of the transition from j to k 
 
 )1)1(|)()(Pr()( =−≠∀>= tdkmtUtUt jmjkjjkλ .   (6.1) 
 
The macho-effect hypothesis can be evaluated with a simple set of inequations, keeping other 
variables constant. Due to the starting point of the paper (exits from dual joblessness) and the 
different dynamics of employment exit, here I do not consider transitions into dual 
joblessness. I start from the following inequation: 
   
  43444241 ,, λλλλ >        (6.2). 
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This inequation states that dually jobless couples prefer any other joint status than female 
breadwinning. The inequation does not include a hierarchy between the left-hand side 
transitions. However, it does state that dually jobless couples may prefer dual joblessness to 
female breadwinning: this follows from the literature on the low employment rates of the 
wives of jobless men. When the husbands and wives have the same characteristics, and as 
wages increase, dual joblessness becomes decreasingly, and dual employment becomes an 
increasingly attractive option. Therefore, a crucial comparison is between transitions to male 
breadwinning and to female breadwinning: 
 
  4342 λλ >         (6.3). 
 
If couples avoid female breadwinning, female breadwinning solutions should be more 
unstable than other joint employment statuses. In particular, we would expect that female 
breadwinner couples choose dual employment more likely than male breadwinner couples: 
 
2131 λλ >         (6.4), 
 
and more generally, we would expect that female breadwinner couples remain in the status 
less likely than male breadwinner couples: 
 
  2233 λλ <         (6.5). 
 
These inequations will be used to evaluate the macho-effect hypothesis.59  
 
This approach differs from those used in most previous studies, as discussed in the third 
section of Chapter 3. These studies have generally concentrated on the labour supply of wives 
(or also of husbands, as in De Graaf and Ultee, 1991; 2000) and used both static and dynamic 
data on individuals (e.g., De Graaf and Ultee, 1991; Garcia, 1991; Maloney, 1991; Davies et 
al., 1994; Dex et al., 1995; Giannelli and Micklewright, 1995; Doris, 1998; Cullen and 
Gruber, 2000; De Graaf and Ultee, 2000; Bingley and Walker, 2001; McGinnity, 2002; 
                                                 
59 Additionally, we can expect that 3223 λλ < . In reality, these transitions are very rare. However, they will be 
discussed in the results section in the case of some simulated transition rates, when relevant.  
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Stephens, 2003). In most cases, the employment status of the spouse has been used as a 
strictly exogenous variable. To the extent that partners’ labour supplies involve joint or 
interdependent decision making, the estimates of the employment status of the spouse are 
biased. Furthermore, since these studies used individual level data, they did not differentiate 
between the joint statuses the couple moved to. Therefore, the “individual approach” to 
studying couples’ labour market decisions is not optimal for our purposes.60  
 
6.4 Method and data 
6.4.1 Method 
I evaluate the hypotheses in two steps: 
 
1. I estimate multivariate models for the joint transitions of couples 
2. Based on the multivariate models, I simulate transition rates for couples in which 
a. The couple has the characteristics of an “average” couple 
b. The spouses have similar characteristics 
c. The wife has better labour market characteristics than the husband 
 
I simulate the transitions both across the EU12 and separately for Germany, Finland, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom. The countries represent the four country clusters (Continental, 
Nordic, Southern, and Anglo-Saxon, respectively) commonly identified in Western Europe 
(e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1999). The details of these simulations are discussed in more detail in 
Section 5.3 of the chapter.  
 
In the first step, I estimate the following model:  
 
P 





++=== ∑
=
−
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k
kitiktkitiktitikttit xzxzxzjkky
0
1 )exp(/)exp(),,|( δγδγ ,   k, j=0,…,K,        (6.6) 
 
which gives the probability that couple i is in joint labour market status k at t, given 
occupancy of joint status j at t – 1, the attributes iktz  of the joint status k faced by the couple at 
t, and the characteristics itx  of the couple at t. The model is a conditional logit model, which 
                                                 
60 A similar “joint” approach as described here was used by Lundberg (1985) to study the labour supply of the 
wives of unemployed men, and Blau (1997; 1998), Blau and Riphahn (1999), and Jiménez-Martin and associates 
(1999) to study joint retirement behaviour.   
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is a suitable choice, when the data have alternative specific (alongside purely 
individual/couple specific) covariates (Wooldridge, 2002: 500-504). In this case, the social 
benefits the couple can expect to receive in each joint status vary across statuses (see below 
for details). For example, a couple may expect to receive higher social benefits if dually 
jobless than if dually employed. This possibility is incorporated into the model.61 Otherwise it 
is similar to the more familiar multinominal logit model. Technically, the model is similar to a 
competing-risks event-history model (cf. Yamaguchi, 1991; Blossfeld and Rohwer, 2002).  
 
6.4.2 Data 
6.4.2.1 Sample 
The data are a sample from the annual files of the ECHP. The annual files include information 
on wages and other incomes, which were not measured at the monthly level. In practice, 
descriptive results from annual data were very similar to those from monthly data.  
 
The sample includes couples from twelve ECHP countries, where the husband is 25 to 55 
years old and neither spouse is enrolled in education. The Swedish data are not panel data, the 
Dutch data do not have the monthly employment measures used to estimate the expected 
benefits, and the Luxembourgish data miss many observations from crucial variables. These 
countries were, therefore, excluded from the sample. The other twelve countries were pooled 
into a single file, as a way to increase the number of transitions, which often remained minor 
in single countries. Country fixed effects are included to control for country-level factors 
influencing the transitions. The effects of the covariates can, however, vary across the 
countries. Due to sample size restrictions, I could not include a full set of interactions. 
However, I tested for interactions between countries and the two child variables included in 
the model (see below). Due to the variation in European child care provision systems and the 
employment of mothers (Gornick et al., 1997; 1998), these interactions are theoretically the 
most plausible. The choice of the interactions included in the final models was made on the 
basis of likelihood-ratio tests. 
                                                 
61 A limitation of the conditional logit model is that relies on the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
assumption (Wooldridge, 2002: 501-502) that states that adding another alternative (say, other spouse employed 
only part-time) or changing the characteristics of the existing alternatives would not affect the relative odds 
between the other alternatives. An alternative method, which relaxes this assumption is the alternative specific 
probit model. Unfortunately, however, it is very burdensome to estimate and the models failed to converge with 
the software used (STATA 9.2).  
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Table 6.2. Descriptive statistics of the independent variables  
 Mean  S.d. 
Logged hourly net wage – husband ($ PPP) 
1.90 0.39 
Logged hourly net wage – wife ($ PPP) 1.60 0.38 
Expected benefit if dually jobless ($ PPP) 156.31 146.43 
Expected benefit if wife works ($ PPP) 138.70 80.70 
Expected benefit if husband works ($ PPP) 73.61 73.57 
Expected benefit if both work ($ PPP) 59.49 82.44 
Male unemployment rate 8.55 2.75 
Female unemployment rate 13.51 5.97 
Number of children 1.25 1.25 
   
 %  
Husband low education 44.11  
Husband middle education 34.13  
Husband high education 21.76  
Wife low education 46.67  
Wife middle education 33.33  
Wife high education 20.00  
Husband bad health 5.06  
Wife bad health 5.60  
Child less than 3 years 14.49  
Married 92.31  
Austria 4.70  
Belgium 6.03  
Denmark 3.61  
Finland 3.62  
France 12.75  
Germany 10.11  
Greece 9.51  
Ireland 5.85  
Italy 15.00  
Portugal 9.53  
Spain 12.48  
United Kingdom 6.80  
   
N (couple-years, total) 147,029  
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, annual data of couples, husband 25-
55 years, no students. 
 
 
6.4.2.2 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the joint labour market status of the couple at time t, conditional on 
its joint status at t – 1. The variable is a combination of the employed – not employed 
dummies of the spouses, constructed on the basis of the ILO measure of labour market status.  
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6.4.2.3 Independent variables  
The independent variables are the logged hourly wages of the partners, the expected benefit 
level of a couple in each joint status, age of husband, education of the spouses, health status of 
the spouses, number of children, presence of under three-year old children, marital status, the 
regional male unemployment rate, the regional female unemployment rate, and country 
dummies. Table 6.2 displays descriptive information on these variables.62 
 
Education is measured with three dummy variables: recognized third-level education (ISCED 
5-7), second stage of secondary education (ISCED 3), and less than second stage of secondary 
education (ISCED 0-2), which is the reference category. Higher educated people not only 
have more human capital, but may also hold different values and preferences regarding family 
provision (Blossfeld and Drobnič, 2001). Health status is measured with a dummy, which is 
unity if the respondent reports having “bad” or “very bad” health. Marital status (married – 
not married) is also measured as a dummy. Married couples are expected to exhibit a more 
traditional division of labour, even in countries with high rates of cohabitation (cf. Ginther et 
al., 2006). Similar reasoning justifies the inclusion of the number of children (18 years or less) 
and the age of the youngest child (measured as a dummy: less than three years or not). The 
model also includes the statistically significant interactions between the child variables and 
the country dummies (see above). Age of husband is measured through three dummies (25-34 
years, 35-44 years (reference), and 45-55 years). Due to the lack of proper labour market 
experience variables, this variable also serves as a proxy for potential experience. Regional 
male and female unemployment rates are estimated from the ECHP files and proxy gendered 
local labour market conditions. 
 
Hourly net wages are estimated by dividing the current net monthly earnings by 4.5 times the 
number of hours worked per week. Wages are observed only for employed partners. 
Following standard econometric practice, I impute the missing wages for nonworking 
individuals to estimate the wage offers these partners would get in the labour market. To do 
this, I estimated OLS wage equations separately for men and women in each country, using 
the full sample of married and cohabiting individuals in the Personal File of the ECHP. The 
regressors of the male wage equation are age (25-34, 35-44 (reference), and 45-55 years), 
education (primary (reference), secondary, tertiary), year dummies, and a dummy for “entry 
                                                 
62 Other variables of interest, such as immigration status, could not be used due to a high number of missing 
cases. 
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wage”. The “entry wage” dummy indicates whether the respondent has started the present job 
during the same year and has experienced unemployment before the present job. This measure 
is included in the estimation to take into account the possibility that wage offers to the 
unemployed may differ from wages offered to those in employment (Gregg and Wadsworth, 
2000). The female wage equation is otherwise similar but includes the number of children as 
an extra regressor. I also estimated wages for self-employed individuals, whose wages are not 
observed. The model used is otherwise the same but does not include the entry wage dummy. 
For the analysis, the wages are logged and the highest and lowest wages (less than 1 % and 
more than 99 %) in each country are excluded.  
 
The benefits a couple63 can expect to receive in joint status k were estimated by multiplying 
the predicted probability of receiving benefits with the estimated level of benefits a couple 
would receive (see Blau, 1997). The probability of receiving benefits and benefit levels were 
estimated using logit regression and OLS regression, respectively, separately for each country 
from the annual measure of benefits received during the previous year. Because of this, the 
information was fetched from wave t + 1. The annual measure was used because of serious 
problems in the monthly household income measure.64 However, I transformed the annual 
benefit levels to monthly ones to get an estimate of the monthly benefits available to a couple 
in state k. In the estimation, the benefits were also logged; in the transition models, the 
estimated benefits are in their original scale. I estimated the probability of receiving benefits 
and the benefit levels separately for each joint status (dual employment, male breadwinner, 
female breadwinner, dually jobless). Since a couple can occupy several joint statuses during 
one year, I estimated the models with a sample of couples, who occupied the joint status in 
question throughout the year. Information on the joint statuses occupied at each month of the 
year were obtained from the “calendar of activities” variables for each month from wave t + 1.  
 
                                                 
63 I use benefits expected benefits for couples instead of individuals because many benefits are targeted at 
households or take the household situation into account. Separating such benefits from purely individual benefits 
was not possible with the data at hand. A problem with this approach is that it may increase measurement error. I 
thank Wout Ultee for pointing out this problem, the possible consequences of which will be discussed in the 
results section of the chapter (6.5.2). 
64 For example, in a large share of households the reported total net household income remained below the sum 
of the gross wages of the partners. This is likely due to the fact that - unlike in the annual measure, which is a 
sum of the individual incomes received - monthly household incomes were reported by the reference person of 
the household. Many reference persons grossly underestimate the incomes of their household, an interesting 
research question in itself.  
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The independent variables included in the logit and OLS models reflect the main factors 
affecting benefit receipt and the level of benefits (see, MISSOC, various years). The 
predictors for benefit receipt and levels for jobless couples are: dummies for the duration of 
joblessness of the partners (with the categories: jobless for one to two years; jobless for three 
years or more; jobless for up to a year (reference category)), dummies for partners who have 
never worked, bad health of the partners (constructed as above), size of household, age of 
husband, and year; for female breadwinner families: hourly wage of wife, hourly wage of wife 
squared, hourly wage of wife cubed, joblessness duration dummies for husband, husband ever 
worked, bad health of husband, size of household, and year; for male breadwinner 
households: hourly wage of husband, hourly wage of husband squared, hourly wage of 
husband cubed, joblessness duration dummies for wife, wife ever worked, bad health of wife, 
size of household, and year; and finally, for dually working couples: hourly wage of husband, 
hourly wage of husband squared, hourly wage of husband cubed, hourly wage of wife, hourly 
wage of wife squared, hourly wage of wife cubed, size of household, and year. Other possibly 
relevant variables, such as previous occupation, could not be used because of a large number 
of missing cases. The highest percentage of the estimated benefits in each country was 
excluded when calculating the expected benefits.  
 
The income variables in the ECHP are in national currency (before the Euro). To make them 
comparable across countries, they are expressed in Purchasing Power Parity adjusted US 
dollars (with a measure found from the ECHP Country Files), and deflated to their value at 
the year 2000, using an index from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database (IMF, 2007). 
Expected benefits are, furthermore, divided by 10.  
 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Joint transition rates of couples: descriptive data 
I start by presenting some descriptive data on joint transitions. Columns (1) to (12) in Table 
6.3 present the transition rates from dual joblessness, male breadwinning, and female 
breadwinning, respectively. 
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 Table 6.3. Annual joint transitions rates  
Origin state Dual joblessness  Male breadwinning  Female breadwinning 
Destination 
state 
Both 
work 
Male 
breadw. 
Female 
breadw. 
Both 
jobless 
 Both 
work 
Male 
breadw. 
Female 
breadw. 
Both 
jobless 
 Both 
work 
Male 
breadw. 
Female 
breadw. 
Both 
jobless 
 
41λ  42λ  43λ  44λ   21λ  22λ  23λ  24λ   31λ  32λ  33λ  34λ  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Austria 0.0667* 0.1833† 0.0667 0.6833  0.1958 0.7749 0.0064† 0.0230  0.2109 0.0748† 0.6667 0.0476* 
Belgium 0.0138* 0.1073 0.0381† 0.8408  0.1219 0.8422 0.0026* 0.0334  0.2258 0.0065* 0.6774 0.0903† 
Denmark 0.0615* 0.1692† 0.0615* 0.7231  0.3848 0.6415 0.0086* 0.0151*  0.4528 0.0566* 0.4434 0.0472* 
Finland 0.1235† 0.2469† 0.1235† 0.5062  0.3636 0.5954 0.0071* 0.0339†  0.3889 0.0625* 0.5000 0.0486* 
France 0.0805 0.2931 0.0728 0.5536  0.1362 0.8278 0.0047† 0.0313  0.3530 0.0499† 0.5268 0.0702 
Germany 0.0920 0.2209 0.0613† 0.6258  0.1912 0.7594 0.0108 0.0386  0.3608 0.0512† 0.5234 0.0646† 
Greece 0.0864 0.3063 0.0497† 0.6258  0.1041 0.8644 0.0033† 0.0283  0.3095 0.0516† 0.5754 0.0635† 
Ireland 0.0301† 0.2010 0.0585 0.7004  0.1417 0.8174 0.0068† 0.0342  0.2780 0.0538† 0.5516 0.1166† 
Italy 0.0219† 0.2088 0.0324† 0.7070  0.0692 0.8922 0.0036 0.0350  0.1881 0.0273† 0.7267 0.0579 
Portugal 0.0441† 0.2000 0.0912 0.6647  0.1415 0.8324 0.0040† 0.0221  0.2534 0.0272† 0.6567 0.0627† 
Spain 0.0599 0.3487 0.0864 0.5049  0.0993 0.8471 0.0080 0.0456  0.3104 0.0872 0.4849 0.1174 
United 
Kingdom 
0.0557† 0.1362 0.0681† 0.7399  0.2352 0.7322 0.0037* 0.0289  0.2635 0.0299† 0.6317 0.0749† 
EU12 
(weighted) 
0.0603 0.2369 0.0564 0.6464  0.1280 0.8310 0.0059 0.0351  0.2970 0.0461 0.5847 0.0721 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, annual data of couples, husband 25-55 years, no students. 
Notes: * number of transitions <10; † number of transitions 10-30. 
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More than half of the couples in each joint status were found from the same status the 
preceding year (female breadwinning in Denmark, Finland, and Spain are the exceptions). 
Consistent with our hypotheses, male breadwinner solutions are more stable than female 
breadwinner solutions, and the transition rates to dual employment are higher from female 
breadwinning than male breadwinning. The latter differences are the smallest in Austria, 
Finland, and the United Kingdom, where the higher transition rates from female to male 
breadwinning than vice versa (the same pattern holds in each country) contribute to the higher 
instability of female breadwinning. Interestingly, female breadwinning appears less stable 
than dual joblessness. Also consistent with our hypotheses, the transition rates from dual 
joblessness to female breadwinning are smaller than the transition rates to male breadwinning 
in each country.  
 
Even though the observed transition rates correspond to our hypotheses in each country, the 
cross-national variation in the transition rates is rather notable. For example, the probability 
that a dually jobless couple was found in the same joint status the preceding year varied from 
an approximately 50 percent in Spain and Finland to over 80 percent in Belgium. Simplistic 
comparisons also suggest that the macho-effect may be stronger in some countries (for 
example, Italy) than in others (for example, Finland). 
 
6.5.2 Conditional logit transition models 
While the results in Table 6.3 give primary support for the macho-effect hypothesis, the 
observed differences may be due to different characteristics of the spouses and couples in the 
different joint labour market statuses. To look into this possibility, I perform a two-step 
analysis as discussed above, and begin by estimating the conditional logit models for the joint 
transitions. 
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Table 6.4. Annual joint transitions of couples, conditional logit estimates 
Origin state Dual joblessness  Male breadwinning  Female breadwinning 
Destination state Dual emp. 
(4 → 1) 
Male 
breadw. 
(4 → 2) 
Female 
breadw. 
(4 → 3) 
 Dual emp. 
(2 → 1) 
Female 
breadw. 
(2 → 3) 
Dual 
joblessness  
(2 → 4) 
 Dual emp. 
(3 → 1) 
Male 
breadw. 
(3 → 2) 
Dual 
joblessness  
(3 → 4) 
Couple-specific covariates            
Husband’s wage 0.737 1.876*** -0.502  -0.722*** -3.365*** -2.969***  0.894*** 1.766** 0.651** 
Wife’s wage 2.535*** -0.714** 1.710*  1.319**** 2.749*** 1.514***  -0.566*** -2.896*** -2.459*** 
Husband’s education: Mid.  -0.242 0.217 0.037  -0.215*** -0.618* -0.221*  0.066 0.148 -0.133 
Husband’s education: High -0.945* -0.016 -1.086*  -0.439*** -1.447*** -0.487**  0.525** 0.472 0.123 
Wife’s education: Middle  0.595** -0.091 0.327  0.214*** 0.185 -0.336***  0.177 -0.340 -0.057 
Wife’s education: High 0.504 -0.108 0.922**  0.682*** 0.368 -0.309†  0.233 -0.818* -0.024 
Husband’s age 25-34 0.614** 0.504*** -0.088  0.247*** 0.408† -0.084  0.355* 0.330 0.146 
Husband’s age 45-55 -1.199*** -0.589*** -0.095  -0.558*** -0.085 1.119***  -1.031*** -0.793** -0.207 
Number of children -0.146 0.030 -0.054  -0.074** -0.201 -0.074†  -0.097† 0.031 0.058 
Child <3 years -0.223 0.252† -0.418  -0.567*** -0.420 0.300**  0.251 1.175*** 0.703* 
Husband’s health bad -1.154*** -1.566*** -0.134  0.125 2.063*** 1.186***  -1.528*** -1.793*** -0.115 
Wife’s health bad -0.845* -0.163 -0.884**  -0.983*** -1.097** -0.264*  -0.250 1.014** 0.826*** 
Married 0.066 -0.042 -0.189  -0.365*** -0.513 -0.519**  -0.167 -0.754* -0.674* 
Male regional unemp. rate 0.019 -0.070*** 0.009  -0.020* 0.038 0.052***  -0.032 -0.151*** -0.080* 
Female regional unemp. rate -0.036 0.034** -0.025  -0.006 -0.012 -0.019*  0.016 0.127*** 0.067** 
Austria -2.472** -1.161† -0.961  -0.835*** -0.491 -0.345  -0.994*** 0.031 -0.343 
Belgium -3.670** -1.234*** -1.188*  -1.356*** -3.415*** -0.467*  -0.914** -2.372* 0.433 
Denmark -0.176 -0.553 -0.548  -1.009*** -2.757** -1.823***  0.631† 0.984 0.860 
Finland 1.094* 0.133 0.852  0.303† -1.804** -0.758*  -0.039 0.232 -0.391 
France -0.482 -0.402 -0.007  -0.704*** -0.862* -0.801***  -0.552** -1.409** -0.408 
Greece 0.369 -0.296 -0.335  -0.480*** -2.601*** -3.047***  -0.251 -1.757*** -1.350** 
Ireland -1.271** -0.493* -0.738†  -0.212 0.303 -1.012***  -0.469† -0.784† 0.431 
Italy -1.841** -0.599* -1.090*  -1.201*** -1.893*** -1.841***  -1.204*** -2.088*** -0.818* 
Portugal 1.530** 0.517† 1.162*  -0.159 -3.257*** -3.401***  0.064 -1.815** -1.778*** 
Spain 0.182 0.284 0.706†  -0.483*** -1.618*** -1.822***  -0.266 -1.290** -0.457 
United Kingdom -0.990* -0.823** 0.095  -0.060 -1.749** -0.536*  -0.292 -0.234 0.573 
Austria*no. children 0.755† 0.555 0.394  0.199** -0.702* -0.153     
France*no. children     -0.180** -0.314† -0.161     
Ireland*no. children     -0.018 -0.351 0.252**     
Italy*no. children     -0.016 -0.458† -0.414***  0.912† -0.751 -1.042 
Austria*child < 3 yrs.     0.719** 0.481 -0.822     
Finland*child < 3 yrs.     -0.814** 0.541 0.060     
Ireland*child < 3 yrs. -1.312 -0.474 1.493**         
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Table 6.4 (continued)            
Italy*child < 3 yrs.     0.386* -0.981 -0.766**     
Portugal*child < 3 yrs.     0.507** 1.102 -0.513     
Destination state specific             
Expected benefits / 10  0.015***    -0.036***    -0.005*  
Constant -4.784*** -1.463** -2.890***  -1.196*** 0.203 3.166***  -0.221 0.444 1.493* 
Log pseudolikelihood  -3256.691    -17429.803    -2930.006  
Χ
2  2338.81    23233.69    1941.89  
Df  88    106    85  
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, annual data of couples, husband 25-55 years, no students. 
Notes: Omitted reference categories: No transition (origin state specific), Husband’s education low, wife’s education low, Husband’s health not bad, wife’s health not bad, no 
small children, not married, Germany. 
Significance levels: † p<0.10; * p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table 6.4 presents the results from these models. The results are displayed for the most part in 
the same way as results for multinominal logit models, the only difference being the single 
estimate for the destination state specific parameter, the expected social benefits from each 
joint status. A positive sign of this covariate tells that the higher the expected benefits from a 
joint status, the higher the probability of moving to this status. The sign of the estimated effect 
of expected benefits is unlike that expected in two of the three cases. For dually jobless 
couples, a $ 10 (PPP) increase in expected benefits in joint status k translates to an estimated 
1.5 (100*(exp(0.015)-1)) percent increase in the transition rate to this status. For male and 
female breadwinner couples, a similar increase in benefits decreases their transition 
probabilities by an estimated 3.6 and 0.5 percent, respectively.65 
 
The effects of the other covariates are mainly as expected, and can be summarized as follows. 
Wages show mainly the expected effects. An increase in own wages promotes own 
employment. The exception is the weak and non-significant effect of wages of the husband on 
transitions from dual joblessness to dual employment. Consistent with earlier literature (see 
Chapter 3, Section 2), the wife’s wage effect is slightly stronger on her employment entry 
than the husband’s wage effect on his entry. Important cross-spouse wage effects can be 
found. Higher wages decrease the spouse’s entry to employment (this is also a possible 
explanation to the weak effect of male wages on transitions from dual joblessness to dual 
employment). Consistent with the literature, the wages of the husband have a stronger cross-
spouse effect than the wages of the wife. The effect of wages is particularly strong in “role 
switches”, where the supporter becomes the supported. In such cases, the estimate combines 
two effects, the negative effect of wages on the employment exit of the ego, and the also 
negative effect on the employment entry of the spouse. Own wages (especially of the wife) 
increase them strongly, while wages of the spouse (especially of the husband) prevent such 
switches. For example, a one percent increase in the wages of the male breadwinner decrease 
the probability of a role switch by 3.4 percent, while a one percent increase in the wages of 
the male breadwinner’s wife increases its probability by 2.7 percent.  
 
                                                 
65 Measurement error in expected benefits is a source of possible bias. In such a case, the estimates would be 
downwardly biased, which could explain the negative signs. Finding a proper instrument for the expected 
benefits proved difficult. Instead, in the simulations below, I made tests, in which the estimates of expected 
benefits were changed upwards (up to 0.1). These naturally changed the predicted transition rates, sometimes 
unplausibly so, but not the qualitative conclusions.  
 130 
Higher education of the husband leads to more stable male breadwinning (even when wages 
are controlled for). Furthermore, high education of the husband decreases the transition 
probability from dual joblessness to dual employment and female breadwinning, and increases 
transitions from female breadwinning to his employment. Female education promotes 
transitions from to dual earning, when she is mobile. Older couples are less likely to move to 
dual earning, but are also less likely to have role switches from female breadwinning, whereas 
younger couples are more likely to move to dual earning. As one would expect, an increase in 
the number of children stabilizes male breadwinning. Small children have a negative effect on 
their mother’s employment, from male and female breadwinning alike, and increase the 
probability of role switches in the latter case. Bad health generally weakens the couple’s 
attachment to the labour market, and the own and cross-spouse effects of bad health of the 
husband are stronger than those of the wife (cf. Blau, 1998; Blau and Riphahn, 1999; 
Jiménez-Martin et al., 1999, on the behaviour of older couples). Marriage stabilizes sole 
breadwinner arrangements, without having an effect on the transitions from dual joblessness. 
The direct and cross-spouse effects of regional male and female unemployment rates are 
mainly as expected.  
 
Without going to the details, many of the country parameters remain significant and often 
large after the couple-level covariates are controlled for. The table also shows the interaction 
terms, the inclusion of which were supported by the likelihood ratio–tests. The relevant 
parameters of the countries used for the simulations are described further in the next section. 
 
6.5.3 Simulated transition rates 
Interesting as they are, the parameter estimates from the conditional logit joint transition 
models are not very helpful in evaluating the macho-effect hypothesis. As discussed above, in 
the second step of the analysis I simulate transition rates for couples with varying 
characteristics, using the coefficients from the estimated models. Before the simulation, Table 
6.5 shows the relationship between the actual transition rates and the ones fitted from the 
estimated models. The models fit the data well. The models slightly overestimate the stability 
of male breadwinning and dual joblessness, and slightly underestimate the stability of female 
breadwinning. The differences are, however, minor and should not affect the qualitative 
conclusions.  
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Table 6.5. Actual (unweighted) and fitted annual transition rates 
 Actual Fitted 
Dual jobless → Dual employed 0.0527 0.0436 
Dual jobless → Male breadwinning 0.2430 0.2402 
Dual jobless → Female breadwinning 0.0630 0.0610 
Dual jobless → Dual jobless 0.6413 0.6694 
Male breadwinning → Dual employed 0.1265 0.1193 
Male breadwinning → Male breadwinning 0.8343 0.8481 
Male breadwinning → Female breadwinning 0.0055 0.0068 
Male breadwinning → Dual jobless 0.0338 0.0387 
Female breadwinning → Dual employed 0.2909 0.3142 
Female breadwinning → Male breadwinning 0.0485 0.0522 
Female breadwinning → Female breadwinning 0.5854 0.5780 
Female breadwinning → Dual jobless 0.0752 0.0958 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8,  
annual data of couples, husband 25-55 years, no students. 
 
The simulations are carried out both for the EU12 as a whole, and separately for the four 
countries representative of the common welfare regime classifications (Esping-Andersen, 
1999): Finland (representing the Nordic countries), Germany (Continental Europe), Spain 
(Southern Europe), and the UK (liberal regime). Of these, Finland is an interesting case 
because there women have been in the labour force longer than in most European countries, 
and the male breadwinner provision model never took properly root (Pfau-Effinger, 2004). 
The dual employment model has furthermore been supported by family policies. Compared to 
Germany, the transition rates from dual joblessness and male breadwinning are higher in 
Finland (Tables 6.3 and 6.4). Maybe surprisingly, Finnish couples with small children have a 
smaller probability of moving from male breadwinning to dual employment. However, partly 
as a response to the extensive home-care policies for families with small children, the 
employment rate of Finnish mothers with children under three years is very low (OECD, 
2004a). Germany, in contrast, has historically had a strong male breadwinner model, which 
has also been supported by public policy. Despite recent rapid increases in the employment of 
Spanish women, Spain remained a male breadwinner family country during the 1990s. 
Accordingly, the male breadwinner status is more stable in Spain than even in Germany. 
Unlike in Germany and Spain, no family model was explicitly favoured in the UK, even 
though the male breadwinner model was dominant in the past. According to Table 6.4, nearly 
all of the transition rates are smaller in the UK than in Germany. 
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Table 6.6. Median and modal values of the independent variables 
 EU12 Finland Germany  Spain United 
Kingdom 
Age of husband 35-44 35-44 35-44 35-44 35-44 
Husband’s education Low Middle Middle Low High 
Wife’s education Low High Middle Low Low 
Married Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Children 1 1 1 1 1 
Children age 0-3 No No No No No 
Health problems, husband No No No No No 
Health problems, wife No No No No No 
Husband’s wage 6.54 5.64 7.17 5.58 7.32 
Wife’s wage 4.80 4.76 4.53 3.94 5.53 
Benefits – Both work 52.30 103.43 94.87 31.10 83.60 
Benefits – Husband works 134.84 414.16 198.89 39.44 144.56 
Benefits – Wife works 506.34 549.72 559.88 407.14 447.04 
Benefits – Both jobless 720.03 950.45 872.91 438.14 899.76 
Regional male unemp. % 7.23 9.23 7.46 13.02 5.69 
Regional female unemp. % 10.25 11.59 8.15 27.26 3.57 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, annual data of couples, husband 25-
55 years, no students. 
 
Table 6.6 shows the median and modal values of the independent variables. The gender wage 
gap is visible in the EU12 as a whole, and in each country separately, including in Finland, 
where the wives in our sample have, on average, higher education levels than husbands. In the 
other countries, wives have on average lower or the same levels of education than husbands. 
In the UK, education levels are two-peaked, with most cases found either in the highest or 
lowest category. In the case of wives, those with low education slightly outnumber those with 
high education, while for husbands the situation is the opposite. The gender gaps in regional 
unemployment rates are also visible, with the UK being the only country where the regional 
female unemployment rate is lower than the male one (cf. Azmat et al., 2006). Not 
surprisingly, dually jobless couples can expect to receive more benefits than female 
breadwinner, male breadwinner, and dually working couples. The national differences are as 
expected on the basis of the welfare regime literature. Otherwise, the median couple is 
married with one child over 3 years of age, and in good health.  
 
 
As discussed above, the simulations include three hypothetical cases, and are presented in 
Table 6.7. The first case represents an “average” couple, which has median or modal values 
for all independent variables. The simulated transition rates are reported in the second rows 
for each country and the EU12. The first rows show the observed transition rates. The average 
couple has a male advantage in wages, education (in the United Kingdom), and 
unemployment rates (except in the United Kingdom). Therefore the simulated transition rates 
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for average couples cannot be used to evaluate the macho-effect hypothesis. They are, 
however, interesting for other reasons. 
 
First of all, they show that dually jobless couples are likely to have worse-than-average labour 
market characteristics: the median couples have dramatically higher transition rates out of 
dual joblessness. The transition rates from dual joblessness to dual employment are higher in 
each country and also the EU12 as a whole. In Finland, these transition rates increase up to 40 
percent, while remaining rather low in Spain and the United Kingdom. Median couples also 
have higher transition rates to male breadwinning, although the difference is more modest in 
Finland than elsewhere. In Spain, nearly 60 percent of the outflows from dual joblessness in 
this group are to male breadwinning. In Finland, transitions to female breadwinning are 
roughly the double from the actually observed rates, while in the other countries and the EU12 
the increase in only modest, and in Spain, the estimated transition rate for median couples is 
actually lower than the observed rate. Recall, however, that in Finland the wife of the median 
couple has a higher level of education than her husband. 
 
The simulated transition rates for the median couples can also be used to assess the 
characteristics of male and female breadwinner couples. In Spain, the observed transition rates 
out of male breadwinning are very similar to those simulated for the median couple. In other 
words, Spanish male breadwinner couples were the “couples next door” in 1990s Spanish 
society, which is not surprising given the prevalence of the male breadwinner model in Spain 
during the past decade. In Finland, Germany, and the United Kingdom, the simulated 
transition rates differ from the observed ones. In each country, the stability of the male 
breadwinner solution and transitions to dual joblessness are lower, and transitions to dual 
employment are higher for the average couple than the observed rates. In these countries, 
male breadwinners and their wives seem to have lower-than-average resources, as shown by 
the transition rates to dual joblessness and dual employment.66 The opposite seems to be true 
in the case of female breadwinner couples (although the difference between the observed and 
the simulated transition rates is smaller in Spain than elsewhere).   
                                                 
66 Because of cross-spouse effects, the issue is somewhat more complicated. The cross-spouse effects are, 
however, in general weaker than the effects of the ego’s resources on his/her transitions. The lower transitions to 
dual employment are also linked to the presence of children, which affect the occurrence of male breadwinning 
in these countries.  
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Table 6.7. Simulated annual transition probabilities  
Origin state Dual joblessness  Male breadwinning  Female breadwinning 
Destination state Both 
work 
Male 
breadw. 
Female 
breadw. 
Both 
jobless 
 Both 
work 
Male 
breadw. 
Female 
breadw. 
Both 
jobless 
 Both 
work 
Male 
breadw 
Female 
breadw 
Both 
jobless 
 
41λ  42λ  43λ  44λ   21λ  22λ  23λ  24λ   31λ  32λ  33λ  34λ  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
EU12               
Actual (unweighted) 0.0527 0.2430 0.0630 0.6413  0.1265 0.8343 0.0055 0.0338  0.2909 0.0485 0.5854 0.0752 
Median couple 0.2576 0.4801 0.0798 0.1824  0.2013 0.7514 0.0114 0.0360  0.4729 0.0945 0.3826 0.0499 
Same characteristics 0.5440 0.2532 0.0662 0.1367  0.2596 0.5883 0.1009 0.0512  0.4945 0.0305 0.4536 0.0214 
               
Finland               
Actual 0.1235 0.2469 0.1235 0.5062  0.3636 0.5954 0.0071 0.0339  0.3889 0.0625 0.5000 0.0486 
Median couple 0.4051 0.2802 0.2356 0.0790  0.3328 0.6591 0.0019 0.0063  0.5322 0.0402 0.4040 0.0235 
Same characteristics 0.6496 0.1708 0.1200 0.0597  0.2973 0.6881 0.0053 0.0093  0.5218 0.0305 0.4347 0.0130 
               
Germany               
Actual 0.0920 0.2209 0.0613 0.6258  0.1912 0.7594 0.0108 0.0386  0.3608 0.0512 0.5234 0.0646 
Median couple 0.2846 0.4993 0.0828 0.1333  0.1647 0.8215 0.0043 0.0095  0.5585 0.0709 0.3354 0.0351 
Same characteristics 0.6483 0.2039 0.0681 0.0797  0.2640 0.6636 0.0556 0.0168  0.5643 0.0200 0.4035 0.0123 
               
Spain               
Actual 0.0599 0.3487 0.0864 0.5064  0.0993 0.8471 0.0080 0.0456  0.3104 0.0872 0.4849 0.1174 
Median couple 0.1117 0.5867 0.0503 0.2513  0.1074 0.8675 0.0037 0.0214  0.3926 0.1140 0.3860 0.1074 
Same characteristics 0.4645 0.2422 0.0705 0.2227  0.1706 0.7402 0.0454 0.0438  0.4085 0.0095 0.5581 0.0239 
               
UK               
Actual 0.0557 0.1362 0.0681 0.7399  0.2352 0.7322 0.0037 0.0289  0.2635 0.0299 0.6317 0.0749 
Median couple 0.1481 0.4149 0.0753 0.3616  0.1467 0.8456 0.0007 0.0067  0.5384 0.0511 0.3627 0.0478 
Same characteristics 0.3793 0.2258 0.1382 0.2567  0.3413 0.6468 0.0057 0.0063  0.6226 0.0122 0.3412 0.0240 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, annual data of couples, husband 25-55 years, no students. 
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The second example is used to assess the macho-effect hypothesis more directly. In this case, 
the spouses have the characteristics of the median husband: his median wage and modal level 
of education. The couple faces the median regional male unemployment rate, is married, and 
both spouses are in good health. Since children increase the value of the wife’s time at home, 
and thus decrease her labour supply, this exemplary couple does not have children. Also, the 
expected benefits from female breadwinning are the same as from male breadwinning. 
According to our model, the differences in relevant transition rates should stem from the 
macho-effect, M. The simulated transition rates for these couples are shown on the third rows 
of each country and the EU12, respectively, in Table 6.7. 
 
The results support the macho-effect hypothesis. In each country and the EU12, the transition 
rates from dual joblessness to female breadwinning are lower than to male breadwinning. 
Likewise, female breadwinning is everywhere more unstable than male breadwinning, and 
transition rates to dual joblessness are higher from female breadwinning than from male 
breadwinning. With the exception of Finland, transition rates from dual joblessness to female 
breadwinning are also lower than stability in dual joblessness. There are some country 
differences in the transition rates. In Finland, the difference in the transition rates from dual 
joblessness to male versus female breadwinning is smaller than elsewhere (but there the 
transition rate to dual employment is higher). In Spain, the transition rates from female and 
male breadwinning to dual employment are lower, and stability in both states is higher than in 
the other countries. At the EU12 level, role shifts from male breadwinning are surprisingly 
more common than from female breadwinning, and these transition rates are higher than in the 
four countries. However, one should not draw heavy conclusions on the cross-country 
differences, because of variation in other institutional features. The other results are: childless 
couples with the same characteristics have notably higher transition rates from dual 
joblessness to dual employment, exit more likely from dual joblessness than average couples 
(with country variation in the difference), are more likely to move from male breadwinning to 
dual employment (with the exception of Finland) and less are likely to remain in male 
breadwinning (except in Finland), while the differences between these couples and average 
couples in transitions out of female breadwinning are smaller (except for female breadwinner 
stability in Germany, Spain, and the EU12). 
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Finally, it can be interesting to analyse how the transition rates change when the wife has 
more labour market resources than her husband: does the macho-effect trump money?67 This 
is done in Table 6.8. To save space, I change the characteristics only for the European couple. 
Because of no interactions between countries and the independent variables in question, the 
shifts are proportionally similar in the four countries. However, since the intercept level of the 
transitions varies across countries, the conclusions may differ. Therefore, the main purpose of 
these simulations is to show the importance of the different variables. 
 
The first row in Table 6.8 is the same as the last row of the European couple from Table 6.7. I 
simulate six new cases, while keeping the other variables at their original values (see Table 6): 
an unmarried couple; a couple in which the husband is from the youngest cohort; bad health 
of the husband; a doubled regional male unemployment rate; an increase in education of the 
wife to middle and to high education; and a 50 percent increase in the wife’s wage.  
 
I concentrate only on the transition rates relevant for the macho-effect hypothesis. Briefly put, 
the main finding is that within-family health inequality in favour of the wife can outrun the 
macho-effect. Dually jobless couples in which the husband has health problems have slightly 
lower transition rates to male breadwinning than to female breadwinning. In such couples, 
female breadwinning is also more stable than male breadwinning (maybe reflecting the 
differences in the severity of the health problems) and “role shifts” from male to female 
breadwinning are common (although entries to dual employment remain slightly more 
common from female than from male breadwinning).68  
                                                 
67 For a similar question in the case of the division of housework, see Bittman et al. (2002).  
68 Recall, however, that the base level of these transitions was higher in the EU12 than the four countries. These 
results should therefore be dealt with some caution. 
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Table 6.8. Further simulations 
Origin state Dual joblessness  Male breadwinning  Female breadwinning 
Destination state Both 
work 
Male 
breadw 
Female 
breadw. 
Both 
jobless 
 Both 
work 
Male 
breadw. 
Female 
breadw. 
Both 
jobless 
 Both 
work 
Male 
breadw 
Female 
breadw 
Both 
jobless 
 
41λ  42λ  43λ  44λ   21λ  22λ  23λ  24λ   31λ  32λ  33λ  34λ  
               
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
EU12 
              
Same characteristics 0.5440 0.2532 0.0662 0.1367  0.2596 0.5883 0.1009 0.0512  0.4945 0.0305 0.4536 0.0214 
Not married 0.5144 0.2667 0.0808 0.1381  0.3074 0.4834 0.1385 0.0708  0.5102 0.0367 0.3952 0.0579 
Youngest cohort 0.6199 0.2585 0.0374 0.0843  0.2969 0.5255 0.1355 0.0421  0.5755 0.0341 0.3701 0.0202 
Husband bad health 0.4094 0.1262 0.1381 0.3262  0.1595 0.3190 0.4305 0.0910  0.1831 0.0087 0.7755 0.0327 
Male ue. rate doubled 0.6348 0.1546 0.0718 0.1389  0.2199 0.5764 0.1304 0.0734  0.4516 0.0116 0.5230 0.0138 
Wife middle education  0.6821 0.1599 0.0635 0.0945  0.3012 0.5509 0.1137 0.0343  0.5438 0.0202 0.4174 0.0186 
Wife high education 0.6293 0.1588 0.1163 0.0955  0.3996 0.4578 0.1134 0.0293  0.5614 0.0123 0.4075 0.0188 
Increase wife wage 50% 0.7681 0.0959 0.0669 0.0691  0.3091 0.4105 0.2143 0.0660  0.4551 0.0109 0.5249 0.0092 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, annual data of couples, husband 25-55 years, no students. 
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Sharp wage inequality in favour of the wife also decreases the relevance of the macho-effect 
at the EU12 level: “role switches” from male to female breadwinning are common, and 
female breadwinning becomes more stable. However, transitions from dual employment to 
female breadwinning remain rare. The decrease in transitions to male breadwinning results 
from an increase in transitions to dual employment. The transition rate from female 
breadwinning to dual employment also remains higher than the rate from male breadwinning 
to dual employment. The macho-effect seems weaker also in couples in which the wife has 
tertiary education and the husband less than a second stage of secondary education. In any 
case, the differences between the transition rates remain as hypothesised by the macho-effect 
hypothesis. A doubling of the regional male unemployment rate tells a similar story. Marriage 
and age group do not seem to matter.69 
 
6.6 Conclusions and discussion 
In this chapter, I have discussed and tested the so-called macho-effect hypothesis, which 
predicts that couples are unlikely to choose a female breadwinning solution because of the 
strongly gendered roles of economic provision. Many qualitative studies have used this 
explanation to understand why women with unemployed husbands have lower employment 
rates than wives with employed husbands. However, quantitative data have not been yet used 
to test the hypothesis explicitly. The macho-effect hypothesis can be included among the 
culturally inspired theories of “doing gender”. I argued that despite the increases in female 
employment rates and dual-earner couples, the cultural role of the female supporter family 
model remains more problematic than one might expect. Starting from the macho-effect 
hypothesis, I made predictions of the joint employment dynamics of couples. I tested them 
with data from twelve European countries from the European Community Household Panel 
by simulating transition rates based on parameter estimates from conditional logit models for 
transition data.  
 
The results support the predictions. Transitions from dual joblessness to female breadwinning 
are very rare; furthermore, female breadwinning is a less stable joint labour market status than 
dual employment, male breadwinning, and even dual joblessness, and female breadwinning is 
more likely than male breadwinning to transform to dual employment. These qualitative 
                                                 
69 In result not presented here, I also included interactions between the wage variables and the number of 
children and the age of the youngest child to account for the possibility that children change wage elasticities. 
The signs of the estimates were as expected, but they usually were not statistically significant. Moreover, the 
qualitative conclusions did not change.  
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conclusions remain even when the spouses have the same levels of labour market resources, 
and do not have children. These conclusions held for the twelve European countries as a 
group, and for Finland, Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom separately. Thus, European 
couples seem to avoid female breadwinning.  
 
This avoidance can be overcome by strong within-couple inequalities that favour the wife. In 
particular, couples in which husbands have health problems seem less wary of female 
breadwinning. In addition to a reduction in employment possibilities, ill health of the husband 
may be an “excuse” to hold behaviours that oppose the prevailing cultural expectations of 
male provision. Wage and human capital advantage of the wife can also increase the utility of 
joint employment patterns, which function against the macho-effect. However, within-family 
economic inequalities in favour of the wife need to be strong to overcome the stigma of 
female breadwinning; for example, a clear wage advantage of the wife mainly increases 
transitions from dual joblessness to dual employment, but not to female breadwinning. In 
other words, cultural expectations of family provision have a strong influence on couples’ 
labour supply decisions.  
 
Financial incentives do not explain the observed avoidance of female breadwinning. But do 
these results permit to conclude in favour of the macho-effect hypothesis? A problem of these 
analyses is that we cannot observe what is happening inside the family. For example, the 
literature on the retirement behaviour of couples has concluded that spouses try to maximize 
their common leisure. It could be that wives are more keen to spend time with their jobless 
husbands than vice versa. But this explanation does not help us understand why female 
breadwinner couples move to dual employment more often that male breadwinner couples. 
Alternatively, the Beckerian thesis of the division of labour in families predicts that husbands 
and wives with similar labour market resources might still choose male breadwinning instead 
of female breadwinning if the productivity of the wife at home exceeds that of the husband 
(Becker, 1981). If husbands were practically incapable of doing housework (or perceived as 
such), wives with similar or higher labour market characteristics than their husbands may opt 
for outsourcing of housework or take a “dual burden” of employment and housework, while 
their husbands remain employed. However, it is important to acknowledge that any real or 
perceived male incompetence in housework depends strongly on cultural conceptions of what 
men do, can do, or should do. In any case, the norm of male economic contribution to the 
family remains strong.  
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Controlling for unobserved variables was beyond the scope of this chapter. It is naturally 
possible that unobserved factors bias the estimates of the independent variables. Neither did I 
control for sample selection bias, because of a lack of suitable instruments. However, 
underlining the macho-effect hypothesis, sample selection can be an issue in the case of 
female breadwinner couples. The employment rates of men (male breadwinner + dual 
employment) whose wives were breadwinners during the previous year are generally lower 
than in the other cases, even when the partners share the same characteristics (Tables 6.7 and 
6.8). This underlines the unusual nature of female breadwinning in Europe. 
 
A comparison of Tables 6.1 and 4.5 reveals another interesting pattern. The share of dually 
employed couples estimated on the basis of the ILO-based measure of joint labour market 
attachment is often higher and the share of male breadwinner couples is lower than on the 
basis of the retrospective monthly measure used in Table 4.5. The latter is based on the 
respondents’ accounts of their main activity status, as discussed in the second section, third 
part of Chapter 4. The obvious tendency of many women to report part-time employment as 
something else than their main activity suggests that the results from this chapter may be 
conservative estimates of the macho-effect: approximately ten percent working women 
(regardless of the employment status of the husband) defined something else than paid work 
or self-employment as their main activity status, whereas the share was less than one percent 
among working husbands.  
 
Despite these possible problems, and needs for additional research,70 I believe that the results 
presented in this chapter do speak in favour of a macho-effect which affects the labour supply 
decisions couples make. At least, they throw the ball to the sceptical side of field. The results 
emphasise the importance of taking the family – and culturally held beliefs – seriously when 
analysing labour supply decisions (cf. Algan and Cahuc, forthcoming). Even though it was not 
possible to open “the black box of the couple” in terms of the meanings attached to different 
models of family provision, the analyses also emphasise the importance of analysing couples’ 
behaviour instead of general attitudes for or against female breadwinning. Curiously enough, 
                                                 
70 Furthermore, it would be interesting to estimate unemployment rationing equations (Bingley and Walker, 
2001) to evaluate the importance of involuntary unemployment. This was, however, beyond the scope of this 
paper.   
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this same belief is shared by many economists and ethnomethodologists, who usually are 
found from very opposite methodological camps. 
 
The results can be used to understand why the female breadwinner model remains so rare in 
the Western countries, despite the increase in female education, labour supply, and wages, and 
a decrease in the economic prospects of many men (e.g., Juhn and Murphy, 1997). In a New 
York Times interview, Kathleen Gerson said that “for some reason we hit a roadblock when it 
comes to single-income households where the single earner is a woman” (Dunleavey, 2007). 
Because of this roadblock, we may not see any dramatic increases in female breadwinning – 
and thus a fundamental shift in gender relations – even as women are taking over men in 
educational qualifications (Buchmann and DiPrete, 2006). For the same reason, dually jobless 
couples may remain dually jobless longer than needed, and policies targeted at increasing the 
labour supply of wives with jobless husbands may not be as effective as expected.  
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7 CHILDBEARING AND DUAL JOBLESSNESS IN EUROPE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I studied the general dynamics of dual joblessness and how gender 
shapes the transitions out of it. The focus of these chapters was implicitly on the experiences 
of the spouses, that is, adults. However, many children experience dual joblessness through 
the joblessness of their parents. Although “jobless parenthood” is mainly associated with 
single mothers, it affects children in “nuclear families” as well. We can see this from Table 
7.1. Between 1994 and 2000, an average of 12.4 percent of Irish, and 8.7 percent of Spanish 
children who lived with two parents (including step/adoption parents) experienced dually 
jobless parenthood.71 Even though household joblessness rates were higher in single-parent 
families, the fact that most European children live with two parents means that most children 
are at risk of household joblessness through dually jobless parenthood. Children with jobless 
parents have a higher likelihood of experiencing poverty. In a recent study, Stephen Nickell 
(2004: Table 3) estimated that over half of poor British children live in jobless households, or, 
the other way around, over three fourths of children living in jobless households were poor.  
 
Table 7.1. Children in (jobless) couples, 1994-2000 (%). 
 All children 
 Living with two 
(step)parents 
…who have  dually 
jobless parents 
Nordic   
Denmark 85.82 2.42 
Finland 91.09 2.89 
Continental   
Austria 91.52 2.62 
Belgium 89.36 4.88 
Germany 88.99 3.18 
France 89.26 3.14 
Luxembourg 92.47 2.24 
Southern   
Greece 96.12 2.31 
Italy 95.06 4.66 
Portugal 93.34 2.84 
Spain 95.06 8.68 
Liberal   
Ireland 93.03 12.44 
UK 84.03 7.05 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel,  
waves 1-8, monthly data of couples, father < 49 years, mother < 46 years, neither parent a student. 
                                                 
71 The trends in children’s exposure to dual joblessness are presented in Figures A7.1a to A7.1d in the Appendix 
to the chapter. In some countries, the shares fell rapidly, but in others they remained noticeably stable throughout 
the period covered.  
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Children’s exposure to dual joblessness was similar or higher than the average dual 
joblessness rates. This means that that many children were more likely to experience dual 
joblessness than adults and at least some couples with children had notably high risks of dual 
joblessness. Table 7.2 shows the rates of dual joblessness across different family types (note 
that here the age-limitation is different than previously: husband less than 49, wife less than 
46 years old; for data restrictions see Section 3 below). In some countries, such as Denmark, 
childless couples had lower or similar dual joblessness rates as couples with children. In 
Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, and especially Ireland, couples with children had 
higher dual joblessness rates. Looking at the different parity levels in more detail, couples 
with two children often had somewhat lower dual joblessness rates than those with one child 
only, whereas in most countries, dual joblessness was more common at higher parities. The 
rates were especially high among couples with four children or more (with the exception of 
Greece). Couples with children aged three years or less often had higher-than-average rates of 
dual joblessness. 
 
Table 7.2. Children and jobless couples in twelve European countries, 1994-2000 (%). 
 All 
couples 
Childless 
couples 
With 
kids 
1 child 2 kids 3 kids 4+ kids ≤ 3 years 
Nordic         
Denmark 2.30 3.05 2.07 2.49 1.36 1.33 9.78 3.47 
Finland 2.57 2.36 2.62 3.16 2.29 1.79 4.66 4.96 
Continental         
Austria 2.28 1.94 2.34 2.63 1.54 2.51 8.43 2.75 
Belgium 3.84 3.28 3.95 3.03 3.38 4.06 13.58 4.09 
Germany 2.56 1.56 2.88 2.94 1.90 5.29 5.66 5.65 
France 2.55 2.38 2.59 2.15 1.81 3.53 9.52 3.56 
Luxembourg 2.04 2.13 2.02 2.20 1.10 3.21 5.38 2.25 
Southern         
Greece 2.49 2.82 2.44 2.90 2.26 2.56 0 2.67 
Italy 4.40 4.24 4.44 4.41 3.87 5.94 10.55 4.81 
Portugal 1.87 1.43 1.95 1.24 1.52 2.98 9.15 2.75 
Spain 7.67 5.87 8.02 7.59 7.20 9.96 22.97 8.35 
Liberal         
Ireland 10.03 3.39 10.92 9.21 8.29 12.04 16.52 10.24 
UK 4.57 1.69 5.61 4.66 3.70 7.93 22.88 7.06 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, couple-months. Husband less than 
49 years old, wife less than 46 years old, neither spouse enrolled in education. 
 
These differences raise the question whether childbearing affects the risk of dual joblessness. 
A sizeable amount of literature has documented how childbearing depresses the employment 
of mothers. A smaller body of literature has found some evidence for positive labour market 
effects of childbearing for fathers (e.g., Lundberg and Rose, 2000; 2002; Lundberg, 2005). 
The decrease in mothers’ employment suggests that childbearing increases dual joblessness, 
while the possible increase in fathers’ labour supply can offset this effect. Previous research 
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offers only limited guidance. Gregg, Scutella, and Wadsworth (2004) found that the 
accumulation of joblessness was stronger among couples with children in Britain and 
Australia (cf. also Irwin and Morris, 1993; Bingley and Walker, 2001; Dawkins et al., 2002), 
whereas the opposite was true in Germany and Spain, and no differences were found in the 
United States. In Chapter 5, we also found how couples with children had lower exit rates 
from dual joblessness. However, none of the studies have focused explicitly on children and 
dual joblessness, and apart from Bingley and Walker (2001), have not controlled for 
unobserved factors. 
 
In this chapter, I estimate the effect of children on the risk of dual joblessness using fixed 
effects logit models. The models distinguish between the effects of different parity levels and 
the age of the youngest child. I also examine selection to parity levels by dual joblessness risk 
and institutional correlates of the estimated effects. The evidence in the chapter is primarily 
descriptive, that is, I do not open the “black box” of labour supply within the family. I chose 
the descriptive approach due to the lack of basic information on the link between childbearing 
and dual joblessness. 
 
The next section presents the theoretical framework for the empirical analyses. I present 
hypotheses for the effects of childbearing and of the age of the youngest child, discuss 
selection issues, and form hypotheses of the associations between the child effects and three 
key institutional factors. In the subsequent section I present the empirical models and the 
sample used. The fourth section presents the results, and the last presents the conclusions.  
 
7.2 Theory 
7.2.1 The effect of childbearing on dual joblessness 
An abundant literature shows that motherhood reduces labour supply. The reduction can be 
seen both in the employment and hours responses to motherhood, can be found through a 
wide range of countries, and has also been established by analyses that controlled for 
unobserved factors (e.g., Killingsworth and Heckman, 1987; Blau and Robins, 1991; Kravdal, 
1992; Angrist and Evans, 1998; Gornick et al., 1998; Uunk, 2005). The leading explanation 
attributes this fall to the increased value of women’s time at home due to childbirth: since 
children need care and attention, mothers value their time at home more than that in 
employment, and thus decrease their labour supplies (e.g., Becker, 1981; 1985). Becker’s 
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theory relies heavily on the notion of specialization within the family. In this scheme, 
husbands and wives divide their time between paid work and housework according to their 
relative efficiencies in each sphere. Since wives are expected to have a relative efficiency in 
housework, they are more likely than their husbands to remain at home.72 Parenthood 
strengthens such interdependency of spouses’ labour market behaviour (Lundberg, 1988). The 
behaviour of employers can also affect mothers’ employment. For example, drawing on their 
results from an experimental study, Correll, Benard, and Paik (2007) concluded that 
employers evaluated mothers less favourably than other women in terms of perceived 
competence and discriminated against mothers in their hiring decisions.  
 
The specialization thesis not only predicts a decline in the labour supply of mothers, it also 
predicts that fathers increase their labour supplies. Several studies have reported a marriage 
premium for men (Korenmark and Neumark, 1991; Loh, 1996; Petersen et al., 2006). The 
evidence on the fatherhood effects on labour supply is somewhat ambiguous, but several 
studies have found positive effects after controlling for fixed unobserved effects (Lundberg 
and Rose, 2000; 2002; Petersen et al., 2006; Choi et al., 2007; for zero effects from an 
instrumental variables approach, Angrist and Evans, 1998).73 The increase in paternal labour 
supply can be seen as a response to the financial pressures arising from family events, and the 
results support the claim that this effect is stronger than the increased demand for men’s 
home-time induced by parenthood (Lundberg and Rose, 1999; Lundberg, 2005). Furthermore, 
Correll and colleagues found that in some cases employers may evaluate fathers more 
favourably than other men with similar characteristics (Correll et al., 2007), which strengthens 
the positive effect of fatherhood on employment.  
 
The specialization thesis and the empirical evidence suggest ambiguous effects of 
childbearing on the risk of dual joblessness. On the one hand, we can expect childbearing to 
decrease wives’ employment and increase the likelihood of male breadwinning. Since single-
earner couples have a higher risk of dual joblessness than dual-earner couples (see Chapter 5), 
we can expect that childbearing increases the risk of dual joblessness. On the other hand, 
fathers can increase their labour supplies to counter this effect and protect their families 
                                                 
72 Needless to say, the objective and perceived differences in these efficiencies are shaped by cultural gender 
roles, identities, and interactions. Such “essentialist” views have also been criticized (e.g., McDonald, 2000). 
Too keep the discussion simple, and in light of the results from the previous chapter and other research, I use the 
gendered division of labour as the general framework.  
73 Curiously enough, the positive labour supply response seems stronger to the birth of sons than to daughters 
(Lundberg and Rose, 2002).  
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against financial risks such as dual joblessness. The net effect of childbearing on dual 
joblessness thus depends on the balance of these effects.  
 
However, the mechanisms involved are likely to be more complex. First, the effects of 
childbearing depend on the age of children, and specifically, on the age of the youngest child. 
Toddlers need more care and attention than older children, and parents (mothers) are more 
likely to stay at home caring for the former than the latter. Consequently, maternal 
employment is the lowest in households with small children (e.g., OECD, 2004a). Therefore, 
we need to distinguish between short-term and long-term effects of childbearing on dual 
joblessness.  
 
We can expect that the short-term effect of a birth is a reduction in maternal employment and 
an increase in the probability that the couple chooses male breadwinning. While fathers are 
expected to increase their labour supplies to compensate for the decrease in the labour supply 
of the wife, we can expect that the short-term net effect is dominated by the reduction in 
wives’ employment. Thus, the expected short-term effect of childbearing is an increase in the 
risk of dual joblessness. Below, I will refer to this effect as the “initial shock” effect. 
However, mothers are more likely to return to work as the child grows older. Accordingly, the 
initial shock effect should gradually fade away. Indeed, the total labour supply of a couple 
with older children may be even higher than the supply of a childless couple. Therefore, older 
children may decrease the risk of dual joblessness. 
 
Second, the effects of children are likely to depend on parity level. The effect of childbearing 
on female labour supply is non-linear, so that the first (two) children have the strongest effects 
(Lundberg and Rose, 2002: 252). This is also feasible from the point of view of the 
specialization thesis and everyday understanding: the marginal demand for parental time is 
higher for the first child than subsequent ones. Similarly, the fatherhood effects decrease by 
parity level (Lundberg and Rose, 2002). Consequently, we may expect that the initial effect of 
childbearing is stronger for the first child(ren), and smaller for the subsequent ones.  
 
7.2.2 Selection issues 
An alternative explanation to the variation in dual joblessness rates by parity level is naturally 
that these differences depend on the fertility patterns of couples with different risks of dual 
joblessness. However, it is not altogether clear whether couples with high risks of dual 
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joblessness would have more children than those with low risks. According to the economic 
theory of the family, fertility decisions are shaped by preferences for and the costs of children, 
the latter of which can be direct (such as nutrition, clothing, education, hobbies, and the like) 
or opportunity costs (forgone earnings due to being outside the labour market, skills erosion, 
and lost experience and seniority) (e.g., Willis, 1973; Hotz et al., 1997). In general, fertility is 
positively related to incomes and negatively related to the costs of children. However, these 
relationships are not straightforward. Instead of having more children, high income families 
can opt to invest in the “quality” of children – such as education, clothing, sports, and the like 
– or of course spend on something completely different.  
 
Because women are expected to be the ones withdrawing from employment due to parenthood 
(even for a short period), mothers face most of the opportunity costs of childbearing. 
Therefore, male employment, human capital, and earnings are expected to boost fertility, but 
the effects of female resources and labour market behaviour depend on the balance between 
the opportunity costs of childbearing (substitution effect) and the change in incomes (income 
effect). The former hypothesis has received strong support in the literature (e.g., Happel et al., 
1984; Heckman and Walker, 1990; Oppenheimer et al., 1997). The empirical evidence 
regarding the latter is somewhat mixed. For a long time, the general wisdom was that female 
human capital and employment were negatively related to fertility, thus stressing the 
opportunity costs of childbearing. However, some recent studies have reported a change in the 
relationship to a positive one (e.g., Andersson, 2000; Rindfuss et al., 2003; Adserá, 2004; see 
also Kögel, 2004; Engelhardt and Przkawetz, 2004). In general, modern women with more 
human capital continue to have their first births later, but some studies have reported that the 
effect of education on total fertility and subsequent births is less clear (e.g., Hoem and Hoem, 
1989; Blossfeld and Huinink, 1991; Martin, 2004; Vikat, 2004; Aassve et al., 2006).  
 
These theorizations and empirical results send mixed signals of the expected association 
between fertility and dual joblessness. The total effect depends on the balance of three 
different mechanisms: the effect of the husband’s human capital and employment (income 
effect), and the income and substitution effects of the wife’s human capital and employment. 
Other approaches can be used to supplement the framework. In the context of union 
formation, Oppenheimer (1988; Oppenheimer et al., 1997) argued that economic stability is a 
fundamental requirement for starting a family. In the same vein, Easterlin (1975; 1976) has 
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argued that couples postpone or forgo fertility when confronting or expecting economic 
problems. One could thus argue that to the extent that couples can anticipate weak labour 
market attachment (for example, by acknowledging their career stage and employment 
stability), couples at high risk of dual joblessness are less likely to have a child. The selection 
effects can vary according to parity level. Hakim (2000; 2003) has argued that while most 
women are responsive to economic and social incentives in planning their family and labour 
market careers, minorities (both approximately 15 percent) put either their career or family 
first and are less responsive to these incentives. Career oriented women (those with the lowest 
risks of joblessness) are the ones most likely to remain childless (and single), while family-
oriented women (those investing less in human capital and the labour market) are more likely 
to have more children than one or two. Accordingly, selection may the strongest for the first 
and three-and-above births.74 
 
7.2.3 Institutional correlates and cross-national variation in the effects of children on 
dual joblessness 
The figures in Table 7.2 showed cross-national variation in dual joblessness by parity level. 
The differences between couples with and without children were minor in some countries, but 
bigger in others. The framework presented on the expected effects of children on dual 
joblessness applies to childbearing effects within countries. However, we can expect that 
these effects vary cross-nationally and are influenced by the institutional differences between 
European societies (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Here, I will focus on three key institutions that 
can shape the effects of children on dual joblessness: support for the employment of mothers, 
direct cash benefits for families with children, and employment protection. I present the 
country values for the measures of these institutional factors in Table 7.5 in the results section 
of the chapter. 
 
We can discuss these factors from the points of view of the effects on paternal and maternal 
employment, and the resulting breadwinner pattern. Most mothers remain out of work directly 
after childbirth. This decision is likely to be rather insensitive to policies. Therefore, we can 
expect that the three institutional factors affect maternal employment mainly by influencing 
whether and when mothers enter employment after childbirth, and thus, the length of the 
period in which the couple is more likely to choose male breadwinning. Likewise, we can 
                                                 
74 However, Berinde (1999) found that in Sweden, an alternative path to a third child is university education. 
This effect may cancel out the effect of family preferences. 
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expect that institutions, which shape coupled labour market attachment through the 
employment of mothers shape the effect of the age of the youngest child.  
 
Due to the strong gendered division of labour around childbirth, couples’ risk of dual 
joblessness depends mainly on the employment of the husband. Therefore, I expect that 
institutions enforcing the employment of fathers decrease the “initial shock” effect of 
childbirth. Institutional settings can also affect the age of child–depended effect on fathers’ 
labour supply. If fathers respond to the new financial demands and the decrease in female 
employment by increasing their labour supplies, institutions that reduce these financial 
demands and support the employment of mothers can reduce fathers’ labour supply. Again, 
the final effect of the age of the youngest child on dual joblessness is complex and depends on 
the balance of different factors. 
 
The European variation in the employment of mothers is well known. This is associated with 
the European differences in family policies. In an influential article, Janet Gornick and 
collegues (1997) identified parental leave, childcare, and school schedules as key policies that 
support the employment of mothers (for the empirical evidence, Gornick et al., (1998); see 
also OECD (2001)). The widest variation in maternal employment is among mothers with 
young children (OECD, 2004a), and following the model discussed above, the early years of 
the youngest child are expected to have particular influence on the risk of dual joblessness. 
Therefore, here I limit the discussion to the effects of childcare and parental leave policies. 
 
Both micro-level and comparative research has documented how publicly provided or 
subsidized high-quality childcare enforces the employment of mothers (e.g., Blau and Robins, 
1991; Gornick et al., 1998; Uunk et al., 2004). In line with the Beckerian thesis of the family 
division of labour, childcare policies have their strongest effect on the labour supply of 
mothers with small children. Parental leave provision is another policy of interest. All 
countries in our sample have legislation against dismissals due to childbirth and motherhood. 
However, the length of paid parental leave and the wage replacement rate vary (Gornick et al., 
1998; Bettio and Prechal, 1998; Kamerman, 2000). The effect of maternal leave policies on 
the employment of mothers is somewhat ambiguous. In the short run, they can enforce 
maternal employment through job return guarantees, while in the long run, they can lead to 
loss in work experience by providing paid time off work (e.g., Ruhm, 1998). Following the 
above theoretical discussion that stresses the importance of the “initial shock” effect and 
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recovery from it, the main interest is in the short-term effects. The empirical evidence has also 
stressed the positive effects of maternal leaves on female employment (Ruhm, 1998; 
Jaumotte, 2003). Summing up, both extensive publicly supported childcare and parental leave 
policies are expected to boost the employment of mothers with small children (Gornick et al., 
1997; 1998; Uunk, 2004). Accordingly, these policies are expected to decrease the 
childbearing effect on dual joblessness through the effect of the age of the youngest child.  
 
All countries in our sample have financial policies targeted at reducing the costs of children. 
These consist of cash benefits, tax allowances, exemptions, subsidies, and services in kind 
(Bradshaw and Finch, 2002). Such policies provide families with unearned income, and thus 
reduce their labour supply. If these policies only affect the labour supply of mothers, we can 
expect that they increase the childbearing effect on dual joblessness through the effect of the 
youngest child (see Jaumotte (2003) on evidence regarding female employment). Child 
related benefits also provide unearned income for fathers. Thus they can reduce the 
fatherhood effect on labour supply, and affect dual joblessness both through the “initial 
shock” effect and the age of the youngest child–effect. However, since the responsiveness of 
female labour supply to unearned incomes is higher than male elasticity, we can expect the 
female response to dominate.  
 
Strict employment protection legislation (EPL) is expected to decrease the “initial shock” 
effect of childbearing by enforcing the employment status of fathers.75 EPL can also shape the 
age of the youngest child–effect. Employers may be reluctant to employ mothers with young 
children, either because of cultural conceptions or perceived risks linked with mothers’ 
assumed inflexibility or lower productivity due to their valuation of home time (Correll et al., 
2007; cf. Becker, 1985). EPL can strengthen these effects by increasing total labour costs for 
employers and by making employers more risk aware in their hires (cf. Esping-Andersen and 
Regini, 2001). Thus, by increasing job search times among mothers, strict EPL can lengthen 
recovery from the “initial shock”. 
 
                                                 
75 Although this is expected to apply on the general level, not all fathers enjoy strong employment protection, as 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
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7.3 Models and data 
7.3.1 Models for estimating the effects of children in each country 
The starting point for the empirical analyses is the following model: 
 
 itiititijtj jit XKIDKIDy εµϕρβα +++++= ∑ = 4
3
1
  (7.1). 
 
ity  is the dependent variable, (the probability of) dual joblessness. ijtKID  is a set of dummy 
variables, where i indicates the couple, t the month, and j indicates if the couple has one, two, 
or three children – either biological, adopted, or stepchildren. 
itKID4  is a dummy variable 
indicating that the couple has four or more children. The theoretical discussion and Table 7.1 
suggested non-linearities in the effects of children on the risk of dual joblessness, and to 
examine this possibility, parity is measured with dummy variables instead of a linear one. The 
dummy variable for four or more children was included, because estimates of the higher-level 
parities were unstable due to low cell numbers (see Lundberg and Rose (2002) for a similar 
specification). The primary interest is in the first three dummies. The other terms of the model 
are itX , a set of observed control variables, iµ , an unobserved couple-level fixed effect, and 
itε , a time-varying error term.  
 
The theoretical discussion also suggested that the effects of children vary by the age of the 
youngest child. Model (1) does not take this into account, but treats the effects of children as a 
constant shift in the risk of dual joblessness, regardless of the age of the youngest child. This 
model has a risk of being misspecified. Therefore, the second model is otherwise the same, 
but includes terms to capture the age of the youngest child: 
 
           itiititititijtj jit XAGEAGEKIDKIDy εµϕψγρβα +++++++= ∑ = 7)ln(4
3
1
        (7.2), 
 
where itAGE)ln(  is the logged age of the youngest child (in months, up to 83 months, zero 
otherwise) of couple i at month t, and itAGE7ψ  is dummy variable, which is unity if the 
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couple has a school-aged child from seven to eighteen years.76 I tested extensively for a 
correct specification using dummy variables and various parametrizations of the age of the 
youngest child. This specification functioned the best for the widest range of countries.  
 
The interpretation of the β:s is different in Models 7.1 and 7.2. In the former, they show the 
average effect of childbearing, over the years. In the latter, they give the intercept shift 
associated with childbirth. This specification can be interpreted as showing the “initial shock” 
of childbearing on the risk of dual joblessness (β), after which the effect can change as the 
child becomes older (γ). The specification thus corresponds to the theoretical discussion.  
  
Because the dependent variable is binary, logit models are appropriate methods to estimate the 
models. However, estimation with ordinary logit regression techniques yields biased estimates 
if the variables are correlated with the unobserved fixed term 
iµ . Such factors may include 
ability and work/leisure preferences (Hakim, 2000; 2003). As discussed in the third section of 
Chapter 4, a common strategy in such cases is to estimate fixed effects (FE) logit models 
which, by time-demeaning the variables in the model, eliminate the effect of the fixed effect 
and produce estimates free of heterogeneity bias (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002; Halaby, 2004). 
Some problems remain, however. First, FE models only estimate parameters for time-varying 
variables. In our case, we can only use fertility events and changes in the age of the youngest 
child for the estimation. This leads to a loss in N, so FE models are less efficient than their 
ordinary regression counterparts. This is also the case in the following analyses. Finally, in the 
presence of a correlation between itX  and itε , FE models continue to yield biased estimates 
of 
itX . For example, if couples anticipate dual joblessness, they may reconsider their plans 
for having children. I include a set of time-varying control variables to reduce this possibility. 
However, it is possible that anticipation of dual joblessness, or dual joblessness itself, affects 
fertility, in which case our estimates are biased. If we expect that (anticipation of) dual 
joblessness reduces or postpones fertility, we could expect that the FE estimates are 
downwardly biased, that is, that the real effect is higher than estimated.77 If the errors are 
                                                 
76 A similar approach was used by Korenman and Neumark (1991) to study the effects of marriage of male 
wages.  
77 Alternative methods could naturally be used. Angrist and Evans (1998) used the sex mix of the two first 
children to estimate the local average treatment effect of a third birth on labour supply. While this technique 
should give unbiased estimates, it is problematic for our use. Firstly, the use of third births naturally limits the 
scale of effects we want to estimate. Secondly, the instrument they used is rather weak, that is, the sex mix of the 
first two children has only a weak effect on a third birth. This, together with our limited sample sizes and 
especially the low propensity of third births in many European countries makes the method of limited use to us. 
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serially correlated, consistency of the estimates is also likely to suffer. According to 
Wooldridge (2002: 302), the inconsistency of the FE estimates in cases like ours can diminish 
as T increases. Since we have up to 84 points in time, the inconsistency of the FE estimates 
can be small even in the presence of serial correlation of the errors.  
 
7.3.2 Assessing selection bias 
Selection bias is assessed by comparing the fixed effects logit estimates and standard logit 
estimates without control variables, using Model 7.1: 
 
 FEjsimplej ,,
∧∧
− ββ         (7.3), 
 
where the first term refers to the estimate from the simple logit model and the latter term 
refers to the fixed effects logit estimate, at parity level j. If the difference is positive, couples 
with higher risks of dual joblessness are more likely to have j children than those with a lower 
risk of dual joblessness. While this simple comparison tells us nothing of the sources of the 
selection bias, it describes the relationship between the risk of dual joblessness and fertility. 
Estimates from Model 7.1 are preferred, because they show the average effect of childbearing 
on dual joblessness. In practice, however, the assessment of selection effects is similar 
regardless of the model used.  
 
The standard error of this difference is given by 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
An alternative would be to use differences-in-differences propensity score matching to estimate the average 
treatment effect on the treated (Heckman et al., 1997). This method is in many ways similar to the FE approach, 
although it may be better in producing less biased estimates through careful matching of couples into the treated 
(had children) and control groups (did not have children). However, identification of the causal effect using this 
method also relies on observed variables that are used to reduce the bias from time-variant factors. Because the 
method relies on events, it also leads to a loss of efficiency in the estimates. Additionally, the computation of the 
propensity scores for each country (or country group, as in Aassve et al., 2005) and for each parity level is a very 
burdensome task. Instead of fixed effects, one could use first-differencing with lagged values of the endogenous 
variables as instruments (Wooldridge, 2002: 307-309). The validity of this procedure depends on the sequential 
exogeneity assumption, where the error term needs to be independent from the previous values of the 
endogenous variables. Here this condition is unlikely to be satisfied, since the number of previous children 
indicates human capital losses for the mother. Other instrumental variables (for fixed-effects with instrumental 
variables, Wooldridge (2002: 310), such as economic conditions before the conception (i.e. 9 months before 
birth) could be used, assuming that such lagged variables do not affect dual joblessness after contemporary 
values of these variables are controlled for. Here again, many of the instruments are likely to be weak. 
Furthermore, the statistical package used (STATA 9.2) does not include fixed-effect logit estimation with 
instruments, and the estimation is beyond this chapter.  
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 2,
2
, FEjsimplej σσ +         (7.4), 
 
where 2,simplejσ  is the standard error of the simple logit model estimate and 
2
,FEjσ  is the 
standard error of the fixed effects estimate, at parity level j.  
 
7.3.3 Cross-national variation and examination of institutional correlates 
As discussed in the theoretical section, I expect that the effects of children on dual joblessness 
vary across countries. In the theoretical section, I discussed the interaction effects of three key 
factors, public support for maternal employment, cash benefits for families with children, and 
employment protection. In the discussion, I hypothesized that some of these factors mainly 
correlate with the “initial shock” of childbearing, while others correlate with the effect of the 
age of the youngest child. Thus, the model used to assess these hypotheses is based on Model 
(7.2):  
  
iktikiktl lkiktiktikt
l lkiktl lkiktiktikt
XINSTAGEAGEAGE
INSTKIDINSTKIDKIDy
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δηρβα
+++++
+++++=
∑
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==
3
1
3
1
3
1
*)ln(7)ln(
*4
 (7.5). 
 
lkINST  gives the value of the institution l in country k. Here, as a matter of simplicity, parity 
level is specified through two parameters, a linear measure of the number of children if the 
couple has three children or less (zero otherwise), and dummy variable for four children or 
more (see Lundberg and Rose (2002) for a similar specification). The institutional measures 
are interacted only with the linear term: the interactions thus apply to the first three children. 
As discussed above, the estimates of higher parities were often unstable. I estimate the 
interactions between the institutions and the age of the youngest child only for the first term, 
the log of the age of the child (in months), if the child is less than seven years old (the age at 
which children haven begun their school careers in each country). As in Model (7.2), 
heterogeneity bias is controlled by estimating a fixed-effects logit model. In this case, since 
the institutional parameters do not vary across time, we do not get an estimate of η . However, 
since the interactions between parity, the age of the youngest child, and the institutions do 
vary across time, we can estimate these interaction effects, and thus examine the institutional 
mediators of the child effects.  
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7.3.4 Sample 
I use ECHP data from eleven countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom). I excluded the Greek data 
due to a zero rate of dual joblessness in couples with four children or more, and the 
Luxembourgish data lacked crucial variables (health and EPL). I estimated the models 
separately for each country. The Dutch data do not have information on monthly employment 
status, and the Swedish data are not panel data.  
 
The age restriction of the sample differs from those in the previous chapters. For this chapter, 
I included couples in which the husband was aged 48 years or less, and the wife was up to 45 
years of age. Women above the age of 45 are unlikely to have children, and on average, the 
husband was three years older than the wife. Such a restriction should also exclude those who 
retired. I did not use lower age restrictions. Lower age restrictions reduced the sample size, 
but did not affect the estimates in an important manner, once the controls were introduced. I 
excluded students from the sample. Although this restriction reduced the number of children 
born to dually jobless parents (especially in the Nordic countries), I made it because the 
labour supplies of such couples undoubtedly differ from the supplies of those who have 
finished education. With these restrictions, the sample consisted of 17,738 couples. After 
excluding the cases with missing values, the final sample had 17,652 couples.  
 
Table 7.3. Description of the variables 
Variable  Mean  
  
Dual joblessness 0.042 
Number of children 1.57 
One child 0.288 
Two children 0.367 
Three children 0.123 
Four children or more 0.039 
Age of youngest child 6.90 
Age of wife 34.95 
Bad health husband 0.037 
Bad health wife 0.042 
Married 0.909 
Regional unemployment – men 0.084 
Regional unemployment – women  0.138 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel,  
waves 1-8, monthly data of couples, husband < 49 years, wife < 46 years, no students. 
 
Again, the couple is the unit of analysis. The dependent variable (dual joblessness) was 
constructed from the monthly main activity variable, and linked from wave t+1. Therefore, 
the data cover the years 1994 to 2000. The monthly main activity variable does not 
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differentiate mothers on maternal leave from those caring for their children outside maternal 
or parental leaves. Therefore, here dual joblessness refers to strictly to couples, in which 
neither partner takes part in paid work during the month in question.78  
 
Household members were defined as children, if they were aged 18 years or less and the 
biological, step, or adopted children of the husband. Since the “Register file” of the ECHP 
includes data on the month of birth, parity levels could be measured with monthly accuracy. 
The same applies to the age of the child, which I measured in months (starting from 1). I 
discussed the child variables above. The control variables are: age of the wife (since fertility 
events are assumed to be affected more by her than his age), age of the wife squared, bad 
health of the husband (dummy), bad health of the wife (dummy), marriage (dummy), the 
regional male unemployment rate, and the regional female unemployment rate. The control 
variables were measured annually (and thus do not vary within waves), and likewise linked 
from wave t+1. Educational attainment was not included in the controls, because the data 
restrictions excluded students and the spouses had thus mainly finished schooling, and 
educational attainment levels hardly varied across time. Year was excluded, since it is 
collinear with age and the fixed effects. Descriptive data on the variables is shown in Table 
7.3. The data were organized into an unbalanced pooled time-series cross-section with couple-
months as the unit of analysis.79 The maximum number of months is 84.  
 
7.4 Results 
7.4.1 The effects of childbearing and age of the youngest child on dual joblessness 
Table 7.4 presents the results from the fixed effects logit models. Due to space considerations, 
I do not present the estimates of the control variables. Models 1 show the effects of parity 
level from the simple dummy variables specification (Equation 7.1), and Models 2 give the 
                                                 
78 This obviously poses some interpretational problems, especially if we are interested in the welfare implications 
of dual joblessness. Maternal leaves have job return guarantees and high replacement rates (see Table A7.1). The 
picture is even more complicated because mothers (or fathers) can also stay at home on parental leaves, in which 
case job return guarantees often remain but the replacement rate is much lower. One possibility is to assume that 
all new mothers are on maternal leave (and thus with an employment contract): thus dual joblessness is 
impossible during the first weeks or months after childbirth. Although I do not do this, I discuss the issue in the 
results section. Overall, the question of whether mothers on maternal or parental leave are “really” jobless or not 
is complex. It is worth noticing that similar questions can be asked of unemployment. A non-ignorable 
proportion of unemployed workers are in fact re-employed by their former employers, and often the workers can 
anticipate this (Cahuc and Zylbenberg, 2004).  
79 Fixed effects estimation with unbalanced data may yield biased estimates if attrition correlates with the time-
varying errors (Wooldridge, 2002: 578-581). In such a case, the use of a balanced sub-sample would also risk 
bias due to sample selection. As discussed in Chapter 4, endogenous attrition should not be a major problem in 
our case.   
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estimates of childbearing and the natural log of the age of the youngest child from the second 
specification (Equation 7.2), as discussed above.  
 
In most countries, the effects of parity level from Models 1 are positive. Spain and especially 
Italy are the clearest exceptions, there the parity level effects are negative. In other words, 
childbearing seems to decrease the risk of dual joblessness. The positive effect of childbearing 
on labour supply (of the husband) would thus be stronger than the negative effect (on the 
labour supply of the wife).80 The effect of an additional child generally depends on parity 
level. In Spain the effect decreases more or less linearly, and in Portugal the effect increases 
linearly. In Denmark, France, and Germany, the estimated effect shows an inverse hump 
shaped relationship, so that the first and the third children increase the risk of dual 
joblessness, while the estimated effect of the second child is smaller (and in fact, having the 
second child seems to decrease the risk, as seen from the comparison 12
∧∧
− ββ ). Especially in 
Denmark, this may be due to small sample size. In Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom, the 
additional effect of the third child is smaller than that of the first two children. In Belgium and 
Finland, on the other hand, the additional effect of the third child is bigger than the marginal 
effects of the first two children. In Austria, the first child has a strong effect, and the estimates 
of the second and third children are slightly smaller. The estimates from the first models thus 
do not show unquestionable support for the hypothesis that the first child or first two children 
have a stronger marginal effect than the subsequent ones.  
 
The discussion so far has focused on the effects of the three first parity levels, for the reasons 
stated above. In Finland and Belgium, the estimates for the highest parity level, four children 
or more, from Models 1 are clearly higher than the other estimates. In most other countries, 
the estimate is also higher, but in line with the other estimates and their marginal effects.   
 
                                                 
80 As discussed in some more detail in the last section of the chapter, this result may also reflect unobserved 
factors not captured by the model. 
 158
Table 7.4. Effects of an additional child and the age of the youngest child on the couple’s risk of dual joblessness (fixed effects logit models) 
 Denmark Belgium France Ireland Italy Spain 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
1 child1  1.444** 
(0.401) 
2.697** 
(0.474) 
1.045** 
(0.296) 
1.623** 
(0.335) 
0.383* 
(0.155) 
1.299** 
(0.192) 
0.755* 
(0.338) 
1.335** 
(0.362) 
-0.462** 
(0.101) 
-0.359** 
(0.144) 
-0.043 
(0.089) 
0.303* 
(0.118) 
2 children1  -0.761 
(0.749) 
0.312 
(0.783) 
1.618** 
(0.401) 
2.032** 
(0.410) 
0.280 
(0.197) 
1.077** 
(0.220) 
1.494** 
(0.395) 
1.931** 
(0.406) 
-1.028** 
(0.139) 
-1.034** 
(0.161) 
-0.188† 
(0.113) 
0.102 
(0.128) 
3 children1 1.970† 
(1.026) 
1.512 
(1.100) 
3.133** 
(0.551) 
3.065** 
(0.575) 
1.038** 
(0.235) 
1.791** 
(0.251) 
2.097** 
(0.431) 
2.202** 
(0.438) 
-1.043** 
(0.190) 
-1.024** 
(0.203) 
-0.477** 
(0.156) 
-0.356* 
(0.169) 
4+ children1 1.135 
(1.772) 
0.552 
(2.219) 
5.149** 
(0.892) 
4.797** 
(0.924) 
2.072** 
(0.317) 
2.814** 
(0.334) 
2.009** 
(0.480) 
2.024** 
(0.483) 
-0.678** 
(0.247) 
-0.464† 
(0.256) 
-0.631** 
(0.224) 
-0.422† 
(0.234) 
Age young kid, 
logged (0-7 yrs.) 
 -0.648** 
(0.135) 
 -0.316** 
(0.083) 
 -0.344** 
(0.045)  
-0.222** 
(0.052)  
-0.026 
(0.037)  
-0.121** 
(0.033) 
Young. Kid 7-18 
yrs. 
 -1.903 
(0.056) 
 -0.711† 
(0.429) 
 -1.576** 
(0.214)  
-1.157** 
(0.254)  
-0.093 
(0.167)  
-0.632** 
(0.133) 
No. obs. 2295 2295 4178 4178 11727 11727 9706 9706 17951 17951 33405 33405 
No. couples 56 56 73 73 218 218 163 163 290 290 562 562 
LL -515.925 -495.023 -1379.700 -1361.644 -4319.618 -4178.518 -3713.793 -3647.100 -7518.823 -7419.417 -13269.71 -13056.59 
Χ
2 205.72 233.61 181.48 199.50 199.23 269.29 1000.53 1009.72 316.22 328.82 1122.49 1116.15 
 Portugal Finland Germany United Kingdom Austria 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
1 child1 0.073 
(0.223) 
0.815** 
(0.302) 
-0.036 
(0.382) 
1.545** 
(0.452) 
1.152** 
(0.180) 
1.090** 
(0.315) 
1.449** 
(0.187) 
1.865** 
(0.226) 
1.888** 
(0.434) 
2.644** 
(0.473) 
2 children1 0.291 
(0.275) 
0.839** 
(0.325) 
0.074 
(0.458) 
1.251* 
(0.488) 
0.699* 
(0.287) 
0.554 
(0.374) 
2.947** 
(0.237) 
3.484** 
(0.263) 
1.788** 
(0.531) 
2.474** 
(0.556) 
3 children1 0.811* 
(0.363) 
1.245** 
(0.379) 
0.574 
(0.616) 
1.098† 
(0.642) 
1.220** 
(0.340) 
1.055** 
(0.396) 
2.852** 
(0.299) 
3.376** 
(0.317) 
1.627** 
(0.590) 
2.467** 
(0.619) 
4+ children1 0.986* 
(0.441) 
1.233** 
(0.453) 
3.654** 
(1.290) 
3.911** 
(1.402) 
1.528** 
(0.400) 
1.386** 
(0.429) 
3.088** 
(0.368) 
3.569** 
(0.387) 
2.761** 
(0.696) 
3.295*** 
(0.712) 
Age young kid, 
logged (0-7 yrs.) 
 -0.141* 
(0.063) 
 -0.797** 
(0.098) 
 0.061 
(0.075)  
-0.200** 
(0.052)  
-0.253** 
(0.081) 
Young. Kid 7-18 
yrs. 
 -1.217** 
(0.287) 
 -2.803** 
(0.526) 
 -0.042 
(0.322)  
0.488† 
(0.272)  
-2.433** 
(0.419) 
No. obs. 7180 7180 2599 2599 8928 8928 8827 8827 4802 4802 
No. couples 122 122 79 79 179 179 147 147 88 88 
LL -2500.99 -2463.15 -863.629 -800.814 -3144.611 -3135.610 -2772.794 -2642.235 -1515.629 -1458.287 
Χ
2 89.24 106.53 202.54 277.22 176.37 183.33 616.67 636.84 88.38 127.20 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, monthly data of couples, husband < 49 years, wife < 46 years, no students. 
Notes: Controls (not shown): age of wife (linear and squared), bad health of husband, bad health of wife, married, regional male unemployment, regional female 
unemployment. 1 Reference group: no children; † p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Models 2 present a somewhat different picture. With the exception of Germany, the estimates 
of the first child–dummies are more positive than those of Models 1. In most countries, this is 
also true of the estimates of the higher parity levels. In some countries, the differences are 
rather striking. In Finland, the estimates of the three first parities from Model 1 are rather 
small and are not significant. However, those from Model 2 are strong and clearly significant. 
Recall that the estimates from Models 1 give the average effect of childbearing, while the 
estimates from Models 2 show the intercept shift – the “initial shock” – of childbearing on 
dual joblessness. The higher estimates from the latter models suggest that the effect becomes 
smaller as the child ages. The estimate of the natural logarithm of the age of the youngest 
child confirms this expectation. The estimate can be read as telling how much the initial effect 
decreases with a one month increase in the age of the youngest child. With the exceptions of 
Italy and Germany, the effect of the age of the youngest child is negative and significant. In 
Italy and Germany, the effects are small and not significant. Thus the “initial shock” 
hypothesis receives general support. 
 
I examine the estimates from Models 2 more closely in Figures 7.1a to 7.1d. The figures show 
the change in the effect of the first child ( 1
∧β ) according to the age of the child, until the child 
is seven years old. Similar figures can be made for other parity levels by shifting the estimated 
intercept ( j
∧β ) accordingly and using the estimate of the age of the youngest child.  
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Figures 7.1a to 7.1d. Estimated changes in the effect of the first child, by age of the child. Child aged 0-7 years. 
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Note: Calculated with 
∧∧
− γβ n  from Models 2 I Table 3 (see Equation 2). 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, monthly data of couples, husband < 49 years, wife < 46 years, no students. 
 161 
As can be seen from Models 2, the effect of childbearing decreases in most countries along 
with the age of the youngest child. Following the logarithmic specification of the effect of the 
youngest child, the parity level effect decreases most sharply during the first year of the 
child.81 The fall is most notable in Finland and Denmark. In Finland, having the first child 
increases the risk of dual joblessness temporarily, but the estimated positive effect disappears 
and becomes negative already during the first year of the child. The effect of older children is 
clearly negative. In Denmark the estimated decline is smaller, but also there the initially 
positive effect becomes small by the third year of the child. The effect is smaller or close to 
zero after the first years also in France and Belgium. The recovery is slower in Austria, the 
UK, and Ireland. Due to the higher intercepts, the effect remains positive and strong in the 
first two countries, even at older ages of the child.82 The decrease in the childbearing effect is 
even smaller in Spain and Portugal, and relatively flat in Germany and Italy. In Southern 
Europe, the small (and negative in Italy) intercept effect means that the effect remains small 
(or turns negative, as in Spain) even as the child gets older. 
 
According to these estimates, the effect of childbearing on dual joblessness is not just an 
artefact of a higher risk period during maternity leaves. The duration of paid maternity leaves 
varies from 14 weeks in Germany and Ireland to 52 weeks in Finland (see Table A7.1 in the 
appendix). In most countries, the effect remains positive even after the expiration time of 
these leaves. The main exception is Finland, where the sharp increase in dual joblessness risk 
during the first year of the child can indeed be a result of the long maternal leaves. 
 
7.4.2 Selection effects 
The results from the fixed-effects logit analyses support the hypothesis that children affect the 
risk of dual joblessness. However, it is also interesting to examine the role of selection 
processes according to dual joblessness risk. Do couples with higher risks of dual joblessness 
have (more) children? Following the discussion in the methods section of the chapter, Figures 
7.2a to 7.2k plot the logit estimates without controls and the fixed effects logit estimates of 
Model 1. The solid line shows the fixed effects logit estimates, while the dashed line shows 
the simple logit ones. If the fixed effects logit estimates are above the simple logit ones, 
couples with higher dual joblessness risks have a lower likelihood of having the number of 
                                                 
81 As discussed above, the logarithmic specification fitted the data the best for the widest number of countries.  
82 Note, however, that according to the Austrian Model 2 in Table 7.4, the effect of children of school age and 
their later teens is strong enough to bring the estimate close to zero.   
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children in question; if the fixed effects line is below the simple logit line, the situation is the 
opposite. Statistically significant differences are shown with the usual signs and are placed 
next to the fixed effects estimates.  
 
In most countries, the selection effects are small and not significant at parities up to three 
children.83 For the higher parities we can often see a wider gap between the estimates, which, 
however, is never significant due to the small number of cases. At the lower parities, the fixed 
effects estimates are higher (and significant) than the logit ones in Belgium and Austria. In the 
United Kingdom, the difference is significant (in the same direction) at parities two and three. 
In these countries, therefore, couples with high risks of dual joblessness seem to have less 
children, or at least postpone childbearing. Italy, and at parity three, Spain, are the only 
exceptions, where the opposite seems to be true. These are also the countries, in which the 
effects of childbearing on dual joblessness are negative. Even though many of the differences 
are small and not statistically significant, a comparison of the estimates from the FE models 
and the logit models seems to offer some preliminary evidence that the lower dual joblessness 
rates among couples with two children (Table 7.2) is due to selectivity: those couples have 
lower risks of dual joblessness to begin with. In most countries, there is less negative selection 
to parity three, and in Italy and Spain, more positive selection to this parity. These results are 
in line with the discussion in the theoretical section. 
                                                 
83 This may be due to the inefficiency of the FE estimates. 
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Figures 7.2a to 7.2k. Assessing selection bias: a comparison between logit models without controls and fixed effects logit models (Models 1, Table 3). 
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Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, monthly data of couples, husband < 49 years, wife < 46 years, no students. 
† p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. The significance levels refer to the difference between the estimates. 
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7.4.3 Cross-national heterogeneity: child care, benefits, and employment protection 
The estimates from Table 7.4 show rather notable cross-national variation. Both the “initial 
shock” and the effect of the age of the youngest child vary across the eleven countries. A 
natural follow-up question concerns the source of this variation. Following the discussion in 
the theoretical section, I here describe the relationship between the two child effects and three 
key institutional characteristics (support for maternal employment, financial support targeted 
at reducing childbearing costs, and employment protection). I measured support for maternal 
employment (of mothers with children under school age) using an updated index in the 
footsteps of Gornick et al. (1997). The rationale of the original index was to combine various 
institutional features that can enforce the employment of mothers with small children into a 
single measure. The index focuses on parental leaves and childcare policies. I discuss the 
updated and modified index and the measures used in it in the appendix to the chapter. I used 
an index developed by Bradshaw and Finch (2002: Table 11.2) to measure the financial 
support targeted at families with children. The index combines the different direct benefits, 
tax allowances, exemptions from charges, subsidies and services-in-kind that are targeted at 
reducing the costs of children. The particular measure used here shows the average value of 
the child support package as percentage of average earnings. The EPL index comes from the 
OECD (2004). Table 7.5 displays the country values.  
Table 7.5. Support for the employment of mothers, value of child benefit packages, and 
employment protection 
 Support for 
employment of mothers 
1 
Child family benefit 2 Employment protection 
index 3 
Denmark 2.64 11 1.2 
Finland 2.83 11 2 
Austria 1.91 21 2.2 
Germany 1.77 9 2.5 
France 2.75 12 3 
Belgium 2.78 10 2.1 
Italy 1.94 5 3.3 
Portugal  1.48 7 3.7 
Spain 2.11 2 3.1 
Ireland  1.10 19 0.9 
United Kingdom 1.65 15 0.5 
1 See appendix for details. 
2 Value of the financial support package targeted at families with children as % of average earnings. Source: 
Bradshaw and Finch (2002: Table 11.2). 
3 Source: OECD (2004).  
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The model estimated is a fixed-effects logit transformation of Equation (7.5). In the 
theoretical section, I expected that especially maternal employment supporting policies, but 
also child benefit packages interact mainly with the effect of the age of the youngest child. I 
expect EPL to correlate with the “initial shock” – that is, the intercept shift – of childbearing, 
but also with the age of the youngest child –component. I show the results of the estimation in 
Table 7.6.  
 
The results correspond rather well with the theoretical expectations. Strict EPL decreases the 
“initial shock”, but flattens the slope of the age of child –component. A possible scenario – as 
discussed above – is that strict EPL first protects the male breadwinner against joblessness. 
However, by making employment entry of mothers more difficult, strict EPL can prolong the 
duration of the male breadwinner status, and thus increase the period in which couples are at 
higher risk of dual joblessness.  
 
Table 7.6. Institutional correlates of the effects of children on dual joblessness 
 
b s.e. 
Child variables   
Number of children (if three or less) 0.634 (0.151) ** 
Four or more children 1.027 (0.110) ** 
Age of the youngest child, logged (if less than seven yrs.) 0.114 (0.065)  
Age of the youngest child 7-18 years old -0.438 (0.055) ** 
Interactions with institutions   
EPL * number of children (<=3) -0.117 (0.033) ** 
EPL * logged age of child (<7 yrs) 0.057 (0.015) ** 
Benefits * number of children (<=3) 0.000 (0.005) 
Benefits * logged age of child (<7 yrs) 0.001 (0.002)  
Maternal support * number of children (<=3) -0.076 (0.042) † 
Maternal support * logged age of child (<7 yrs) -0.182 (0.018) ** 
Control variables   
Age of mother -0.325 (0.036) ** 
Age of mother, squared 0.003 (0.001) ** 
Bad health of husband 0.558 (0.044) ** 
Bad health of wife 0.144 (0.049) ** 
Married 0.545 (0.089) ** 
Regional male unemployment 0.104 (0.005) ** 
Regional female unemployment -0.004 (0.004) 
N observations 
N couples 
LL 
Χ
2 
109,613 
1969 
-41529.765 
2745.27 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, monthly data of couples, husband < 
49 years, wife < 46 years, no students. 
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As expected, more support for maternal employment is associated with a faster “recovery 
rate” after the initial shock of childbearing: mothers in countries with more support for their 
employment can return faster to employment after childbirth, and thus decrease the couple’s 
risk of experiencing dual joblessness. The estimate for the interaction between support for 
maternal employment and the initial shock effect is also negative, but only weakly significant. 
As expected, the interaction between financial support for families with children and the 
initial shock is not significant. However, unlike expected, neither is the interaction between 
financial support and the age of the youngest child. Although a causal interpretation cannot be 
made, policies supporting the employment of mothers seem to be more important than the 
financial disincentives created by family benefits. 
 
7.5 Conclusions and discussion 
In this chapter, I analysed how childbearing affects the risk of dual joblessness. There is a 
huge literature on the motherhood effects on employment, hours worked, and wages, and a 
smaller but growing corpus of literature on the effects of fatherhood on labour market 
outcomes. Many welfare influences of childbearing function, however, through its 
consequences on the household as an economic unit. Furthermore, the employment status of 
both parents affects the economic welfare of children (in case of children living with two 
parents that constitute the majority in Europe). However, no previous studies have explicitly 
focused on the link between children and dual joblessness.   
 
The results reflect both bad news and more positive findings. The first negative conclusion is 
that on average, childbearing increases the risk of dual joblessness in most of the eleven 
European countries covered. Spain and Italy were the only countries in which childbearing 
seemed to decrease dual joblessness. The average effect is often curvilinear, but I did not find 
any patterns from which any generalisations could be made. This result can be a part of the 
explanation why childbearing has negative economic welfare implications in Europe (at least 
in the short term) (Aassve et al., 2005). One positive result is that this effect is – in most 
countries – a short-term one. An additional child generally implies a sharp initial increase in 
dual joblessness risks, which then gradually declines. In some countries, the decline is steep 
so that children beyond their first years actually decrease dual joblessness. One could ask 
whether these findings reflect a high-risk period only during the well-paid maternity leave 
period. However, with the possible exception of Finland, this does not seem to be the case. 
Instead, the positive effect of childbearing on dual joblessness lasts beyond the maternity 
 169 
leave period. From the point of view of children’s welfare, dual joblessness and poverty at an 
early stage of life can have detrimental longterm consequences (Ermisch et al., 2004; 
Heckman, 2006). Therefore, the combination of a large “initial shock” effect and a “slow 
recovery” is worst possible combination.  
 
These effects vary across the eleven countries, and correlate with the tightness of employment 
protection legislation (EPL) and the institutional support for maternal employment. A possible 
explanation is that these policies shape the childbearing effects by affecting the specialization 
of husbands and wives and the likelihood of male breadwinning. Couples generally increase 
their specialization around childbirth: the male breadwinner arrangement is then dominant. As 
seen in Chapter 5, male breadwinner couples have a higher risk of dual joblessness than 
dually working ones. Therefore, policies that promote a dual earner pattern after childbirth can 
decrease the effects of childbearing.  
 
However, institutions protecting the male breadwinner from joblessness can also reduce the 
effect of childbearing on dual joblessness. EPL is such an institution, which can promote the 
employment of male breadwinners. On the other hand, mothers wishing to return to 
employment in countries with tight EPL may have a harder time in finding a job, which 
increases the duration of the riskier male breadwinning arrangement.84 Thus, tight EPL both 
reduces and increases the effect of childbearing on dual joblessness. Support for maternal 
employment, on the other hand, shortens the period in which childbearing increases the risk of 
dual joblessness by supporting the dual earner model. Therefore, in countries like Finland and 
Denmark, which have strong institutional support for maternal employment and modest EPL, 
childbearing induces a sharp “initial shock” effect on dual joblessness, which then declines 
rapidly. In Southern European countries, where EPL is strict, but support for maternal 
employment weaker, there is a smaller “initial shock” effect, but less change in the effect as 
the child becomes older. Still in other countries, such as the United Kingdom and Ireland, 
where EPL is lax and support for maternal employment at a rather low level, the initial effect 
can be strong, and recovery slow. Such a combination of institutions can have the worst 
possible outcomes for children’s welfare. I also tested for correlations between the generosity 
of financial benefits targeted at families with children and the effects of children. Although 
                                                 
84 Results from Chapter 5 however suggest that stricter EPL can be associated is faster exit rates from dual 
joblessness.  
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one would expect them to reduce the labour supply of parents, the results did not support this 
expectation. 
 
The chapter also presented some descriptive results on selection issues. I found no evidence of 
selective childbearing patterns according to dual joblessness risks in five of the countries. In 
four, the results pointed to negative selection: that is, couples with higher risks of dual 
joblessness have less children, or at least postpone having children. This can be seen as a 
positive finding. In Italy and Spain – the two countries in which the effects of childbearing on 
dual joblessness were generally negative, the opposite was true. In general, thus, there seemed 
to be a negative correlation between the effects of childbearing and the selection into parity 
levels according to dual joblessness risks. Here it is worth recalling that the fixed effects logit 
models do not control for all unobserved factors. Therefore, the result showing that 
childbearing reduces the initial shock effect on dual joblessness in Italy can also reflect 
fertility decisions that take into account employment security and the risk of dual joblessness. 
Couples may decide to have children only when they have sufficient financial security. 
 
These descriptive results demonstrate preliminary evidence on the effects of childbearing on 
dual joblessness and the institutional contexts mediating these effects, and they provide the 
first empirical results on the topic. Although selection into parenthood according to dual 
joblessness risk factors were given only secondary attention in this paper, an interesting line 
of further research would be to focus on them – and their institutional underpinnings – more 
carefully. For example, the results suggested that selection effects may differ according to 
parity level. After all, both the labour market and demographic behaviour of parents determine 
the socio-economic circumstances in which children live (cf. Macunovich and Easterlin, 
1990). 
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Appendix to Chapter 7 
 
Figures A7.1a to A7.1d. Trends in children’s exposure to dually jobless parenthood 
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Notes: % of children living with two jobless (step)parents, of children living with two (step)parents. 
Source: Eurostat (2003) European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8, monthly data of couples, father < 49 years, mother < 46 years, neither parent a student. 
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The index for support of the employment of mothers 
The rationale behind Gornick et al.’s (1997) original index was to construct a measure that 
captures the various public policies that can affect the employment of mothers of children 
under school age (cf. OECD, 2001 for a different indexation that includes firm’s policies). 
Several policies can affect the employment of mothers and they can be substitutes to each 
other. This was the rationale for aggregating the different measures to a common index. 
 
I constructed a similar index to the one by Gornick and colleagues with updated information. 
There are some differences in the original index. First, due to data availability, I used the 
starting age of compulsory schooling instead of the share of five-year olds enrolled in 
preschool. Second, I estimated the importance of tax relief for childcare and childcare 
guarantees on a 0-1 scale with information from Bettio and Prechal (1998). Third, I measured 
paternity leave in working days (divided by 10, the maximum). Fourth, I included a measure 
of the costs of childcare into the index. And fifth, the final scale of the index is different to the 
original one. Table A7.1 shows the country values of the variables.  
 
Table A7.1. Country values of the measures used in the construction of the maternal employment 
support index. 
 DK FIN AT BE FR D IRL UK IT PRT SP 
Legislated job protection yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Coverage of mat. leave 
(% employed women) 
100 100 75 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Paid maternity leave in 
weeks 
30 52 16 15 16 14 14 18 21.5 24.3 16 
Replacement rate of 
maternity leave 
100 70 100 78 84 100 70 50 80 100 100 
Paid paternity leave in 
working days 
10 10 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Tax relief for childcare 0 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.25 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 
Guaranteed childcare for 
0-2 years old children 
1 1 0.5 0.75 1 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Guaranteed childcare for 
3 years old to school 
aged children 
1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.25 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 
Cost of childcare 8 8 13 16 34 12 30 25 12 19 6 
% children in childcare 
(<3 yrs) 
58 48 3 30 29 5 2 2 6 12 5 
% of children in 
childcare (3-school age) 
83 73 80 97 99 85 55 60 95 48 84 
Compulsory school 
starting age 
7 7 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 
Sources: Legislated job protection (Bettio and Prechal, 1998; MISSOC, various years); Coverage of maternity 
leave (Bettio and Prechal, 1998); Duration of maternity leave (OECD, 2001); Replacement rate (Kamerman, 
2000). In Belgium, the replacement rate varies between 75 and 82 percent, in the UK it decreases from 90 
percent during the first six weeks to a low flat rate during the twelve next weeks and unpaid for the rest; 
Paternity leave (Kamerman, 2000); Tax reliefs are based on evaluations of the importance of the policy based on 
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Bettio and Prechal (1998); Guarantee of child care, based on evaluations of the importance of the policy based on 
Bettio and Prechal (1998); Cost of childcare: gross amounts charged from parents (Immervol and Barber ,2005: 
Figure 2.2); Enrolment rates in public childcare (Kamerman, 2000); Compulsory school starting age (Kamerman, 
2000).  
 
I constructed the index from these values with the following formula. 
 
Support for the employment of mothers with children under the age of 7:  
0.5*{[0.5*(job protection  + (coverage of maternity leaves/100)*(duration of paid maternity 
leave/52) + wage replacement rate + coverage of maternity leaves/100 + 0.5*paternity 
benefits/10 + 0.5*tax relief for child care + guaranteed child care coverage for kid 0 to 2 
years + percent kids (0 to 2 years) in childcare – cost of childcare/100)] + (0.5*tax relief for 
childcare + guaranteed childcare coverage (3 to school age) + percent kids (3 to school age) 
in childcare + 0.25*(7 – school starting age) – cost of childcare/100}. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In this dissertation, I analysed the simultaneous joblessness of both partners of a couple, dual 
joblessness, in Europe. The poor employment performance of many European economies in 
the 1990s put strain not only on the individuals who lacked a job, but often also on their 
families. The family, therefore, is natural context in which to analyse unemployment, 
joblessness, and its consequences (Morris, 1990). An important motivation to analyse the 
distribution of work and worklessness at the household level is the finding that individual and 
household level indicators of the distribution of work can send conflicting signals (Gregg and 
Wadsworth, 2001: 778). Good labour market performance in terms of job creation and 
reductions in unemployment may go hand in hand with an uneven distribution of work 
between households. Indeed, this is precisely what many studies have found: some households 
have many working members, whereas others have none (e.g., OECD, 1998; Gregg and 
Wadsworth, 2001). This polarisation in employment is a bigger problem in some countries 
than in others (OECD, 1998; Gregg and Wadsworth, 2001; 2003; Iacovou, 2001; Gregg et al., 
2004). Quite worryingly, polarisation has increased in several countries, contributing to the 
growth in income inequality (Ercolani and Jenkins, 1998; Gregg and Wadsworth, 2001; 2003; 
Breen and Salazar, 2004).  
 
Three main factors motivated the choice to focus on dually jobless couples. Dual worklessnes 
implies a dramatic increase in poverty risks (Iacovou, 2001; Figure 2.1). There has been a lot 
of interest in the employment behaviour and problems of single parents. At the same time, 
less research has been done on joblessness of couples. However, a married (or increasingly, 
cohabiting) couple remains the norm of a European family, and most Europeans continue to 
live in households formed around couples. Therefore, dual joblessness can touch more people 
than joblessness in single-adult households. A focus on couples instead of all households also 
made analytical sense, because partners behave differently than single men and women. 
Finally, I analysed coupled joblessness instead of coupled unemployment, because many of 
the negative consequences depend more on whether or not at least the other partner is 
employed than their search for work if jobless.  
 
Previous studies have approached dual joblessness mainly by analysing the polarisation of 
employment across couples. The motivating puzzle for these analyses has often been the 
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finding that the partners of the unemployed (or non-employed) are less likely to work than 
those with working spouses. Scholars have given particular interest to the question whether 
wives increase their labour supply as a response to their husband’s unemployment. While 
some studies have provided a confirming answer, mechanisms working in the opposite 
direction often seem to be stronger. I reviewed previous results and their explanations in the 
second section of Chapter 1 and in the third section of Chapter 3. 
 
My specific aim was to contribute to the understanding of European dual joblessness by 
focusing on three areas, which I saw as deserving more attention. I recognized the lack of 
dynamic analyses of dual joblessness as an important gap in the literature. Furthermore, there 
is only one other study on the dynamics of dual joblessness, which has used comparative data 
(McGinnity, 2002). There was also a lack of an understanding of comparative differences in 
dual joblessness more generally, even though these differences are clear enough to warrant 
attention. This lack was the motivation to compare thirteen European countries, namely 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The data available, the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP), determined the choice of the countries. I discussed the data and the 
reasons for focusing on these countries in the second section of Chapter 4, and the main 
features and experiences of the countries in the 1990s in the third section of Chapter 2.  
 
Dynamic analysis can be used to decompose country differences in the rates of dual 
joblessness (or unemployment or poverty) into inflows and outflows from this status. The 
dynamics are also interesting as such. These were the motivations of Chapter 5, where I 
analysed the dynamic roots of the European variation in dual joblessness rates, and sources of 
the variation in the flows into and out of dual joblessness.  
 
One of the findings of Chapter 5 was that jobless wives with jobless husbands rarely enter 
employment before their husband. I found this result for all the thirteen countries. This gave 
the impulse for Chapter 6. Some previous studies have found that the wives of unemployed 
men may be reluctant to become the single breadwinner of the family because of cultural 
codes that govern the household division of work. This “macho-effect” can provide an 
explanation for the puzzle of the low employment rates of these women. Although discussed 
in some studies that have used quantitative data, none have explicitly tested this hypothesis. A 
test of this hypothesis was the leading motivation for Chapter 6.  
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Dual joblessness does not affect couples only; it affects their children as well. Several studies 
have analysed child poverty and its determinants. Household joblessness is a particularly 
important factor. However, none of the studies on coupled joblessness have focused on the 
link between children and coupled joblessness. In Chapter 7, I sought an answer to the 
question of whether childbearing and the age of the youngest child affect dual joblessness. I 
also analysed sources of the cross-national variation in these effects.  
 
I present the main findings of these empirical chapters in the next section. In the third section, 
I discuss some implications of these findings for research and for policy. In the fourth and last 
section, I suggest some lines for future research.  
 
8.2 Main findings 
I displayed the first empirical findings in the fourth section of Chapter 4. The rates of dual 
joblessness vary widely across Europe. The average rates of dual joblessness over the period 
(1994-2000) ranged from approximately 2 percent in Denmark to above 10 percent in Ireland. 
The rates were not stable through the period, however. In Ireland, the dual joblessness rate 
halved during the period, from approximately 13 percent in 1995 to 6 percent in 2000. The 
rate decreased rapidly also in Spain. Nor did dual joblessness hit everyone equally. Partners 
with low levels of education or health problems were at particular risk. In some countries, 
most notably in Belgium and Italy, dual joblessness was a particular problem among older 
couples (in this case, where the husband was aged 25 to 55). The problem of dual joblessness 
became even more pronounced when the time-frame was included to cover all seven years: 
one fourth of Spanish couples experienced dual joblessness during the period, and rate was 
approximately 10 percent even in Denmark.  
 
The primary aim of Chapter 5 was to analyse the dynamic roots of the European variation in 
dual joblessness. The decomposition of rates into inflows and outflows revealed that there was 
cross-national variation in both flows, and both contributed to the variation in dual joblessness 
rates. However, the variation in inflows – that is, dual joblessness incidence – was more 
important. In further decompositions, I found that the European differences in breadwinner 
models were of central importance in explaining the variation in dual joblessness incidence. 
Dual earner couples had a lower incidence of dual joblessness than male breadwinner couples. 
These two family provision forms represent the majority of European couples. In some 
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countries, particularly in the two Nordic countries, dual employment is the norm. In others, 
and especially in Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Spain, male breadwinning was 
common in the 1990s. These differences were important sources for the variation in rates of 
dual joblessness incidence. Since the spread of the dual earner model depends primarily on 
female employment levels, we can conclude that policies promoting female employment are 
also an insurance against dual joblessness (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Haataja, 2000).  
 
However, the full story is more complex. Secure employment of the male breadwinner can 
reduce the risk of dual joblessness considerably. This has been a motivating factor behind the 
strict employment protection laws in the Southern countries, but also in many Continental 
countries (Esping-Andersen, 1996). Employment security came up as a factor that decreased 
the jobless risk of male breadwinners in the empirical analyses. Employment security can be 
provided by permanent and well-protected jobs. The employment security enjoyed by male 
breadwinners was a crucial reason why dual joblessness risks were low in Luxembourg, a 
country that had a strong male breadwinner model. However, many countries have 
experienced increasing employment insecurity (DiPrete et al., 2006). Economic restructuring 
and the increases in temporary employment have made male breadwinners increasingly 
vulnerable. Male breadwinning in times of employment insecurity makes for a risky 
combination. This combination contributed to the very high dual joblessness incidence rates 
in Spain. Finally, a male breadwinner’s risk of losing his job continues to depend on such 
structural factors as his occupational and the educational levels, health, and the characteristics 
of the establishment he works in. Therefore, at least some male breadwinners and their 
families remain at a low risk of dual joblessness. The event-history models used to analyse the 
factors affecting the joblessness risk of male breadwinners explained some of the observed 
country variation, although other country differences were not fully explained.  
 
Although the variation in inflow rates was more important in explaining European dual 
joblessness rates, the variation in outflow rates (that is, duration) also contributed to these 
differences. Furthermore, the duration of dual joblessness is interesting in itself. Long-term 
unemployment reflects pronounced difficulties in securing employment, and due to its socio-
economic consequences, it can be used as a measure of social distress. Prolonged dual 
joblessness can strengthen these outcomes. The thirteen countries had wide variation in 
outflow rates from dual joblessness. Consequently, the expected duration of dual joblessness 
varied from 8 months in Finland to an astonishing 34 months in Belgium, as shown by the 
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results in Chapter 4, Section 4. One can claim that the latter provides an indication of 
underclass formation in Belgium (cf. Buckingham, 1999).  
 
Most of this variation was due to the differences in the exits from dual joblessness to male 
breadwinning. Therefore, although female employment is an important factor in reducing dual 
joblessness, it appears to function mainly by reducing the incidence of dual joblessness, not its 
duration. Most dynamics of dual joblessness were, therefore, in fact dynamics of male 
breadwinners who lost their jobs and (re-)entered employment.  
 
The European variation in dual joblessness durations is a part of the wider problem of long-
term unemployment in Europe, and can be explained with similar factors. Indeed, these 
explained the long durations of dual joblessness in Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the 
United Kingdom, and the short average duration in Finland and Austria. Dually jobless 
couples that faced rapidly changing labour markets had difficulties in entering employment. In 
line with the literature on unemployment durations, long-lasting unemployment benefits also 
prolonged spells of dual joblessness. On the other hand, wide coverage of collectively 
bargained wage deals seemed to decrease durations. A possible scenario is that by increasing 
low wages, an extended coverage of collective deals makes employment more attractive to 
dually jobless couples, which often have inferior labour market resources. I also found weak 
evidence in support of a “hump-shaped” relationship between the centralisation/coordination 
of wage bargaining and exits from dual joblessness (cf. Calmfors and Drifill, 1988). Against 
expectations, stricter employment protection also seemed to shorten dual joblessness 
durations. This can be a result of the sample of countries analysed. I also speculated (with 
some corresponding evidence) upon the possibility of some behavioural responses. Dually 
jobless couples may prefer secure employment, especially when confronted with a possible 
fall in means tested benefits after a brief spell of employment. In line with many previous 
findings, I also found that couples that received means tested benefits had lower rates of exit 
from dual joblessness. Finally, older dually jobless couples with bad health, prolonged 
joblessness, and children experienced longer durations. Overall, dually jobless couples seem 
to be rather responsive to policies that shape incentives for taking up paid work. However, it 
is obvious that since unobserved factors were not controlled, these results cannot be 
interpreted in a strict causal sense. 
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Much previous research on dual joblessness has focused on the wives of unemployed men, 
sought for the Added Worker Effect, and tried to understand why it is so hard to find. An 
explanation brought up in the ethnographic literature is that the wives of jobless men do not 
want to become single breadwinners because of the cultural inappropriateness of female 
breadwinning. This is called the macho-effect. Although some studies have discussed this 
effect, it has not yet been tested with quantitative data. Inspired by the finding in Chapter 5 
that dual joblessness hardly ever ends in female breadwinning, I sought for the macho effect 
in Chapter 6. 
 
The macho-effect hypothesis is one of ways in which partners “do gender” in their daily 
interactions. The doing gender theory explains the persistent gender differences in behaviour 
with the – often unreflected – rules that govern social interactions. The division of labour in 
the household is a classic example. The rules governing this division have changed. Women 
take an active part in employment and men have gradually increased their share of housework. 
Still, in the words of Kathleen Gerson, there seems to be “a roadblock when it comes to 
single-income households where the single earner is a woman” (Dunleavey, 2007), as we have 
already noted. Despite the increases in female employment rates, men have not withdrawn 
from the labour force, often not even to take care of their small children. Men continue to 
consider themselves, and women often consider their husbands, as the breadwinners of the 
family (Hakim, 2003). The female breadwinner remains very much an exception.  
 
There can be several other reasons why jobless women with jobless husbands do not become 
breadwinners. Men continue to have a wage advantage both in the economy at large, and 
within the family. In many European countries, women experience more difficulties in getting 
a job (Azmat et al., 2006). These can create both incentives and constraints when deciding 
between who works and who does not. Women are also more constrained by childcare 
obligations. Taking these factors into account, I formulated hypotheses of what a macho-
effect would look like in data on transitions between the partners’ joint employment statuses 
and used conditional logit modelling and simulations to test them.  
 
Did I find a macho-effect? I believe that the answer is positive. Dually jobless couples had 
very low transitions rates to female breadwinning, and female breadwinner solutions were less 
stable and more likely to transform into dual earner solutions than male breadwinner 
households. I found these patterns for the twelve European countries at large, and for Finland, 
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Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom separately. These results remained even when the 
partners had similar characteristics. To be sure, there were national differences, so the macho-
effect seemed somewhat weaker in Finland than the other three countries. I tested the results 
further at the European level. The macho-effect persisted even when the couple was young, 
childless, and not married, and husbands faced higher regional unemployment rates. Health 
problems of the husband appeared as a factor that was strong enough to oppose the macho-
effect. Sharp wage or human capital inequality in favour of the wife could also weaken it. 
However, such inequalities need to be strong to produce any significant weakening in the 
macho-effect. It is of course possible that more sophisticated models with more variables or 
controls for unobserved factors counter these results. This is a task for future research.  
 
I concluded Chapter 3 by stating that previous research on dual joblessness has found maybe 
the most conclusive support for explanations that stress the common characteristics of 
couples, the conditions of their local labour markets, and the effects of social benefits, which 
all work in the opposite direction than the Added Worker Effect. Based on Chapter 6, it seems 
that the macho-effect hypothesis can add to our understanding. 
 
Many children live with two jobless parents. I began Chapter 7 by showing the average shares 
of children who experience dually jobless parenthood, that is, the simultaneous joblessness of 
both parents, between 1994 and 2000. The rates varied widely across Europe from a low of 
two percent in Denmark to a high of twelve percent in Ireland. The rates were similar or 
somewhat higher than the average dual joblessness rates estimated elsewhere in other 
chapters. This implies that many children were at higher risk of experiencing coupled 
joblessness (through their parents) than adults, and that at least some couples with children 
had high rates of dual joblessness. This was indeed the case, as in particular couples with 
three, four, or more children often had high risks. This raised the question whether 
childbearing affects dual joblessness. 
 
I approached this question by first discussing a theoretical model in which wives are expected 
to withdraw from work following childbirth but in which husbands are expected to continue 
working or even increase their labour supplies. I expected this strengthening of the male 
breadwinner provision pattern to increase the risk of dual joblessness, following the results 
from Chapter 5. The question of how long the male breadwinner model persisted after 
childbirth depends mainly on the labour supply behaviour of mothers. The longer mothers 
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remain at home, the longer childbearing increases the risk of dual joblessness. I also discussed 
selection issues, which can affect the observed patterns.  
 
I then moved on to discuss the institutions that can affect these processes. I discussed three 
core institutions: policies that support the employment of mothers, cash benefits for families 
with children, and employment protection laws. I expected that the first two shape the effect 
of childbearing as a function of the age of the child, that is, by affecting the length of the 
period in which the mother stays at home. I expected that policies that support the 
employment of mothers shorten the male breadwinner period of the couple, and thus its higher 
exposure time to dual joblessness, while – by providing unearned income for the family – I 
expected the effects of cash benefits to function in the opposite direction. I hypothesised that 
employment protection decreases the “initial shock” effect of childbearing by protecting the 
employment of the father, while at the same time increasing the male breadwinner period of 
the couple by depressing the employment of mothers, and thus, lengthening the “recovery 
period” from the initial shock. 
 
I tested these hypotheses against the data with fixed effects logit models. These models enable 
one to control for unobserved fixed factors, but cannot eliminate possible bias from time-
variant unobservables. In most countries, childbearing increased the risk of dual joblessness, 
in the expected ways. The risk of dual joblessness increased directly after childbirth, but 
decreased gradually as the child became older. I reported some cross-national differences. The 
most visible exceptions were Italy and Spain, where the overall effect of childbearing was 
negative. Moreover, in Italy even the initial shock was negative. It seems that Italian fathers 
are able to strengthen their attachment to employment as a consequence of fatherhood, 
although it is also possible that Italian men have (additional) children once their employment 
status is secured. Again, with the exceptions of Italy and Spain, I found that couples with 
lower risks of dual joblessness had a higher likelihood of having (an additional) a child at a 
certain point in time. Fertility behaviour can thus protect children against socio-economic 
risks. 
 
The models used to explain the cross-national variation supported two of the institutional 
hypotheses. Employment protection was negatively associated with the initial shock and 
positively associated with the effect of the age of the youngest child. Employment protection 
thus seems to work in opposing ways: first by reducing the initial impact of childbearing, then 
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by slowing recovery from it. Policies that support the employment of mothers, on the other 
hand, fasten the recovery from the initial shock. The generosity of financial benefits targeted 
at families with children did not correlate with the child effects. 
 
8.3 Implications 
What are the implications of the results of this dissertation? In this section, I discuss some 
implications for research and for policy. The implications for research are of the general kind. 
I present some more specific suggestions for future research in the next section. I start with 
the implications for research. 
 
A recurrent theme running through the analyses of this dissertation is the role of male and 
female employment for dual joblessness. Female employment protects couples from falling 
into dual joblessness, while male employment helps them in getting back up. Male 
employment decreases the initial socio-economic effects of childbearing, while female 
employment affects the duration of these effects. Different cultural rules govern male and 
female employment and their role in family provision. An implication of this is that both male 
and female employment should be taken seriously.  
 
While this sounds all too obvious, it has not always been so in previous research. As discussed 
throughout the dissertation, most previous studies have analysed the labour supply of the 
wives of unemployed men. This reflects the view that male employment can be taken for 
granted, whereas women supply the additional labour of households. The rise in dual earner 
and dual career households is in partial conflict with the latter view. However, the gradual rise 
in male non-employment in many countries and especially at the low end of the skill 
distribution casts even the first assumption into increasing doubt (Faggio and Nickell, 2003).  
 
Families are a core unit of social stratification and affect the behaviour of their members. 
Research on economic inequalities, social mobility, and female labour supply are the areas 
where this has been best understood. However, labour market research would do well in 
taking family situations into account more broadly than has been the case so far. Men do not 
exist as “islands”, and men’s family situations affect their economic behaviour, which again 
has feedback effects on their family situations (Lundberg, 2005). A key argument in Chapter 7 
and Chapter 6 in particular was that cultural preconditions shape the gender divisions of 
labour and the ways families respond to economic incentives. These preconditions themselves 
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may be rather unresponsive to economic changes. Too often, social inequality research has 
either focused solely on economic factors or taken cultural preconditions for granted. The 
apparent persistence of gendered behavioural patterns also sends a signal to researchers 
analysing gender inequalities in employment and housework. Men and women continue to 
behave differently, and these differences can remain despite economic changes. This 
argument is similar to the one by Catherine Hakim (2000), who has argued that women’s 
continuously lesser involvement in the labour market often reflects their own preferences. 
 
The poverty rates presented in Figure 2.1 show clearly that dual joblessness should be of 
interest to policy makers. The pressure it puts on social security schemes only adds to this 
conclusion. The questions of male and female employment are again crucial. The analyses in 
chapters 5 and 7 stressed the important role of female employment for reducing dual 
joblessness. Female employment reduces the incidence risk of dual joblessness and the risks 
faced by families with children, and consequently, children themselves. As argued by Esping-
Andersen (1999), a promotion of female employment can be a good policy for reducing social 
inequalities and poverty (also, Haataja, 1999). This conclusion seems especially topical as job 
insecurity is on the increase and labour market regulation and welfare states are under strain. 
However, as seen in Chapter 6, the promotion of female employment as a way out of dual 
joblessness is likely to face limits. The cultural barriers that seem to stigmatise female 
breadwinning are not easy to overcome by normal policy means. 
 
This brings us back to the importance of male employment and “general” employment 
policies used to promote employment and reduce unemployment. The analyses in Chapter 5 
and Chapter 7 showed that measures to improve job security continue to be relevant as an 
insurance against labour market risks, including dual joblessness. Quite obviously, adequate 
employment protection and permanent jobs reduce the incidence risk of dual joblessness. 
Furthermore, they can support families against possible social risks induced by childbearing 
(although this initial effect can be overrun by the lengthening of the high risk period after 
childbirth). Employment protection measures can even be beneficial for dually jobless 
couples, unlike one might expect. At least, no adverse associations between dual joblessness 
duration and employment protection were found, although the results cannot be interpreted in 
a causal sense. The need for employment protection measures as an insurance against dual 
joblessness depends on the dominant family model. One could claim that the spread of the 
dual earner model reduces the need for strict employment protection (of course, employment 
 184 
protection can be defended for other reasons). What at least seems obvious is that male 
breadwinner societies need secure jobs. Job insecurity (whether through liberal employment 
protection or temporary jobs) does not work well in a male breadwinner society. Since a high 
share of temporary employment seems to be closely linked with tight employment protection 
legislation (OECD, 2004; Polavieja, 2006), promotion of the latter instead of the dual earner 
model may not, however, be a reasonable strategy in contemporary labour markets.  
 
Long-term dual joblessness can be a bigger problem than a high incidence rate of coupled 
joblessness. Couples that are dually jobless for a long period can face excessive financial and 
social strain and can lose contact with the world of work. The children of such couples can 
face difficulties in their later lives (cf. Ermisch et al., 2004). Policy makers should thus be 
interested in preventing such developments. The results from Chapter 5 suggested that dually 
jobless couples are responsive to labour market and welfare state institutions. In particular, 
exhaustion limits to unemployment compensation and the availability of jobs paying a living 
wage appeared important (on the latter, see also Gregg and Wadsworth, 2000).  
 
Much research has focused on the effects of means tested benefits. The results in Chapter 5 
suggested that couples who receive means tested benefits had lower exit rates from dual 
joblessness, although the measure I used for such benefits was not perfect. Several previous 
results also support the claim that excessive means testing creates disincentives that are likely 
to harm dually jobless couples, although Doris (1998) claimed that these findings are a result 
of model misspecifications. These studies have focused on the labour supply of the wives of 
unemployed men. Male labour supply reactions to benefit means testing have not been studied 
in this context, even though the results in this dissertation suggest that they may be more 
important in helping dually jobless couples regain contact to work.  
 
Although not covered explicitly in this dissertation, what should be of special focus are 
policies to prevent economic inactivity of prime-aged men (cf. Dorsett, 2001; Faggio and 
Nickell, 2003; Clasen et al., 2006). An optimist could see male economic inactivity as a 
possibility for renewal of the gender contract and a more active involvement of men in the 
household. This is unlikely to happen on a major scale, at least in the short-run. More likely 
outcomes are a polarisation of employment across households, an increase in idle single men, 
and further increases in single parenthood, especially at lower educational levels (Ellwood and 
Jencks, 2004; Edin and Kefalas, 2005).  
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8.2 Future research 
In this last section, I present some suggestions for future research.  
 
First, future research could build on the analyses of this dissertation. In the empirical chapters, 
I analysed aspects of dual joblessness that have not gained sufficient interest in previous 
research. The results raised several issues that warrant further analysis. One such issue 
concerns the durations of dual joblessness. As I reported in the fourth section of Chapter 4, 
dual joblessness is a highly persistent state in many countries (see also Dorsett, 2001). 
Chapter 5 suggested that this persistency depends partly on welfare state and labour market 
policies. Future analysis of these issues could benefit from analysing the role of sickness 
benefit systems in addition to unemployment compensation and social assistance. Health 
status of the partners, and especially of the husband, appeared as an important risk factor of 
(prolonged) dual joblessness. Some research has pointed to the functioning of sickness benefit 
systems as an important factor in explaining the increasing inactivity of prime-aged men 
(Faggio and Nickell, 2003; Clasen et al., 2006). A hypothesis is that these systems also affect 
dual joblessness durations. Finally, it would be interesting to analyse whether Clark’s (2003) 
findings suggesting that unemployment of the spouse decreases the adverse psychological 
impacts of own unemployment – and thus decreases exits from unemployment – can be 
replicated with other data and outside the United Kingdom. 
 
Another task for future research is a closer examination of the factors that affect children’s 
exposure to household joblessness. In the conclusions to Chapter 7, I already mentioned the 
association between dual joblessness risk factors and fertility as an interesting topic of further 
research. One could also analyse the effects of policy shifts (such as changes in childcare and 
parental leave policies, or cash benefits systems, such as the home-care allowance policies in 
Finland and Norway) on the risks of household joblessness and poverty.  
 
Obviously, the macho-effect also warrants further analysis. Despite the results in Chapter 6, 
future research with larger (national) data, more sophisticated models, and preferably, direct 
measures could add to our understanding of the cultural rules determining gendered family 
provision patterns. In this context, one should also remember the virtues of qualitative 
research, which can often inform us of processes that function behind the scene of quantitative 
data. This same conclusion applies also to research on dual joblessness in general. 
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An analysis of the longer-term trends in dual joblessness and employment polarisation would 
be an interesting topic. Some descriptive research has already been made (Ercolani and 
Jenkins, 1998; Gregg and Wadsworth, 2003). Long-term data from several countries data 
would be useful for assessing the factors behind dual joblessness that I found important in this 
study. Have the increases in female employment reduced the risk of dual joblessness? Have 
they affected the polarisation of work? What is the role of the decline in the employment of 
low-skilled men? How have changes in employment protection and wage-setting institutions 
affected dual joblessness? In this context, it would be very interesting to analyse the 
relationships between rising wage inequality, dual joblessness, and employment polarisation. 
Rising wage inequality may contribute to employment polarisation through several channels. 
Wage inequality can strengthen polarisation by increasing the labour supply of highly skilled 
workers and depressing the supply of low-skilled workers (if lower real wages stagnate). 
Since female wage elasticity is higher than male elasticity, this would happen in particular 
through the increases in the labour supply of high-wage women, who often have high-wage 
partners, and a decline (or slower increase) in the labour supply of low-wage women, who 
generally have low-wage partners (cf. Juhn and Murphy, 1997). A decrease in the wage 
elasticity of female labour supply (as suggested by Blau and Kahn (2006) for the United 
States) can counter this development. Furthermore, a decrease in the responsiveness of female 
labour supply to the wages of the husband (Blau and Kahn, 2006) would further dampen any 
additional worker effects. This kind of research could be done with the European Union 
Labour Force Survey. 
 
Finally, it would be interesting to study the long-term impacts of dual joblessness on labour 
market outcomes. Research has documented scar effects of own unemployment (Arumpalam, 
2001; Gangl, 2003; 2004; 2006). Do dual joblessness and joblessness of the spouse have 
similar effects? If spouse joblessness depresses labour supply, this can add to the scar effects 
of unemployment by increasing human capital losses and stigma in the eyes of employers due 
to increases in unemployment durations. Spouse joblessness may also mean lost contacts to 
the labour market (De Graaf and Ultee, 2000). If, on the other hand, joblessness of the spouse 
makes unemployed workers accept less optimal employment conditions that they otherwise 
would, this can carry on to their later careers.  
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